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Abstract 
The sense of agency (SoA) refers to the feeling of control towards our actions 
and their effects in the outside world. The aim of this thesis was to study SoA 
to gain a better understanding of it and how it originated, particularly in light of 
the cue integration approach to SoA. Additionally, this work aimed to bring 
greater understanding of agency changes in populations where there has been 
little or no agency research.  
To achieve this, we used paradigms that created agentic uncertainty by 
modulating external agency cues. 
We found that the susceptibility to manipulation of external agency cues 
predicted schizotypy scores in healthy adults. We also showed that SoA in 
patients with anosognosia for hemiplegia is overall dominated by their intention 
to move, while external agency cues are discounted.  
When examining changes in SoA throughout adulthood, our results suggested 
that older adults rely more on internal agency cues and discount external cues; 
we showed that this is potentially a result of increased reliance on internal 
agency cues. 
For the first time, we investigated changes in SoA in people with Mirror-touch 
synaesthesia. We found that their experience of agency is more malleable than 
in non-synaesthetes, perhaps due to an enhanced saliency of external cues in 
the creation of SoA. 
Having tested SoA in these groups, we looked at the neural mechanisms that 
might be responsible for the observed SoA changes. We used transcranial 
Direct Current Stimulation to test the contribution of right Temporo Parietal 
Junction to agency processing, in response to the same tasks used in the 
previous chapters. 
Lastly, we investigated the relationship between sense of agency and sense 
of ownership, a theme running throughout this thesis.  
We suggest that the cue integration approach is a valid framework to 
understand SoA and discuss future directions.
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CHAPTER ONE  
Introduction 
Most of our everyday actions feel like they are under our control. We commonly 
experience a fluent natural flow from our thoughts, to our actions, to the 
consequences that our actions produce in our environment. When it gets dark, 
we go and press the light switch and the light turns on. Without even realising 
it, we are continuously controlling the movements of our body and we feel that 
we are in charge of those. In other words, we have a ‘sense’ of our agency. 
The sense of agency refers to this feeling of control towards our actions and 
their effects in the outside world. 
As with many other aspects of our cognition, we take it for granted until it goes 
awry. Disturbances in sense of agency can be very dramatic. Patients with 
schizophrenia may not feel that their actions are under their control, such as 
for this patient reported by Mellor (1970): ‘‘It is my hand and arm which move, 
and my fingers pick up the pen, but I don’t control them. What they do is nothing 
to do with me’’. Changes in the sense of agency can be much subtler than this, 
but still have a considerable impact.  
In this thesis I examine these changes, whether they are dramatic or subtle. I 
will present an investigation into sense of agency in different groups, with the 
aim of understanding more about these groups while increasing our 
understanding of the sense of agency itself. In this first chapter, I present an 
overview of the concepts and previous research that is relevant to this thesis 
and I end by giving a rationale for the following experimental chapters.  
Defining sense of agency 
The sense of agency (SoA) is defined as the experience of initiating and 
controlling one’s own actions and, through them, influencing the outside world 
(Haggard, 2017; Moore & Fletcher, 2012). While in other literatures the sense 
of agency may refer to different and broader concepts (e.g. social psychology, 
Bandura, 1989), this definition draws the focus onto the experience 
surrounding a motor act.  
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The sense of agency around an action can be implicit or explicit. Synofzik and 
colleagues (Synofzik, Vosgerau, & Newen, 2008) proposed a two-step account 
of agency that distinguishes between implicit and explicit aspects of agency. 
The implicit SoA, or ‘feeling of agency’, is a low-level, pre-reflective feeling of 
being the agent of an action. That is, for implicit SoA to be formed, it does not 
require a reflective act of consciousness. The implicit agency is thought to arise 
from sensorimotor signals, such as motor signals and sensory feedback of an 
action. On the other hand, the explicit SoA, also known as the ‘judgement of 
agency’, is a high-level, reflective process that leads to the explicit attribution 
of agency to oneself or another. Various factors contribute to explicit SoA such 
as contextual information, beliefs and desires (Gallagher, 2000; Synofzik et al., 
2008). 
While these two aspects tap into different processes and certainly can be 
dissociated from one another (Dewey & Knoblich, 2014; Moore, Middleton, 
Haggard, & Fletcher, 2012; Saito, Takahata, Murai, & Takahashi, 2015), they 
are uniquely linked and interdependent (Moore et al., 2012; Synofzik et al., 
2008). In most cases, the implicit sense of agency is a necessary condition for 
the explicit sense of agency. For example, a judgement that I turned the light 
turned on, is dependent on the lower level experience of pressing the light 
switch, which in turn causes the light to come on. However, under certain 
ambiguous conditions this may not be true. For example, if many people act at 
the same time to produce a single effect, we may attribute agency over an 
event to ourselves only because we thought about making the action, while it 
was in reality caused by someone else (Wegner, 2003).  
Importantly, the circumstances and the context of an action determine the 
extent to which the implicit and the explicit aspects of agency contribute to the 
overall sense of agency. In unambiguous circumstances, the implicit SoA 
towards an action might be so strong that we are not required to form any 
further conceptual interpretation over it. However, the more the action effects 
become agent-ambiguous or arbitrary, the more importance is given to the 
explicit SoA attribution processes. Thus, the overall sense of agency is a 
‘dialectic combination’ of both low-level implicit processes and high-level 
explicit processes (Synofzik et al., 2008).  
17 
 
Measuring the sense of agency 
There are measures for both implicit and explicit aspects of sense of agency. 
Implicit measures of agency infer participants’ SoA over an action without 
asking them directly about their agentic experience. Until now, the paradigm 
that has been most commonly used in the investigation of implicit SoA is 
Intentional Binding (IB) (Haggard, Clark, & Kalogeras, 2002). This is a 
perceived temporal compression between a voluntary action and its 
consequences, i.e. the action is perceived to occur later in time, while the 
sensory effect is perceived as occurring earlier (Figure 1.1). This change in 
time perception is considered a measure of implicit SoA. IB has been shown 
to be reliable and robust in studies with both healthy and clinical populations 
(Moore & Obhi, 2012). 
 
 
Figure 1.1. Schematic representation of the intentional binding effect. During a voluntary action, the time 
of action and its effect (i.e. outcome) are perceived as shifted towards one another. The time interval 
between action and outcome is perceived as shorter than the actual interval. 
Another implicit measure of SoA is based on what is called ‘sensory 
attenuation’. Sensory attenuation refers to a reduction in the perceived 
intensity of sensations caused by voluntary actions compared to externally 
generated actions (Blakemore, Wolpert, & Frith, 1998), (Figure 1.2). This 
change in the perceived intensity of an action’s sensory effect is used as a 
measure of implicit sense of agency (e.g.  Desantis, Weiss, Schütz-Bosbach, 
& Waszak, 2012; Dewey & Knoblich, 2014). 
18 
 
 
Figure 1.2. Representation of the experimental set-up in the study conducted by Blakemore et al. (1998). 
The horizontal rod could be pressed by either the subject or the experimenter. The pressure of the rod 
was controlled so that it was the identical in both conditions. Self-produced tactile stimuli corresponded 
to less activation of the somatosensory cortex, compared to externally generated stimuli. From 
Blakemore et al. (1998).  
Unlike implicit measures of SoA, explicit measures are based on participants’ 
judgements. Participants can be asked about their agentic experience in 
different ways. For example, they can be asked to rate how much control they 
felt over an action (e.g. Sato & Yasuda, 2005; Wegner, Sparrow, & Winerman, 
2004) or to make action-recognition judgments (e.g. Daprati et al., 1997; Farrer 
& Frith, 2002; Farrer et al., 2008). Action-recognition tasks require participants 
to make self-other agency judgments while the authorship of their actions is 
made ambiguous by the experimental setting. For example, participants 
perform or control a movement and a temporal or spatial distortion is inserted 
into the visual feedback of that movement. When the distortion in the feedback 
goes past a threshold, the participants don’t recognise the actions as their own, 
even when they are. These types of tasks can be used to measure the ways 
and the degree to which the threshold varies across individuals, as an 
indication of their SoA. 
The debate on whether implicit or explicit agency measures are more accurate 
in capturing this elusive phenomenon often arises in the field of SoA research. 
Implicit measures are less vulnerable to demand effects or cognitive biases. 
However, they fail to directly capture our agentic experiences which play a 
crucial role in the regulation of our everyday life (Haggard & Tsakiris, 2009). 
Recent studies have shown how implicit and explicit measures are in fact 
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weakly correlated (e.g. Dewey & Knoblich, 2014; Moore et al., 2012). Thus, it 
is plausible that both measures are equally accurate but representative of 
different aspects of agency, perhaps mapping onto the explicit/implicit 
distinction described by Synofzik et al (2007; see above).  
Before concluding this section it is important to note that, unlike other aspects 
of our conscious experience such as visual perception, the experience of 
agency is thin and evasive (Haggard, 2005). That is, while we continuously 
perform actions, we are rarely aware of our sense of agency. As a result of 
this, measuring the SoA can be difficult and researchers are pushed to find 
paradigms that can capture this elusive phenomenon. In this work, I use 
agency illusions as an informative way to investigate the explicit SoA 
processing in clinical populations and in healthy populations that do not 
present clear disturbances of SoA. 
Theories of sense of agency 
Until recently, there have been two main competing theories of sense of 
agency. One suggested that sense of agency arises from internal processes 
within the motor system (Blakemore, Wolpert, & Frith, 2002; Frith, Blakemore, 
& Wolpert, 2000). This is also known as the ‘Comparator Model’ of SA, and it 
is based on the computational models of the motor control system (Frith et al., 
2000). 
The other main theory of SoA deemphasizes the contribution of the motor 
processes and underlines the importance of external, situational cues (Wegner 
& Wheatley, 1999; Wegner, 2002). This is the ‘theory of apparent mental 
causation’, which was developed by Wegner and Wheatley (1999) and Wegner 
(2002). According to this theory, the SoA does not arise within the motor control 
system, but instead stems from the perceived relationship between the 
intention to act and the action.  
These two theories were considered mutually exclusive, but a more recent 
approach reconciles them. The ‘cue integration theory’ proposes that both 
aspects emphasised by the theories above are equally important for the SoA. 
According to this theory, the SoA originates with the contribution of both 
internal motor signals and external situational cues (Moore, Wegner, & 
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Haggard, 2009; Moore & Fletcher, 2012). Here I outline the main concepts and 
evidence for all three theories and underline how the cue integration theory 
seems to be a promising framework for better understanding the cognitive 
process underpinning SoA. 
The comparator model of SoA 
According to the comparator model of SoA, the awareness of an action, the 
SoA, arises from the same motor processes that are responsible for the 
generation of the action itself (Frith et al., 2000). This theory is based on the 
computational forward models of motor control (Miall & Wolpert, 1996). The 
characteristic feature of ‘forward’ models is that they are based on predictions 
(Rumelhart, 1992). Figure 1.3 shows the forward model of motor control 
system reported by Frith et al. 2000. The action starts with an intention or a 
goal. Based on this, a representation of the desired state of the motor system 
is created. This representation, combined with the sensory information about 
the state of the world (i.e. affordances), is used to generate motor commands. 
A copy (called ‘efference copy’) of the motor commands is issued at the same 
time to predict the future state of both the motor system and the sensory 
consequences of a movement. This representation of the predicted state of the 
system is compared with the desired state of the system to update the motor 
commands and prevent errors in the movements. Crucially, the same 
representation of the predicted state of the system is also compared with the 
actual state of the system. In this comparison lies the sense of agency: if there 
is a match then the SoA arises, if there is a mismatch then the SoA is reduced 
or absent.  
A few studies have brought evidence in support of this tight relationship 
between sensorimotor processes and SoA (e.g. Blakemore et al., 1998; Sirigu, 
Daprati, Pradat-Diehl, Franck, & Jeannerod, 1999). Blakemore et al. (1998) 
showed that a self-produced tactile stimulus is perceived less ticklish than 
when the same stimulus is externally induced (i.e. sensory attenuation). In line 
with the comparator model, for somatosensory sensations to be attenuated to 
self-produced sensory stimuli, these stimuli need to be predicted accurately. 
This model has been used to explain various disturbances of agency such as 
anarchic hand syndrome, anosognosia for hemiplegia or delusions of control 
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characteristic of schizophrenia (Blakemore et al., 2002; Frith et al., 2000). A 
patient with delusion of control would produce an action in line with their 
intention and the action would be successfully performed. However, while 
being aware that the action matches the intention, there is an experienced 
mismatch between the predicted and actual sensory consequences of 
movement. This results in the patient feeling as though his actions are not his 
own, and instead are being controlled by an external force or agent (Blakemore 
et al., 2002). 
 
Figure 1.3. Representation of the motor control system proposed by Frith et al. 2000. The sense of 
agency arises from the comparison between predicted and actual state of the system: if there is a match 
then the SoA arises, if there is a mismatch then the SoA is reduced or absent. From Frith et al. (2000). 
The theory of apparent mental causation 
In contrast to the comparator model, the theory of apparent mental causation 
explains sense of agency in a substantially different way. According to this 
theory, sensory and motor processes are not consciously accessible and 
therefore cannot be responsible for the SoA. Figure 1.4, taken from Wegner & 
Wheatley (1999), represents how the experience of conscious will (i.e. sense 
of agency) arises. This theory distinguishes between conscious and 
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unconscious pathways that are formed around a voluntary action. There is an 
unconscious pathway that takes place in motor control system and is 
responsible for the action itself (the actual causal path). There is a second 
unconscious pathway that gives rise to action-relevant, such as intentions. 
Finally, there is an apparent path (that is conscious) that draws a link between 
the intention and the action. The relationship between thought and action gives 
rise to the sense of agency. There are specific conditions that must be met for 
the SoA to arise: priority, consistency and exclusivity. The intention must 
happen before the action, the intention and the action must be consistent, and 
the intention must be the only plausible cause of the action. Importantly, this 
conscious path responsible of the SoA is only an ‘apparent’ casual path. That 
is, the inference that the intention is the cause of the action is fallacious, as the 
unconscious processes are really responsible for the action. 
 
Figure 1.4. Model of the mental system for the production of the experience of conscious will (i.e. sense 
of agency). The sense of agency is an illusion that arises from the apparent path between conscious 
thought and action. From Wegner and Wheatley (1999).  
Different studies have supported this theory (Sato, 2009; Wegener & Wheatley, 
1999; Wegner et al., 2004). Wegner & Wheatley (1999) induced false SoA over 
movements that participants had not performed by priming the sensory 
consequences of the movement (see Figure 1.5). In this study, participants 
were asked to move the computer cursor on the screen, together with a 
confederate, presented to them as a participant. Alongside the cursor on the 
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screen, there were small images of objects displayed (e.g. swan, dog, car…). 
While moving the cursor, the participant would hear a word read out. They 
were asked to stop moving the cursor after 30 seconds signalled by the playing 
of some music. The stop did not need to be abrupt, but when the participant 
and their co-mover felt they were ready. On some trials, participants were 
primed with a word, for example ‘swan’ and the confederate was told through 
the headphones to move the cursor onto the swan. After each stop, 
participants were asked how much they intended to make the stop. Results 
showed that intentionality increased when the primes occurred five or one 
second before the stop, even when participants were in reality not responsible 
for the move.  
 
Figure 1.5. Experimental set up of the ‘I spy’ study conducted by Wegner and Wheatley (1999). 
Participants were asked to move the computer cursor on the screen, together with another participant, 
while listening to music and words and that they would stop after 30 seconds. On the screen there were 
small images displayed (e.g. swan, dog…). The other participant was in reality a confederate. On some 
trial, participants were primed with a word, for example ‘swan’ and the confederate was told through the 
headphones to move the cursor on the swan. Every 30 seconds, participants were asked how much they 
intended to make the stop. Results showed that intentionality increased when the primes occurred five 
or one second before the stop, even when participants were in reality not responsible for the move. From 
Wegner and Wheatley (1999). 
Another study by Wegner and colleagues, showed conclusively that the SoA 
does not have to be tied to motor processes, but instead is largely influenced 
by external situational agency cues. In a vicarious agency task (Figure 1.6), a 
participant was asked to remain still and look in a mirror placed in front of them. 
Another participant placed their hands where the participant’s hands would 
normally be and performed a gesture right after an instruction previewing this 
gesture had played. Participants felt SoA over movements that they did not 
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perform just by merely thinking about a movement and seeing the movement 
performed such as it was theirs. 
 
Figure 1.6. Experimental set up in Wegner et al. 2004. A participant is viewed from the front, as she 
would see herself in the mirror (left); View from the side where another participant is shown standing 
behind her with her hands forwards (right). Adapted from Wegner et al. (2004). 
These studies demonstrate that the Comparator model fails to fully explain the 
SoA (see Synofzik et al., 2008 for an extensive discussion of this) and leads 
us to reconsider the importance of external cues in the creation of SoA. 
The cue integration approach 
The comparator model of SoA and the theory of apparent mental causation 
differ substantially on where the primary source of information is for creating 
SoA. The comparator model puts emphasis on the internal processing within 
the motor control system, while the theory of apparent mental causation 
emphasises the role of external information such as environmental, situational 
cues. 
This important conceptual difference has led the two theories to be thought of 
as incompatible with each other. The ‘cue integration’ approach to SoA 
challenges this view by advocating that both sources of information, internal 
motoric signals and external cues, contribute to sense of agency. Specifically, 
the SoA is in fact the product of various cues. These cues are not additive but 
interactive and their relative influence is determined by their reliability. That is, 
various cues are optimally integrated depending on their availability and 
reliability (Moore et al., 2009; Moore & Fletcher, 2012; Synofzik, Vosgerau, & 
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Lindner, 2009). For example, in unambiguous circumstances, the motoric 
signals might be enough for the SoA to arise. The more agent-ambiguous and 
uncertain the circumstances are, the greater the number of cues that are 
weighted and integrated. 
A few empirical studies have led to this formulation (e.g. Moore et al., 2009; 
Moore & Fletcher, 2012; Synofzik, Vosgerau, & Lindner, 2009). Moore and 
colleagues used priming to modulate the SoA for voluntary and involuntary 
actions. A priming tone (high or low pitched) was presented at the beginning of 
each trial. After the priming tone had played the participant pressed a key, 
which caused an effect tone to be played (the effect tones were the same as 
the primes: either high or low). The participant was then asked to estimate the 
time interval between action and effect tone, as a measure of implicit SoA. In 
the involuntary condition, participants were instructed to not press the key. The 
key was secretly pulled down by the experimenter. The results showed that the 
primes modulated the perceived intervals for voluntary and involuntary 
movements, and crucially the modulation was greater for involuntary 
movements (Figure 1.7). This showed that conscious prior thoughts (induced 
by primes) influence SoA and that these have a greater influence on 
involuntary passive movements. In other words, external agency cues exerted 
a stronger influence on SoA when internal motor signals were weaker (when 
participant did not actively press the key).  
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Figure 1.7. Results presented by Moore et al. 2009. Intervals initiated by voluntary movements were 
perceived as shorter than those following involuntary movements. Congruency between prime and effect 
led to enhanced SoA for both voluntary and involuntary conditions. Crucially, the effect of prime was 
greater in involuntary compared to voluntary conditions. From Moore et al. (2009). 
Further evidence of the validity of this framework comes from studies with 
patients with schizophrenia (Synofzik, Thier, Leube, Schlotterbeck, & Lindner, 
2010; Voss et al., 2010). Synofzik and colleagues showed that the ability to 
attribute sensory event correctly to their own actions is impaired in patients 
with schizophrenia. In particular, agency attribution relied more on the visual 
feedback about an action that on the internal sensorimotor signals. The greater 
weighting on external cues is predicted by the cue integration framework, as it 
was shown that patients with schizophrenia have noisier, less reliable, internal 
signals (Voss et al., 2010).  
The cue integration approach provides a unifying framework that promises to 
be particularly helpful for understanding SoA processing, and SoA changes in 
different groups. Throughout the work presented in this thesis, I will use this 
framework to develop and test predictions, to identify agency differences 
across different groups and bring evidence of its validity across a broader 
range of cases. 
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Neural basis of Sense of Agency 
Neuroimaging studies as well as patient studies have helped identify some of 
the brain areas and networks involved in SoA. Here I will give a brief overview 
of the most significant findings. 
Early neuroimaging studies have looked at neural activation in action 
recognition tasks that require participants to make explicit agency attribution 
judgements (e.g. Farrer & Frith, 2002; Farrer et al., 2008). As explained above, 
in these tasks participants perform a movement and a distortion is applied to 
the visual feedback provided. These studies have consistently highlighted the 
role of the right inferior parietal cortex (Figure 1.8), and more specifically the 
right temporo parietal junction (rTPJ). While a more detailed discussion of the 
role of rTPJ in SoA will be presented later in the thesis, a general observation 
that arose from these studies is that parietal regions may be more involved in 
the loss of sense of agency, rather than the positive experience of sense of 
agency (Moore, Ruge, Wenke, Rothwell, & Haggard, 2010; Sperduti, 
Delaveau, Fossati, & Nadel, 2011). That is, parietal regions seem to be 
concerned more with a ‘‘this is not my action’’ feeling. This may be due to the 
fact that, rather than being associated with the initiation of the action per se, 
they are responsible of the monitoring and integration of different conflicting 
signals around the action. This hypothesis is partially explored in two studies 
presented in this thesis. 
 
Figure 1.8. Activation of the angular gyrus in the rTPJ for perturbed SoA and awareness of action 
discrepancy during an action recognition task. From Farrer et al. (2008). 
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One area that has been consistently associated with the positive self-agency 
is the anterior insula (Farrer & Frith, 2002; Ruby and Decety, 2001), (Figure 
1.9). The fundamental role played by the anterior insula in self-awareness is 
confirmed by patient studies. For example, insular lesions have been 
associated with anosognosia for hemiplegia (Vocat, Staub, Stroppini, & 
Vuilleumier, 2010) or somatic hallucination in epileptic patients (Roper, 
Levesque, Sutherling, & Engel, 1993). 
 
Figure 1.9. Attribution of an action to oneself activates the anterior insula bilaterally during an action 
recognition task. From Farrer & Frith (2002). 
While the aforementioned studies used explicit judgements of agency, studies 
investigating implicit SoA found that pre-frontal areas are also involved in SoA 
(Cavazzana, Penolazzi, Begliomini, & Bisiacchi, 2015; Moore, Ruge, Wenke, 
Rothwell, & Haggard, 2010). Moore and colleagues (2010) used Transcranial 
Magnetic Stimulation (TMS) to disrupt the activity of pre-supplementary motor 
area (pre-SMA) during an intentional binding task (see above). They found that 
disrupting pre-SMA reduced the binding effect, and in particular the binding of 
outcome towards actions (Figure 1.10). Similarly, a reduction in intentional 
binding effect was found by Cavazzana and colleagues (2015) by using 
transcranial direct current stimulation over pre-SMA. Although more work is 
needed to clarify the exact contribution of pre-SMA in the SoA (Javadi, 2015), 
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this area seems to play a key role in generating the positive experience of 
agency (“I did that” type experiences).  
Figure 1.10. Figure taken from Moore et al. (2010) showing changes in the perceived time of action and 
effects following theta-burst brain stimulation (cTBS) in each condition (a) and mean of overall binding 
between action and effect for each stimulation site (b). Binding effect was reduced following stimulation 
of pre-SMA. From Moore et al. (2010). 
Another prefrontal region that is involved in SoA is the dorsolateral prefrontal 
cortex (DLPFC). In particular, DLFPC was shown to play a role in selection 
between action alternatives (Rowe, Toni, Josephs, Frackowiak, & 
Passingham, 2000). In line with this, a more recent meta-analysis of tDCS 
studies of Intentional Binding concluded that the DLPFC contributes to SoA 
when participants had to freely select an action (Khalighinejad, Di Costa, & 
Haggard, 2015). 
While these are the principal areas involved in the SoA, it was recently 
proposed that the key neural correlate of SoA may reside in the connectivity 
between frontal and prefrontal areas responsible of initiating and action and 
parietal areas that monitor multiple signals relevant to SoA (Haggard, 2017). 
Sense of Agency and Sense of Ownership  
Sense of agency, as the feeling of generating or controlling an action, is a key 
aspect of self-awareness. A second fundamental aspect of self-awareness 
consists of the sense of ownership (SO). The sense of ownership refers to the 
feeling that I am the one that is moving, regardless of whether the movement 
is voluntary or not (Gallagher, 2000).  
In voluntary actions, SoA and SO usually coincide (e.g. an agent voluntarily 
moves their limb), however these two components of self-awareness can be 
experienced separately. For example, in the case of an involuntary action, the 
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subject has no experience of control (thus no sense of agency), while still 
experiencing sense of ownership over the part of the body that moved. 
Conversely, a subject with delusions may report controlling other people’s 
actions, showing sense of agency towards the action itself but not sense of 
ownership towards the executor of the action. 
SoA and SO can also be selectively impaired (De Vignemont, 2007). Patients 
with the Anarchic hand syndrome show a selective disturbance of SoA, as they 
experience movements of the hand that are perceived as alien to the patient’s 
volition. Patients with the Alien hand syndrome show a selective disturbance 
of ownership by reporting a sense of disownership towards their own hand.  
Various studies have tried to clarify the nature of the interplay between agency 
and ownership (e.g. Braun, Thorne, Hildebrandt, & Debener, 2014; Tsakiris, 
Schütz-Bosbach, & Gallagher, 2007), but this remains unclear (Ma & Hommel, 
2015; Tsakiris, Longo, & Haggard, 2010; Tsakiris, Prabhu, & Haggard, 2006). 
One view suggests that SoA entails body-ownership (additive model), viewing 
agency as an addition to the somatic experience of ownership. Another view, 
based on the existence of selective deficits of SO or SoA, along with results 
from behavioural and neuroimaging studies (e.g. Tsakiris et al., 2010) have 
suggested that SoA and SO are two independent experiences (independent 
model).  
An extensive investigation of the relationship between agency and ownership 
is beyond the scope of this thesis. However, there will be un underlying 
discussion about it, as gaining understanding of one may help with the 
understanding of the other.  
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Rationale for experiments within the thesis  
In this chapter, I have summarised the concepts that are fundamental to the 
development of this work.  
The aim of this thesis is to study SoA with the principal intention of a) gaining 
a better understanding of SoA itself and how it originated, particularly in light 
of the cue integration approach to SoA, and b) improving our understanding of 
agency changes in populations where there has been little or no agency 
research. These two objectives bring mutual gains to each other: by 
investigating agency in groups that deviate from those normally studied (i.e. 
young neurotypical adults) we gain unique insight into the mechanisms of 
agency processing. At the same time, improving our understanding of the basic 
mechanisms involved in sense of agency will help us better understand, and 
remedy, agency processing problems.  
The paradigms used throughout the thesis have been inspired by previous 
studies investigating explicit sense of agency (Farrer et al., 2008; Wegner et 
al., 2004). Their characteristic feature is that they aim to create agentic 
uncertainty. As visual illusions provide a unique window into normal visual 
processes (Gregory, 2009), authorship illusions give access to aspects of 
agency processing that would normally be hidden. By modulating external 
agency cues we were able to test specific predictions about SoA changes in 
both clinical and healthy populations. Importantly, these predictions were 
developed on the basis of the cue integration approach framework.  
With these aims in mind, I have investigated changes in explicit SoA in relation 
to schizotypy (chapter 2), in patients with anosognosia for hemiplegia (chapter 
3), older adults (chapter 4) and mirror-touch synaesthetes (chapter 5). These 
groups have been chosen with two principal motivations. Firstly, there were 
good reasons to expect changes in SoA in these groups (Cioffi, Moore, & 
Banissy, 2014; Fotopoulou et al., 2008; Metcalfe, Eich, & Castel, 2010; 
Synofzik et al., 2010) but they have been very little or not at all investigated. 
Secondly, as SoA is such a fundamental component of our daily lives, acquiring 
knowledge of how SoA works in these groups can potentially have great impact 
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on future research that looks into improving the wellbeing of these specific 
populations.  
After having tested SoA in these groups, I looked at the neural mechanisms 
that might be responsible for the observed SoA changes (chapter 6). 
Specifically, I used transcranial Direct Current Stimulation to test the 
contribution of right Temporo Parietal Junction to agency processing in 
response to the same tasks used in the previous chapters. 
Lastly, chapter 7 addresses the underlying discussion about the relationship 
between SoA and SO. This was investigated directly by testing the interplay 
between illusory experience of ownership and agency. 
This thesis concludes with a general discussion, where I present key findings, 
limitations and directions for future research. 
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CHAPTER TWO  
Schizotypy and the vicarious experience of agency  
Aberrant experiences of agency in schizophrenia may be characterised by 
changes in the relative influence of different agency cues, with external cues 
being more dominant. Here we test this hypothesis in a healthy sample by 
examining the relationship between schizotypy and performance on a 
vicarious agency task, where external agency cues are deliberately 
manipulated. 
Introduction 
Over 100 years after being so named, schizophrenia is still considered one of 
the least understood and costliest mental disorders (Van Os, Linscott, 
Delespaul, & Krabbendam, 2009). Around one in 130 individuals are likely to 
develop schizophrenia in their lifetime (Saha, Chant, Welham, & Mcgrath, 
2005). Symptoms of schizophrenia can be classified into ‘positive’ and 
‘negative’ symptoms. Positive symptoms are characterised by the presence of 
perceptions (e.g. visual hallucinations) or delusional beliefs. Negative 
symptoms consist in the absence, or reduction, of adaptive functions such as 
emotional understanding, speech or abstract thinking (Kay, Fiszbein, & Opler, 
1987). Within the positive symptoms category are included abnormal 
experiences of agency. Patients with schizophrenia may feel that their actions 
are not under their own control. Instead they may feel that someone else or an 
external force is causing them to move. These phenomena are known as 
passivity symptoms. An example is provided by (Mellor, 1970), with the patient 
reporting, ‘It is my hand and arm that move, and my fingers pick up the pen, 
but I don’t control them. What they do is nothing to do with me.’  
Interestingly, while patients with schizophrenia are inclined to experience a 
lack of agency towards their actions, action-recognition studies in 
schizophrenia show that patients tend to show an excessive SoA (Daprati et 
al., 1997; Franck et al., 2001). That is, when patients were asked to distinguish 
between theirs and someone else’s actions, they were consistently more likely 
to attribute the actions to themselves. For example, Daprati and colleagues 
asked patients with schizophrenia to perform simple finger and wrist 
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movements whilst their hand was hidden from view. Instead, the image of their 
hand or an alien hand was presented on a screen in real time (Figure 2.1). 
When asked to determine if the hand on the screen was their own or not, 
patients with schizophrenia were more likely to attribute the alien hand to 
themselves. 
 
 
Figure 2.1. Representation of the experimental set up in Daprati et al. (1997) The subject (S) performs 
simple hand movements without being able to see their hand directly. Instead, with the use of two mirrors 
(M1 and M2), the participant is presented with a live recording of either their hand or the experimenter’s 
one (E). Patients with schizophrenia were more likely to misattribute the experimenter’s hand to 
themselves. From Daprati et al. (1997). 
More recent studies found that these altered experiences of control are 
associated with specific agency-processing changes (Synofzik, Thier, Leube, 
Schlotterbeck, & Lindner, 2010; Voss et al., 2010). Synofzik and colleagues 
used an agency attribution paradigm in which participants were required to 
perform pointing movements in a virtual reality set-up. They were provided with 
a modified visual feedback of their pointing movements. The results showed 
that the patients were less able to detect distortions of their pointing in the 
visual feedback. Importantly, when asked to estimate their pointing direction, 
they relied more on their visual feedback than on their sensorimotor cues.  
Within the cue integration approach to SoA (chapter 1), these studies strongly 
support the hypothesis that SoA in schizophrenia is characterised by a 
reduction in the contribution of internal sensorimotor cues, coupled with an 
increased contribution of external cues (Moore & Fletcher, 2012).  
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In the experiment presented in this chapter, we provide a direct test of this by 
examining the relationship between schizotypy and performance in a paradigm 
testing the influence of external agency cues. The choice to use a healthy 
population to investigate agency in schizotypy was based on evidence that 
psychotic experiences lay on a continuum. That is, the same symptoms that 
are seen in patients with schizophrenia can be measured in non-clinical 
population (Van Os, Linscott, Delespaul, & Krabbendam, 2009) (Figure 2.2). 
Preliminary studies have found that people who are highly schizotypal show 
an abnormal sense of agency (Asai & Tanno, 2007), but the mechanisms 
behind these changes are still unknown. Using the vicarious agency paradigm, 
we aim to shed light on these.  
 
Figure 2.2. Representation of how psychosis varies along a continuum. Subclinical psychotic 
experiences and subclinical psychotic symptoms are associated with a degree of distress and help-
seeking behaviour that do not necessarily amount to clinical psychotic disorder. From van Os et al. 
(2009). 
In the vicarious agency illusion set-up, the experimenter’s hands are extended 
on either side of the participant in a body-congruent posture. Participants also 
wear headphones through which action previews are played. These previews 
are either congruent or incongruent with subsequent actions of the 
experimenter. Wegner et al. found that the participant’s experience of 
controlling these movements was increased when the previews were 
congruent with the experimenter’s action.  
This paradigm neatly demonstrates the influence of external situational agency 
cues (action previews and experimenter-made movements) on the sense of 
agency. These cues can lead people to experience a sense of agency over 
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movements that are not their own (i.e. in the absence of internal sensorimotor 
cues). Given the putative link between schizotypy and schizophrenia, we 
predict that in the vicarious agency task, changes in the experience of control 
will be predictive of schizotypy. More specifically, the modulation of SoA 
induced by the illusion should be greater for those scoring higher on our 
measures of schizotypy, reflecting an increased reliance on external agency 
cues.  
Methods 
Participants 
A total of 53 participants took part in the experiment (46 females; mean age: 
20 years; age range: 17-35 years). All participants had normal or corrected-to-
normal vision and no history of mental illness.  
Procedure 
The description of the vicarious agency task is largely taken from Cioffi et al. 
(2017), (in appendix). 
Vicarious agency task 
All participants performed the vicarious agency task first. Participants sat on a 
chair facing a full-length mirror at a distance of 1m. Participants wore over-ear 
headphones on which were played the action previews. A blue sheet covered 
the participants’ body from the shoulders downwards and a blue curtain was 
placed behind their back to block their view of the experimenter (see Figure 
2.3). 
Participants’ arms were placed out of view under the sheet. The experimenter 
put on another set of headphones to hear the instructions, a blouse that was 
the same colour as the sheet covering the participant and a pair of white 
gloves. The experimenter was positioned behind the curtain. The experimenter 
placed their arm (either left or right) forward through two specific holes in the 
curtain, so that it appeared where the participant’s own arm would have been. 
Participants were asked to look at the mirror in front of them while the 
experimenter performed the gestures with either the left or the right hand and 
to remain still during the experiment.  
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A tape with a list of 16 unimanual action instructions was played (e.g., “make 
a waving gesture,” “snap the fingers twice”, “point to the mirror”). The examiner 
performed an action immediately after each instruction. Each instruction-action 
stimulus, consisting of one instruction plus action performed by the 
experimenter, lasted between 8 and 10 seconds with a three second break 
between stimuli.  
There were two within-subject conditions. In the match condition, the action 
corresponded to the instruction; whereas in the mismatch condition each 
instruction was randomly matched with a different action (e.g. after the 
instruction “make a waving gesture” the examiner snapped their fingers). In 
this mismatch condition, the gesture was different for every repetition of the 
same instruction (e.g., on the second repetition, after the instruction “make a 
waving gesture” the examiner pointed to the mirror). These conditions were 
completed for both the right and left hand separately. The order of match – 
mismatch conditions and the order of hand tested were counterbalanced 
across participants. The list of 16 instruction-action stimuli was repeated from 
the beginning to the end without interruption 3 times for each of the four 
conditions (match/mismatch and left/right hand), so as to augment the effects 
of this manipulation. The list of 16 action instructions was kept identical for the 
entire experiment, only the actions performed by the experimenter changed 
accordingly to the condition. 
At the end of each condition participants were asked to report their experiences 
by answering 3 questions on a 7-point scale from 1 - not at all - to 7 - very 
much (this was done for each hand and the judgements were averaged across 
hands). In total, each participant was given 12 instruction-action list repetitions 
(i.e. 3 repetitions for each of the 4 conditions) and provided 4 ratings for each 
of the questions reported below. 
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The questions were similar as those included in Wegner et al.’s (2004) study: 
1) Anticipation: ‘’To what degree did you feel you could anticipate the 
movements of the arm?”  
This control question assesses the success of the manipulation and whether 
the primes were attended to. This was included because a failure to attend to 
the primes may explain any putative performance differences in the two 
groups. If primes are attended to then anticipation judgements should be 
higher in the match than in the mismatch conditions. This question also serves 
as a control for any response bias (e.g. general tendency of one group to report 
higher or lower ratings).  
2) Sense of Agency: ‘’How much control did you feel you had over the 
arm’s movements?” 
This target question directly assesses the experience of agency. 
3) Sense of Ownership: ‘’To what degree did the arm feel like it belonged 
to you?’’  
This question provides an additional measure of the effect of the manipulation, 
examining the impact on sense of ownership over the body part.  
A practice session consisting of 3 match and 3 mismatch trials was performed 
at the beginning of the experiment. 
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Figure 2.3. Experimental set-up. Pictured here is the side view (left) and participant view (right). The 
experimenter sits behind the curtain hidden from the participant’s view and places his arm forward in a 
body congruent position. The participant sits in front of the mirror where she can see the arm as her own. 
The participant hears instructions through the headphones and observes the action being performed. In 
the match condition instructions and actions are congruent, while they are incongruent in the mismatch 
condition. From Cioffi et al. (2017) 
Schizotypy scales 
After the vicarious agency task, participants completed two schizotypy scales. 
The Peters Delusion Inventory (PDI), (Peters, Joseph, Day, & Garety, 2004), 
is a 21-item scale designed to measure delusional ideation in the normal 
population (e.g. “Do your thoughts ever feel alien to you in some way?”). When 
an item is endorsed, three five-point scales exploring distress, preoccupation, 
and conviction are then completed (Figure 2.4). The Cardiff Anomalous 
Perceptions Scale (CAPS), (Bell, Halligan, & Ellis, 2006), is a 32-item scale 
designed to measure unusual perceptual experiences in the normal population 
(e.g. “Do you ever see things that other people cannot?”). When an item is 
endorsed, three five-point scales exploring distress, intrusiveness, and 
frequency are then completed (Figure 2.5). The validity and reliability of both 
measures has been previously demonstrated (Bell et al., 2006; Peters et al., 
2004). 
According to dimensional perspectives, higher scores on these scales position 
an individual closer to the psychopathological end of the putative “normal”- 
“psychopathological” continuum (e.g. Peters et al., 2004). 
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Figure 2.4. Example of an item from the Peters Delusion Inventory (Peters et al., 2004). When an item 
is endorsed, three five-point scales exploring distress, preoccupation, and conviction are completed. 
 
Figure 2.5. Example of an item from the Cardiff Anomalous Perceptions Scale (Bell et al., 2006). When 
an item is endorsed, three five-point scales exploring distress, intrusiveness, and frequency are then 
completed. 
Results 
Vicarious agency task 
We replicated the basic vicarious agency effect. There was a main effect of 
Condition (Match/Mismatch), with mean anticipation, control and ownership 
judgements higher in the match vs. mismatch conditions (F (1,52) = 131.99,  
p < .001, η2partial = .72). There was also a main effect of Question 
(Anticipation/Agency/Ownership), with overall levels of anticipation higher than 
control or ownership (F (2,104) = 39.79, p < .01, η2partial = .44). Finally, there 
was a significant interaction between Condition and Question  
(F (2,104) = 46.16, p < .001, η2partial = .47), with the effect of our manipulation 
being strongest for anticipation (Figure 2.6). 
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Figure 2.6. Mean ratings for Anticipation Agency and Ownership in Match and Mismatch conditions. 
Participants showed consistently higher ratings in the match conditions compared to the mismatch 
conditions. 
Schizotypy scales 
To calculate the PDI and CAPS total scores for each participant, a 1 was 
scored for each “yes” response, 0 was for each “no” response, and was 
summed across all items. Added to this were the scores for the participant’s 
answers to the three additional 5-point scales for each “yes” response. 
Summary statistics for total scores and sub-scale scores are presented in 
Table 2-1. 
Table 2-1. Mean scores on the 21 Item Peters Delusion Inventory (PDI) and Cardiff Anomalous 
Perceptions Scale (CAPS). Standard deviation of the mean in parentheses. 
 
Mean (SD) 
PDI CAPS 
Total 53.6 (38.0) 64.4 (48.0) 
Distress 16.6 (13.0) 19.0 (15.2) 
Preoccupation 16.1 (12.7) 20.1 (15.3) 
Conviction 16.9 (12.8) 16.8 (14.3) 
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Relationship between vicarious agency and schizotypy 
In order to examine the relationship between vicarious agency and schizotypy, 
we ran two separate hierarchical linear regression analyses for the CAPS and 
PDI respectively. The predictor variables were differences in mean judgements 
(match – mismatch) for control, anticipation and ownership experiences 
respectively. Given our initial hypothesis that individual differences in the 
experience of control would predict schizotypy scores, ‘control’ was entered 
into the model first followed by the two remaining judgement types (which were 
entered simultaneously into the linear regression model). The results are 
presented in Table 2-2. For CAPS, control was a significant predictor of CAPS 
total scores. This relationship is plotted in Figure 2.7. No other judgement types 
were predictive of CAPS. For the PDI no judgement types were significant 
predictors of PDI total scores (Figure 2.7). These results partially support our 
initial hypothesis – control did predict schizotypy but only for CAPS measure.  
Table 2-2. Output for separate hierarchical linear regression analyses assessing the relationship 
between CAPS and PDI total scores (dependent variables) and mean judgement differences (match – 
mismatch) for the three judgement types (predictors). 
CAPS Beta Standard error of beta Standardised beta 
Step 1    
Constant 52.16 8.30  
‘Control’ 9.03 3.95 .31* 
Step 2    
Constant 46.07 13.75  
‘Control’ 11.19 4.96 .38* 
‘Anticipation’ 2.34 3.38 .10 
‘Ownership’ -4.57 4.97 -.16 
 
PDI Beta Standard error of beta Standardised beta 
Step 1    
Constant 46.06 6.71  
‘Control’ 5.54 3.19 .24 
Step 2    
Constant 45.74 11.17  
‘Control’ 7.47 4.03 .32 
‘Anticipation’ .45 2.74 .02 
‘Ownership’ -3.43 4.03 -.15 
 
Note: CAPS: R2 = .09 for Step 1, ΔR2 = .02 for Step 2 / PDI: R2 = .06 for Step 1, ΔR2 = .01 
for Step 2.   * < 0.05    
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Figure 2.7. Scatterplot depicting the relationship between CAPS total scores and mean agency 
judgement differences (match – mismatch). The magnitude of the agency illusion is predictive of CAPS 
total scores. (Above) Scatterplot depicting the relationship between PDI total scores and mean agency 
judgement differences (match – mismatch). (Below) 
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Discussion 
We explored the relationship between schizotypy and the susceptibility to 
illusory experience of agency in a group of young adults. Schizotypy was 
measured with two scales, PDI and CAPS. We showed that the magnitude of 
illusion of vicarious agency predicted CAPS scores. That is, people with higher 
schizotypy scores experienced a great effect of agency illusion.  
Recent findings suggested that the experience of agency in patients with 
schizophrenia seems to be dominated by external agency cues, coupled with 
reduced reliability of internal sensorimotor cues (Synofzik et al., 2010; Voss et 
al., 2010). Here, we have tested this hypothesis by investigating the 
relationship between schizotypy and the susceptibility to an agency illusion, 
which was achieved through the manipulation of external agency cues. Our 
results showed that a stronger influence of external cues is predictive of higher 
schizotypy scores in a healthy adult population. These findings are consistent 
with the hypothesis that agency processing in schizophrenia is characterised 
by an increased reliance on external cues. However, future studies should 
extend this investigation to patients with schizophrenia.  
Importantly, we have found a relationship between agency illusion and CAPS, 
but not with PDI. In other words, the malleability of the agency experience 
seems to be associated with hallucinatory symptoms rather than with 
delusional beliefs. At first glance, this may look surprising given that abnormal 
experiences of agency are normally classed as delusions (Nordgaard, Arnfred, 
Handest, & Parnas, 2008). However, this result may be explained by the 
largely perceptual nature of the task. The vicarious agency task has a very 
strong perceptual component: both auditory and perceptual cues have to be 
processed in order for the vicarious agency illusion to emerge, while internal 
sensorimotor information is weak as the participant is asked to not move 
throughout the experiment. Future studies looking at agency in patients with 
schizophrenia may attempt to further investigate the relationship between 
agency changes and delusional versus hallucinatory symptoms.  
Our results showed that the agency illusion was uniquely predictive of 
schizotypy, as no relationship was found between schizotypy and the illusion 
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of ownership. Recent findings have been challenging the idea that 
schizophrenia presents a selective deficit in the SoA (see Klaver & Dijkerman, 
2016 for an extensive discussion). For example, patients with schizophrenia 
have been consistently been found to be more susceptible to illusions of 
ownership induced by the rubber hand paradigm (e.g. Thakkar, Nichols, 
Mcintosh, & Park, 2011). Importantly, a recent study from Garbarini et al. 
(2016) showed that when an agentic component is added (i.e. the presence of 
a hand is combined with the hand moving), the SoA seems to be the aspect of 
self-awareness that is primarily impaired in schizophrenia. These results 
combined with the present findings support the view that patients with 
schizophrenia experience a predominant disorder of agency. 
In this chapter, we have shown that the susceptibility to vicarious experience 
of agency is linked with schizotypy. More specifically, we found that the 
strength of the influence exerted by the external agency cues is predictive of 
schizotypy scores, with higher scores corresponding to stronger the influence. 
These results are informative, increasing our understanding agency 
abnormalities in schizophrenia while providing further insights in agency 
processing.  
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CHAPTER THREE  
Sense of agency and anosognosia for hemiplegia: 
investigating changes in susceptibility to illusory 
experiences of control. 
Research suggested that patients with anosognosia for hemiplegia may be 
discounting external feedback around their own movements, while over-relying 
on their intention to move. Here we investigate anosognosic patients’ SoA with 
a task that manipulates external agency cues. Importantly, for the first time our 
study will include the healthy limb. 
Introduction 
Anosognosia is defined as the apparent inability to recognise one’s deficits. 
The term was coined by Babinski (1914) from the Greek “  ”,  
 = without,  = disease,  = knowledge, to describe the behaviour 
of patients with right brain damage who denied their hemiplegia.  
Anosognosia for hemiplegia (AHP) is a neuropsychological condition following 
brain damage (Karnath & Baier, 2010). The reported incidence of anosognosia 
is extremely varied. For example, Jehkonen and colleagues (2006) reviewed 
anosognosia studies between 1995 and 2005 and found that its incidence 
would vary from 8% to 27% of stroke patients. These unprecise estimates are 
a consequence of many factors, such as the multifaced nature of the 
phenomenon (see Orfei, Caltagirone, & Spalletta, 2009, for a detailed review 
of assessment factors) and its change over time (Vocat, Staub, Stroppini, & 
Vuilleumier, 2010), (Figure 3.1). Furthermore, AHP manifestations can be very 
different. Some patients may believe that their limbs are completely functional, 
even when they are faced with opposite evidence. For example, some patients 
when asked to clap their hands and confronted with the evidence that no sound 
is produced, they still believe that they were involved in the action. Other 
patients may instead provide excuses (confabulations) to justify the lack of 
movement, for example ‘my arm is tired’, ‘I could walk at home, but not here 
because it is slippery’ (Nathanson, Bergman, & Gordon, 1952).  
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Figure 3.1. Evolution of awareness for the motor deficit over time. Anosognosia was present in almost 
two thirds of the patients at onset, in around one third after three days and in one fifth a week later. 
Anosognosia was rarely present after six months. From Vocat et al. (2010) 
Early accounts of anosognosia proposed that this is caused by a disconnection 
between the left (language dominated) hemisphere and the right (sensory) 
hemisphere (Geschwind, 1965). This would prevent patients from accessing 
and expressing information about their impaired limbs. Others proposed that 
AHP is caused by a psychological defence mechanism against negative 
emotions caused by the injury (Weinstein & Kahn, 1950). More recently it has 
been argued that AHP may be due to more general cognitive impairments, 
such as confusion or self-evaluation processes (e.g. Levine, 1990). However, 
while all these factors may contribute to anosognosia, they do not seem to be 
able to fully explain it.  
More recent accounts of AHP have suggested that this is the result of a 
malfunctioning motor control system. These approaches draw on 
computational models of the motor system (Frith, Blakemore, & Wolpert, 2000; 
Miall & Wolpert, 1996) (e.g. Figure 3.2). As explained in chapter 1, according 
to these models the action starts with an intention or a goal. Based on this, a 
representation of the desired state of the motor system is created. This 
representation, combined with the sensory information about the state of the 
world (i.e. affordances), is used to generate motor commands. A copy (called 
‘efference copy’) of the motor commands is issued at the same time to predict 
the future state of both the motor system and the sensory consequences of a 
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movement. This representation of the predicted state of the system is 
compared with the desired state of the system to update the motor commands 
and prevent errors in the movements. Crucially, the same representation of the 
predicted state of the system is also compared with the actual state of the 
system. In this comparison lies the sense of agency: if there is a match then 
the SoA arises, if there is a mismatch then the SoA is reduced or absent.  
 
Figure 3.2. Computational model of the motor system. From Frith et al. (2000) 
Various explanations of anosognosia are inspired by this model of motor 
control and sense of agency. The ‘motor intention deficit’ theory suggested that 
anosognosia is due to a lack of intention to move (Heilman, Barrett, & Adair, 
1998). If the intention is not present, then the efference copy of the motor 
system cannot be created. In turn, the comparator is not able to detect any 
mismatch between predicted and actual state leading to an unawareness of 
the motor impairment (Figure 3.3).  
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Figure 3.3. Computational model of the motor system with representation of where the deficit would be 
if anosognosia was due to lack of motor intention. The patient does not formulate the intention to perform 
the action. Modified from Frith et al. (2000). 
However, subsequent findings provided evidence against the ‘motor intention 
deficit’ theory (Berti, Spinazzola, Pia, & Rabuffetti, 2007; Garbarini et al., 
2012). Berti et al. (2007) looked at proximal muscles activation using 
Electromyogram (EMG) measures. It was found that patients with hemiplegia 
both with and without AHP following right brain damage showed left proximal 
muscle activation when asked to perform movements, although they were not 
able to perform them. Based on this new evidence, Berti and colleagues 
hypothesised that patients with AHP have a preserved intention for movement. 
They create an appropriate representation of the desired state of their motor 
system, but they are unable to detect a discrepancy between the desired and 
the actual state of the system (Figure 3.4).  
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Figure 3.4. Computational model of the motor system with representation of where the deficit would be 
if anosognosia were caused by a deficit in detecting discrepancy between desired and actual state of the 
movement. The patient formulates the action needed to fulfil their intention and is aware that the action 
initiated is appropriate. No information about the actual position of the limb is available to indicate that 
no action has actually occurred so a discrepancy can’t be detected. From Frith et al. (2000) 
This hypothesis was supported by findings from Fotopoulou and colleagues 
(2008). In this study, a group of four hemiplegic patients with AHP were asked 
to move their paralysed hand or to remain still. They were presented with false 
visual feedback of their left paralysed arm through the use of a rubber hand. 
Their ability to visually detect the movement of the hand varied based on 
whether they were instructed to move it or not. Patients with AHP were more 
likely to ignore the visual feedback of a hand that did not move (and claim that 
they had moved it) when they were instructed to move it, compared to when 
they expected an experimenter to move their hand or when they expected no 
movement at all. These results suggest that AHP patients’ not only have 
preserved intention to move, but that the intention prevails over any sensory 
feedback about their movement. 
The cue integration approach to SoA (chapter 1) provides a useful framework 
to understand AHP (Moore et al., 2009; Synofzik et al., 2009). AHP patients’ 
sense of agency seems to be completely influenced by pre-motoric signals 
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associated with their intention to move, while visual, proprioceptive and 
external cues are largely discounted. In this chapter we test this hypothesis, 
by systematically investigating SoA in AHP with a task that is aimed to elicit the 
patients’ intention to move and deliberately manipulates the external visual 
cues around the movement.  
Moreover, for the first time we will investigate AHP patients’ SoA by looking at 
their experience of agency not only around their impaired arm but also around 
their healthy arm, allowing us to gain an understanding of their SoA for the limb 
that is seemingly unaffected. By looking at SoA in the healthy arm we aim to 
provide insights on whether AHP is a disorder specific to the paralyzed limbs 
or more a general disorder of motor awareness. 
Lastly, AHP’s severity and its functional impact is influenced by the presence 
of other body awareness disturbances. The belief of not being paralysed, 
which is characteristic of AHP, can be associated with a disturbed sense of 
ownership towards the impaired arm. For example, patients may attribute their 
limbs to others, such as in the case of somatoparaphrenia (Feinberg et al., 
2010), or experience them as not belonging to them, or completely missing, 
such as in the case of asomatognosia (Loring, 2015). While disturbances of 
sense of agency and ownership have been found to often coexist in patients 
with brain damage and hemiplegia (Baier & Karnath, 2008), not all patients 
with AHP also report disturbance of body ownership (Cutting, 1978). One of 
the aims of the experiment presented in this chapter is to further investigate 
the relation between SO and SoA in AHP. 
In the following study, hemiplegic patients with and without AHP, and healthy 
controls completed the so-called vicarious agency task originally developed by 
Wegner, Sparrow, & Winerman (2004). In this paradigm, the experimental 
setting is designed such that the participant is led to feel SO over the 
experimenter’s arm and SoA over the experimenter’s arm movements. The 
task requires participants to look in front of them, towards a mirror. Gestures 
are performed by the experimenter hidden behind the participant in such a way 
that the gestures look like they are being performed by the participant’s hands. 
The gestures seen in the mirror can be either congruent with the action 
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instructions heard over a pair of headphones (match condition) or incongruent 
(mismatch condition). Action instructions are designed to induce the intention 
to move in the participants, that are asked to remain still. This leads 
participants to plan the movement without being instructed to do so. 
Participants are then asked to report their feeling of agency and ownership 
over the gestures of the hand. If AHP patients discount external visual agency 
cues, we predict that their sense of agency (and perhaps ownership) would 
not be modulated by the gestures performed in the mirror. 
Methods 
Participants 
Brain damaged patients 
A group of 15 stroke patients (average age = 56.4, sd = 13.01; four females) 
with unilateral right hemisphere damage took part in this study. All participants 
were right handed. Demographics are reported in Table 3-1.  
Motor and general cognitive assessment 
Only patients with contralesional (i.e. left) motor impairment for the upper limb 
were considered for the study. Motor impairment was assessed with the 
Motricity Index (Wade, 1992). This test assesses the three core movements of 
the upper arm: ‘pinch grip’, ‘elbow flection’ and ‘shoulder abduction’. For each 
of these movements the participants’ arm was given a score between 0 (no 
movement) and 33 (normal movement). The total score is therefore calculated 
by adding the score for each movement plus one, with the total ranging 
between 1 (severe motor impairment) and 100 (no motor impairment). 
Extrapersonal neglect was assessed with the Clock Test (Mondini, Mapelli, 
Vestri, & Bisiacchi, 2003) and their general cognitive state was measured with 
the Mini Mental State Examination (Folstein, Folstein, & McHugh, 1975). 
Neuropsychological data is reported in Table 3-1. 
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Table 3-1. Demographic and neuropsychological data of 15 right brain damaged patients. Note: HP = 
presence of hemiplegia without anosognosia, AHP = presence of anosognosia for hemiplegia. F/M = 
female/male. RBD = right brain damage. 
PATIENT GROUP GENDER AGE 
VATA-
UPPER LIMB 
MOTRICITY 
INDEX 
P1 HP M 75 1 83 
P2 HP M 68 1 83 
P3 HP M 33 1 72 
P4 HP M 52 1 0 
P5 HP M 49 1 71 
P6 HP M 64 2 47 
P7 AHP M 72 4 76 
P8 AHP M 61 4 0 
P9 AHP M 65 5 23 
P10 AHP F 72 14 0 
P11 AHP F 49 4 0 
P12 AHP F 41 14 0 
P13 AHP F 50 11 11 
P14 AHP M 68 8 24 
P15 AHP M 63 5 0 
.  
Anosognosia assessment 
To assess the presence of explicit anosognosia for hemiplegia of the upper 
limb, all patients were tested with the Visual-Analogue Test for Anosognosia 
for Motor impairment (VATAm) (Della Sala, Cocchini, Beschin, & Cameron, 
2009). In this test, patients are required to rate (on a scale from 1 = no problem 
to 3 = problem) their ability to perform simple motor tasks that require the use 
of both hands or legs (Figure 3.5). Four questions that elicit obvious answers 
are also included as ‘check questions’, for example: ‘Do you have any difficulty 
drinking from a glass?’ or ‘Do you have any difficulty in juggling five balls in the 
air?’. These questions are aimed at monitoring poor comprehension, 
perseveration behaviour or lack of compliance. The scores to these check 
questions are not considered in the final score. The participants’ self-
evaluation is compared with ratings of their caregivers who also filled the 
questionnaire evaluating the patient’s motor skills. For the purpose of this 
study only the eight items testing the performance of the upper limbs were 
used. 
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The resulting upper limb score is calculated by subtracting the patient’s ratings 
of the 8 tasks from those of their caregiver (i.e. caregiver - patient discrepancy). 
The score represents the patient’s degree of awareness about their upper limb 
motor impairment. The score ranges from -24 (negative values indicate that 
the patient overestimates the motor deficit) to +24 (positive values indicate that 
the patient underestimates the motor deficit). According to the normative data 
provided by Della Sala et al.(2009), values falling between 3.8 and 8.0 indicate 
mild anosognosia, values between 8.1 and 16.0 represent moderate 
anosognosia and values between 16.1 and 24 are representative of severe 
anosognosia.  
Nine patients showed anosognosia for hemiplegia (AHP) and six patients 
showed hemiplegia without anosognosia (HP) (Table 3-1). 
 
 
Figure 3.5. Example of VATAm questions and the visual analogue scale used for ratings. Example of a 
standard question (a). Example of check questions (b) and (c). Visual - analogue scale (d). From Della 
Sala et al. (2009).   
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Control participants 
A group of 20 healthy adults matched by age acted as controls. All participants 
were right-handed, their average age was 60.2 years old (SD = 15.9, age 
range = 30-77). 
Procedure 
The task required participants to look in front of them, towards a mirror. 
Gestures were performed by the experimenter hidden behind the participant 
in such a way that the gestures look like they were being performed by the 
participant’s hand (Figure 4.4). The gestures seen in the mirror were either 
congruent with the action instructions heard over a pair of headphones (match 
condition) or incongruent (mismatch condition). Participants were asked to 
report their experiences by answering three questions on a 7-point scale with 
1 being “not at all” and 7 being “very much’’. 
The questions were similar as those included in Wegner et al.’s (2004) study: 
1) Anticipation: ‘’To what degree did you feel you could anticipate the 
movements of the arm?”  
This control question assesses the success of the manipulation and whether 
the primes were attended to. This was included because a failure to attend to 
the primes may explain any putative performance differences in the two 
groups. If primes are attended to then anticipation judgements should be 
higher in the match than in the mismatch conditions. This question also serves 
as a control for any response bias (e.g. general tendency for one group to 
report higher or lower ratings).  
2) Sense of Agency: ‘’How much control did you feel you had over the 
arm’s movements?” 
This target question directly assesses the experience of agency. 
3) Sense of Ownership: ‘’To what degree did the arm feel like it belonged 
to you?’’  
This question provides an additional measure of the effect of the manipulation, 
examining the impact on sense of ownership over the body part.  
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As the procedure of the vicarious agency task was identical to the one 
described in chapter 2, further details can be found there. 
 
Figure 3.6. Experimental set-up (based on Wegner et al., 2004). The left picture shows what the 
participant sees in the mirror placed in front of her. The right picture shows the set up from the side, with 
the experimenter sitting behind the participant and putting her hand forward so that it appears where the 
participant’s hand would normally be. 
Results 
Non-parametric statistics were used as data failed the Shapiro-Wilk test of 
normality (p < .05).  
The majority of AHP patients failed to show a difference between match and 
mismatch for the impaired arm in the Anticipation check question (see below 
preliminary analysis on Anticipation). As this did not allow us to exclude that 
attentional differences may be responsible for observed changes in SoA and 
SO, we did not consider the data for the impaired arm. The following analysis 
and results on SoA and SO refer to the healthy arm data only. For controls, 
where both arms were healthy, an average between left and right arm ratings 
was used, as no differences between left and right hand were found.  
Anticipation 
Anticipation was measured by asking participants ‘To what degree did you feel 
you could anticipate the movements of the arm?’. 
This question serves as a control, to check that potential changes observed in 
agency and ownership are not due to differences in attention or any response 
bias. 
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A preliminary analysis on anticipation scores was carried out.  
We calculated the difference scores between match and mismatch ratings for 
anticipation for both the impaired and the healthy arm. Seven out of nine AHP 
patients did not report higher anticipation in match conditions compared to 
mismatch conditions (i.e. match – mismatch < 1) for the impaired arm. As 
attentional problems for the contralateral arm could not be ruled out, we 
decided to not run the full analysis on the impaired arm data. 
Equally, patients who did not report higher anticipation in match conditions 
compared to mismatch conditions (i.e. match – mismatch < 1) for the healthy 
arm were removed from the analysis. Two AHP participants (P7-P8) were 
removed from the sample. Figure 3.7a shows the mean anticipation judgments 
in the three groups plotted as a function of instruction-action congruence (i.e. 
match and mismatch conditions). Means and standard deviations are reported 
in Table 3-2. A Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test showed that the participants of all 
three groups reported significantly higher anticipation in the match than in the 
mismatch conditions (Controls Match vs Controls Mismatch: Z = -3.995,  
p < .001; HP Match vs HP Mismatch: Z = -2.232, p = .026; AHP Match vs AHP 
Mismatch: Z = -2.555, p = .011). This suggests that all three groups paid 
attention to instructions and actions. 
Kruskall-Wallis tests showed that the three groups did not differ in Anticipation 
ratings in the match conditions (p = .109) but differed in mismatch conditions 
(p = .001). Post-hoc t-tests revealed that AHP patients reported higher 
anticipation than HP patients (p = .002) and Controls (p < .001) in the mismatch 
conditions.  
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Sense of agency 
The SoA was measured by asking participants ‘How much control did you feel 
you had over the arm’s movements?’. Figure 3.7b shows mean agency 
judgments in the three groups plotted as a function of instruction-action 
congruence (i.e. match and mismatch conditions). Means and standard 
deviations are reported in Table 3-2. A Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test showed that 
Controls reported significantly higher agency in the match than in the mismatch 
conditions (Controls Match vs Controls Mismatch: Z = -2.944,  
p < .003). HP patients equally reported higher ratings in match than in 
mismatch conditions, although this was just above significance (HP Match vs 
HP Mismatch: Z = -1.857, p = .063). Equally, AHP patients showed higher 
agency ratings in the match compared to the mismatch conditions (AHP Match 
vs AHP Mismatch: Z = -2.06, p = .039). This replicates Wegner’s original 
findings showing an effect of congruent instructions on the SoA. 
Kruskall-Wallis tests revealed that the three groups differed in Agency ratings 
in match conditions (p = .030) and in the mismatch conditions (p = .003). Post-
hoc t-tests revealed that AHP patients reported higher agency than Controls in 
the match conditions (p = .026) and in the mismatch conditions (p = .002). This 
suggests that AHP patients experienced higher sense of agency in both match 
and mismatch conditions. 
Sense of Ownership  
The sense of ownership was measured by asking participants ‘To what degree 
did the arm feel like it belonged to you?’. Figure 3.7c shows mean agency 
judgments in the three groups plotted as a function of instruction-action 
congruence (i.e. match and mismatch conditions). Means and standard 
deviations are reported in Table 3-2. A Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test showed that 
Controls reported significantly higher ownership in the match than in the 
mismatch conditions (Controls Match vs Controls Mismatch: Z = -3.318,  
p = .001). HP patients and AHP patients did not show any significant 
differences between match and mismatch conditions (HP Match vs HP 
Mismatch: Z = -1.342, p = .180, AHP Match vs AHP Mismatch: Z = -.816,  
p = .414). 
68 
 
Kruskall-Wallis tests revealed that the three groups did not differ in Ownership 
ratings in neither match (p > .250) nor mismatch conditions (p = .197). 
Figure 3.7. Mean ratings for anticipation (a), agency (b) and ownership (c) for Controls, aware patients 
(HP) and anosognosic patients (AHP). AHP patients show higher sense of agency in both match and 
mismatch conditions compared to controls. Error bars show standard deviation. 
 
Table 3-2. Average ratings for each question and conditions obtained from Controls, patients without 
anosognosia for hemiplegia (HP) and with anosognosia for hemiplegia (AHP). Standard deviation in 
brackets. 
Question Condition Controls HP patients AHP patients 
Anticipation Match 6.13 (1.1) 5.2 (1.2) 4.86 (1.1) 
 Mismatch 1.05 (.22) 1 (0) 2.14 (1.21) 
Agency Match 2.33 (1.86) 3.33 (1.877) 4.72 (2.36) 
 Mismatch 1.1 (.22) 1.67 (1.04) 3.29 (2.06) 
Ownership Match 2.58 (1.08) 2.2 (1.61) 3.58 (2.94) 
 Mismatch 1.45 (.72) 1.33 (.82) 3.14 (2.86) 
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Discussion 
The primary aim of this study was to investigate SoA in anosognosia for 
hemiplegia by including, for the first time, an investigation on the healthy limb. 
We did so by testing the susceptibility to the vicarious experience of control in 
patients with hemiplegia with and without anosognosia, and in a group of 
healthy participants. The use of the vicarious agency illusion paradigm (based 
on Wegner et al. 2004) enabled us to directly test the influence of internal and 
external cues to the SoA in anosognosia. This is particularly relevant in a group 
such as patients with hemiplegia, where testing the role of sensory feedback 
can be problematic. 
Our results showed that patients with AHP had stronger feeling of agency, in 
both the match and mismatch conditions. These results are in keeping with 
previous findings suggesting that motor awareness in patients with AHP is not 
influenced by external feedback and instead mostly dominated by motor 
intentions (Fotopoulou et al., 2008). In our experiment, the gesture instructions 
had the role to generate the intention to move. This was sufficient for AHP 
patients to feel a strong SoA towards the actions seen in the mirror, regardless 
of whether these were congruent or incongruent with the instruction. With 
regards to the models of anosognosia, this finding supports the hypothesis that 
AHP patients have preserved intention to move and they are unable to detect 
a discrepancy between their intended movement and the actual state of the 
movement (Berti et al., 2007; Frith et al., 2000).  
In the context of the cue integration approach to SoA, our findings strongly 
suggest that efferent pre-motor cues predominate in AHP, while external visual 
agency cues are largely discounted. If AHP patients’ SoA was entirely 
dominated by intentions and sensorimotor predictions, we would expect no 
modulation induced by the congruency of the condition (match or mismatch). 
Interestingly, patients with AHP still showed a difference between match and 
mismatch conditions. This could be due to implicit processing taking place (see 
Cocchini, Beschin, Fotopoulou, & Della Sala (2010) for explicit/implicit AHP 
double dissociation). Alternatively, this could be attributed to the mild to 
moderate degree of anosognosia shown by our sample. Patients with severe 
AHP may not present this match-mismatch modulation, showing a complete 
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dominance of pre-motor signals associated with their intention to move over 
external visual feedback.  
Our results also speak to the debate on whether unawareness in anosognosia 
is selective to the impaired arm, or it is a more generalised condition. For the 
first time, we have shown that the disturbance of SoA, which manifests in the 
impaired limb, extends to the healthy limbs. While AHP it is not considered a 
general disorder of unawareness (Jehkonen, Ahonen, Dastidar, Laippala, & 
Vilkki, 2000), our data suggests that SoA impairment may be generalised.  
This result points towards new directions for therapeutic intervention with a 
more comprehensive focus. In particular, these interventions may involve 
behaviourally increasing the weighting that patients with AHP give to external 
visual feedback. 
To date, we know of various strategies aimed at better managing AHP but no 
effective treatment is currently available (see Jenkinson, Preston, & Ellis, 2011, 
for a review). One of the aims of the experiment presented in this chapter was 
to contribute to AHP understanding with the intention of laying the groundwork 
for designing effective treatments. Notably, the impact of unawareness in 
patients after stroke is significant. AHP can considerably affect motor 
rehabilitation (Gialanella, Monguzzi, Santoro, & Rocchi, 2005) and it is linked 
to a poorer prognosis (Appelros, Karlsson, Seiger, & Nydevik, 2002) as well as 
reduced likelihood of returning to independent living (Pedersen et al., 1996). 
With regards to the SO, our data does not highlight any differences between 
patients with and without AHP, and controls. Some studies support the 
suggestion that there might be a strong connection between AHP and 
disturbances of body ownership (e.g. Baier & Karnath, 2008). Others underline 
the existence of double dissociations between AHP and disturbances of body 
ownership and support the hypothesis of two independent systems for SoA 
and SO (e.g. Invernizzi et al., 2013). Our data seems to support the latter view, 
by showing an alteration of SoA not accompanied by altered SO. Our study is 
limited to patients with mild or moderate AHP. Further studies should aim to 
investigate whether the same result is replicated in patients with severe 
anosognosia.  
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Furthermore, our study included patients with right brain damage only. Given 
the evidence that the right hemisphere is heavily involved in SoA and more 
generally in body self-awareness (e.g. Tsakiris, Costantini, & Haggard, 2008), 
it is possible that AHP patients with left damage would present a less 
generalised or even a reduced alteration of SoA than AHP patients with right 
hemisphere damage. It would important for future work to compare SoA in 
anosognosic patients following right vs left brain damage. 
In this work, we have tested SoA and SO in patients with AHP. We found a 
clear change in agency experience in patients with AHP that seems to extend 
to the healthy limb. We suggest that this is due to an increased weighting of 
internal agency cues (e.g. motor intention) and a discounting of external 
sensory feedback (e.g. visual cues). 
Significantly, we have argued that knowing how SoA works in anosognosia can 
not only be informative for the study of SoA, but it also provides new directions 
for understanding this condition and devising suitable interventions. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
An investigation of sense of agency in older 
adulthood 
Research has shown a reduction in the SoA in older adulthood, but the reasons 
behind this change remain unclear. Here we investigate agency processing 
differences that may underpin age-related changes in SoA. We do so by 
manipulating external situational agency cues in younger and older adults. We 
then investigate the mechanisms that may be responsible for these changes.  
Introduction 
With an increasingly older population (He, Goodkind, & Kowal, 2016), there 
has been more interest in understanding the psychological and cognitive 
changes associated with older adulthood. This is driven by, and is driving, the 
development of interventions aimed at improving older adults’ well-being and 
promoting successful ageing. 
In the last few decades, researchers looking at sense of agency in older 
adulthood have focussed on the link between ageing and changes in self-
reported sense of control over life events (Langer and Rodin, 1976; 
Heckhausen & Schulz, 1995; Rodin & Langer, 1977, Lachman & Weaver, 
1998). Several studies (e.g. Heckhausen & Schulz, 1995; Mirowsky, 1995; 
Rodin & Langer, 1977) showed a general reduction in feeling of control over 
life events in older adulthood (Figure 4.1). More recently, Lachman and Firth 
(Lachman & Firth, 2004) confirmed these findings by examining age 
differences in sense of control with a large-scale survey of Americans. They 
found a lower sense of control for those in later life: almost 80% of the young 
said they are in control of what happens in their life, whereas it was 71% for 
the middle aged, and only 62% for the older adults. 
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Figure 4.1. Relationship between age and sense of control in Illinois (left) and U.S. national (right) 
samples. Average sense of control differs across age groups and decreases progressively with age. 
From Mirowsky (1995). 
Crucially, there is consistent evidence that higher sense of control is 
associated with successful aging (Baltes & Baltes, 1990; Rowe & Kahn, 1998). 
Successful aging is defined as ‘including three main components: low 
probability of disease-related disability, high cognitive and physical functional 
capacity and active engagement with life’ (Rowe & Kahn, 1997). Langer and 
Rodin (1976) conducted a now famous field study set in a nursing home to 
assess the effects choice and responsibility in older adults. They showed how 
acquiring sense of control improved quality of life. More specifically, they found 
that emphasizing personal responsibility and giving the freedom to make 
choices led to a significant improvement of the resident’s alertness, 
participation and overall well-being. More recent studies have shown that 
adults that report having a higher sense of control are more likely to have better 
health (Lachman & Firth, 2004), report fewer memory problems (Lachman, 
2005) and are more likely to adopt effective coping strategies (Lachman & 
Andreoletti, 2006). 
Despite this large body of evidence underlining the important psychological 
and social impact of being an active agent, there is very little experimental 
research that has focussed on age-related changes in the SoA. To date, only 
two studies have systematically investigated SoA in older adulthood. 
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One is a study from Metcalfe and colleagues (2010). In this study, they 
investigated differences in SA across the lifespan. They tested children, 
younger adults and older adults on a computer game that required hitting one 
target and avoiding another (Figure 4.2). In some trials, random spatial 
distortions (‘turbulence’) and delays (‘lag’) were introduced, as well as a ‘Magic’ 
condition where participants would be credited for hitting a target even if they 
had not touched it. These three manipulations were carried out with the aim of 
decreasing participant’s control. After each trial participants had to make a 
judgment on their agency and their accuracy. The results showed that older 
adults were less sensitive to these external performance manipulations 
compared to younger adults. In particular, older adults seemed to not be able 
to notice when they were left to be more in control compared to when their 
control was greatly distorted.  
 
Figure 4.2. A screenshot of the task used by Metcalfe et al. (2010). The participant moves the square on 
the grey bar at the bottom of the screen to catch downward scrolling X’s and avoid catching O’s. From 
Metcalfe et al. (2010). 
More recently, Wolpe and colleagues (2016) conducted a large population-
based study investigating how voluntary movement changes with age. In 
particular, they looked at a specific component of motor control that is the 
integration of sensory information with predictions of the consequences of 
action. They did so by measuring changes in sensorimotor attenuation. As 
explained in chapter 1, sensory attenuation refers to a reduction in the 
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perceived intensity of sensations caused by voluntary actions compared to 
externally generated actions (Blakemore et al., 1998). It is commonly used as 
a measure of implicit sense of agency (e.g.  Desantis, Weiss, Schütz-Bosbach, 
& Waszak, 2012; Dewey & Knoblich, 2014). In this study they used a Force 
Matching Task (Shergill, Bays, Frith, & Wolpert, 2003), in which participants 
were required to reproduce a force applied to their finger (Figure 4.3). It was 
found that sensorimotor attenuation increased with age, in proportion to 
reduced sensory sensitivity. In the same study, it was shown that this 
phenomenon was associated with reduced grey matter volume in the pre-
Supplementary Motor Area (SMA) and reduced functional connectivity 
between pre-SMA and a frontostriatal network. The authors suggested that this 
reduced functionality and connectivity of the pre-SMA compromises the 
balance between internal predictive signals and sensory information. That is, 
ageing seems to increase reliance on sensorimotor predictive internal models, 
to compensate for a reduced sensory sensitivity.  
 
Figure 4.3. Representation of the task used by Wolpe et al. (2016). Participants were required to match 
a force applied to their left index finger. In the Direct condition, participants used their right index to apply 
the force directly on the lever. In the Slider condition, they matched the force by moving a slider. Older 
adults showed increased sensory attenuation in the Direct condition only. From Wolpe et al. (2016). 
The results from both studies imply that there are age-related changes in SoA, 
but it is still not clear what mechanisms underpin these changes. In the context 
of the cue integration approach to SoA (chapter 1), these findings suggest that 
the influence of external agency cues may be reduced in older adults. In the 
studies presented in this chapter, we directly test this hypothesis by 
80 
 
manipulating external agency cues in groups of younger and older adults. 
Secondly, we investigate how the reduced influence of external cues in older 
adults could be due to a relative increase in the reliability of internal cues.  
In Experiment 1, younger and older adults completed the so-called vicarious 
agency task (developed by Wegner et al., 2004). This paradigm is designed 
such that the participant is led to feel SO and SoA over someone else’s arm 
and arm’s movements. In this paradigm, internal sensorimotor signals are 
absent as the participant remains still throughout the experiment. As such, it 
can isolate the influence of external situational cues on the SoA. Given the 
indication that older adults seem less sensitive to external manipulation of 
agency (Metcalfe et al., 2010), we predicted that the magnitude of the illusory 
experience of (vicarious) agency in older adults would be reduced. 
According to the cue integration approach to SoA, the reduction in the 
influence of external cues in older adults could be due to a relative increase in 
the reliability of internal cues. Experiment 2 aimed to explore the relationship 
between the susceptibility to vicarious experience of agency and the reliability 
of internal cues in a group of younger adults. We did so by testing young 
participants with interoceptive and proprioceptive accuracy tasks, as measures 
of their ability to interpret internal bodily cues. We then tested them with the 
same vicarious agency illusion paradigm used in Experiment 1 to quantify their 
susceptibility to illusory experiences of agency induced by external 
manipulations. We predicted that increased susceptibility to the agency illusion 
may be linked with worse performance in the interoceptive and proprioceptive 
tasks. 
In Experiment 3 we aimed to test the hypothesis that age-related changes in 
SoA observed in Experiment 1, are due to increased reliability on internal cues 
in older adults. We therefore tested younger and older adults with the 
interoceptive and proprioceptive tasks, and with the vicarious agency illusion 
paradigm. Along with replicating the findings of Experiment 1, we predicted 
that older adults would perform better in the interoceptive and proprioceptive 
accuracy tasks, relative to younger adults.  
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Experiment 1: Age-related changes in the experience of 
vicarious agency 
A group of younger adults and a group of older adults were tested on a 
modified version of a vicarious agency paradigm created by Wegner and 
colleagues (Wegner, Sparrow, & Winerman, 2004). The task requires 
participants to look in front of them, towards a mirror. Gestures are performed 
by the experimenter hidden behind the participant in such a way that the 
gestures look like they are being performed by the participant’s hands. The 
gestures seen in the mirror and the action instructions heard over a pair of 
headphones can either be congruent (match condition) or incongruent 
(mismatch condition). Participants are asked to report their feeling of agency 
and ownership over the gestures and the hand. 
The following method and results sections are partially taken from Cioffi, 
Cocchini, Banissy and Moore, 2017 (in appendix). 
Method 
Participants 
Two groups of participants were recruited. The ‘Younger Adult’ group consisted 
of 14 participants (6 females; average age = 23.0 years, sd = 4.7,  
range= 17-34). The ‘Older Adult’ group consisted of 14 participants (6 females; 
average age= 64.2 years, sd = 6.2, range = 54-72).  
Procedure 
The task required participants to look in front of them, towards a mirror. 
Gestures were performed by the experimenter hidden behind the participant 
in such a way that the gestures look like they were being performed by the 
participant’s hand (Figure 4.4). The gestures seen in the mirror were either 
congruent with the action instructions heard over a pair of headphones (match 
condition) or incongruent (mismatch condition). Participants were asked to 
report their experiences by answering three questions on a 7-point scale with 
1 being “not at all” and 7 being “very much’’. 
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The questions were:  
1) Anticipation: ‘’To what degree did you feel you could anticipate the 
movements of the arm?”  
2) Agency: ‘’How much control did you feel you had over the arm’s 
movements?” 
3) Ownership: ‘’To what degree did the arm feel like it belonged to you?’’  
As the procedure of the vicarious agency task was identical to the one 
described in chapter 2, further details can be found there. 
 
Figure 4.4. Experimental set-up (based on Wegner et al., 2004). The left picture shows what the 
participant sees in the mirror placed in front of her. The right picture shows the set up from the side, with 
the experimenter sitting behind the participant and putting her hand forward so that it appears where the 
participant’s hand would normally be. From Cioffi et al. (2017) 
Results  
Anticipation 
Anticipation was measured by asking participants ‘To what degree did you feel 
you could anticipate the movements of the arm?’. Figure 4.5a shows mean 
anticipation judgements in the ‘Younger Adult’ and ‘Older Adult’ groups plotted 
as a function of instruction-action congruence. A 2x2 mixed-design ANOVA 
was performed on the mean anticipation judgements (between-subjects factor: 
‘Age’ young/old, within-subjects factor: ‘Condition’ match/mismatch). We found 
a significant main effect of Condition (F (1, 26) = 85.56, p < .001, η2partial = .77). 
Participants reported greater anticipation in the match condition, where the 
gesture corresponded to the listened instruction, than in the mismatch 
condition. Crucially, there was no main effect of ‘Age’ (F (1, 26) = .05, p > .250, 
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η2partial = .01) and no significant interaction between Age and Condition  
(F(1,26) = .78, p > .250, η2partial = .03). Overall, these results show that the 
primes and actions were equally well attended to in each group.  
Sense of Agency 
The SoA was measured by asking participants ‘How much control did you feel 
you had over the arm’s movements?’. Figure 4.5b shows mean agency 
judgements in the ‘Younger Adult’ and ‘Older Adult’ groups plotted as a function 
of prime-action congruence. A 2x2 mixed-design ANOVA was performed on 
the mean agency judgements (between-subjects factor: ‘Age’ young/old, 
within-subjects factor: ‘Condition’ match/mismatch). We found a significant 
main effect of Condition (F (1, 26) = 18.02, p < .001, η2partial= .41). Participants 
reported having a stronger experience of control over the experimenter’s arm 
movements in the match condition than in the mismatch condition. There was 
also a significant main effect of ‘Age’ (F (1, 26) = 9.81, p = .004, η2partial = .27), 
showing that the overall SoA was significantly weaker in the older adults. 
Crucially, there was a significant interaction between ‘Age’ and ‘Condition’,  
(F (1, 26) = 4.26, p = .049, η2partial = .14). Inspection of  Figure 4.5b suggests 
that the effect of the experimental manipulation was weaker in older adults. 
Two post-hoc t-tests were carried out to examine this interaction (Bonferroni 
correction: p < .025). Although there was a significant effect of congruence in 
both age groups, this effect was weaker in older adults (‘Younger Adults’, 
Match vs. Mismatch, match: M = 3.36, mismatch: M = 1.39, mean difference = 
1.97, 95%, CI = [0.72, 3.21], t(13) = 3.41, p = .005, d = 1.28; ‘Older Adults’, 
Match vs. Mismatch, match: M = 1.71, mismatch: M = 1.04, mean difference = 
0.67, 95%, CI = [0.16, 1.19], t(13) = 2.85, p = .014, d = 1.03). These findings 
suggest that the vicarious agency illusion was attenuated in older adults. 
Sense of Ownership  
The sense of ownership was measured by asking participants ‘To what degree 
did the arm feel like it belonged to you?’. Figure 4.5c shows mean ownership 
judgements in the ‘Younger Adult’ and ‘Older Adult’ groups plotted as a function 
of prime-action congruence. A 2x2 mixed-design ANOVA was performed on 
the mean ownership judgements (between-subjects factor: ‘Age’ young/old, 
within-subjects factor: ‘Condition’ match/mismatch). We found a significant 
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main effect of Condition (F (1, 26) = 22.16, p < .001, η2partial = .46). Participants 
reported a stronger experience of ownership in the match condition than in the 
mismatch condition. There was also a significant main effect of ‘Age’  
(F (1, 26) = 5.88, p = .023, η2partial  = .18) suggesting that the overall experience 
of ownership was weaker in the older adults. Moreover, there was a significant 
interaction between ‘Age’ and ‘Condition’ (F (1, 26) = 4.89, p = .036,  
η2partial = .16). Inspection of Figure 5c suggests that the effect of the 
experimental manipulation was weaker in older adults. Two post-hoc t-tests 
were carried out to examine this interaction (Bonferroni correction: p < .025). 
These tests show that there was only a significant effect of congruence on 
ownership in the younger adults (‘Younger Adults’, Match vs. Mismatch, match: 
M = 4.11, mismatch: M = 1.93, mean difference = 2.18, 95%, CI = [1.01, 3.35], 
t(13) = 4.03, p = .001, d = 1.36; ‘Older Adults’, Match vs. Mismatch, match:  
M = 2.39, mismatch: M = 1.61, mean difference = .78, 95%, CI = [0.09, 1.48], 
t(13) = 2.44; p = .030, d = 0.78). These findings mirror the agency effects 
reported above and confirm that the older adults were less sensitive to the 
vicarious agency illusion.  
 
 
Figure 4.5. Mean ratings for anticipation (a), agency (b) and ownership (c) in match and mismatch 
conditions. The error bars show standard deviation across participants. Older adults show a weaker 
effect of agency and ownership illusion. Modified from Cioffi et al. (2017) 
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Discussion 
The aim of this study was to investigate the modulation of SoA by external 
agency cues in younger and older adults. First, we replicated the vicarious 
agency effect found by Wegner et al. (2004). Both younger and older adults 
showed increased feeling of agency and ownership in the match conditions, 
compared to the mismatch conditions. Second, we found that the vicarious 
experience of agency and ownership was less pronounced in older adults. 
Importantly, as no differences were found between groups in the check 
question (i.e. anticipation question), we can conclude that the effects in SO 
and SoA are not due to differences in attention, or any response bias. 
In line with our predictions, our findings show that the influence of external 
agency cues seems to be reduced in older adults. Increased reliability of 
internal sensorimotor cues in older adults can explain this reduction. That is, 
older adults may rely more on their internal sensorimotor cues, that leads them 
to discount external cues, and consequently, show a reduced susceptibility to 
the vicarious agency illusion. This hypothesis is tested in the experiments that 
follow. 
Experiment 2: Individual differences in susceptibility to the 
vicarious experience of agency: an investigation in young 
adults. 
The aim of this experiment is to explore the relationship between susceptibility 
to illusory experience of control and individual differences in awareness of 
internal bodily signals, in young healthy participants. Afferent information 
arising from within the body is defined as interoception (Ádám, 1998). This is 
typically assessed with an ‘interoceptive accuracy’ task, which consists of a 
heartbeat perception measure (Garfinkel, Seth, Barrett, Suzuki, & Critchley, 
2015). Previous work has shown that interoceptive accuracy predicts 
malleability of ownership experience, that is, people with lower interoceptive 
accuracy experienced a stronger illusion of ownership measured with the 
Rubber Hand Illusion (Tsakiris, Tajadura-Jiménez, & Costantini, 2011). 
However, nothing is known about interoceptive accuracy and malleability of 
agency experience. Here we tested a group of younger adults with an 
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interoceptive accuracy task and the vicarious agency paradigm presented in 
Experiment 1. We predict that worse performance at interoceptive accuracy 
corresponds to increased experience of vicarious agency and ownership. 
Participants were also tested with a proprioceptive accuracy task. 
Proprioception refers to the ability to sense stimuli arising within the body 
regarding its position in the space  (Sherrington, 1948). It was measured here 
with a modified version of a well-established contralateral concurrent matching 
task (Goble, Coxon, Wenderoth, Van Impe, & Swinnen, 2009) that required 
participants to place their arms in specific positions, without the help of vision. 
Similarly to our predictions about interoception, we expected that a worse 
performance in proprioceptive accuracy would correspond to an increased 
illusion of agency and ownership. 
Method 
The following method section is partially taken from Cioffi, Cocchini, Banissy 
and Moore, 2017 (in appendix). 
Participants 
Thirty participants were recruited. The average age was 23.87 years (sd = 7.1; 
age range 18-41; 16 females). All participants gave informed consent prior to 
taking part in the study. The study was approved by the Goldsmiths Ethical 
Committee. 
Procedure 
Vicarious agency illusion  
The procedure was identical to the one described in Experiment 1. 
Interoceptive accuracy 
As a measure of interoceptive accuracy, a heartbeat monitoring task was used 
(Knoll & Hodapp, 1992; Tsakiris et al., 2011). Participants were asked to sit 
comfortably, keep their legs uncrossed and close their eyes. Their heartbeat 
was monitored by a pulse transducer (Xpod, model 3017LP, Nonin Medical 
Inc., MN, USA) attached to the participant’s non-dominant index finger. They 
were instructed to silently count their own heartbeats during an interval of time 
that started and finished with an audio cue. At the end of each interval, each 
participant was asked to report the number of heartbeats counted. The six 
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intervals presented in a randomised order were 20, 20, 30, 30, 40 and 40 
seconds. The interoceptive accuracy was measured by calculating the 
proportional discrepancy between the perceived and the actual number of 
heartbeats:  |counted heartbeats – recorded heartbeats|/ recorded heartbeats. 
This was averaged across intervals to provide an accuracy error index, with 0 
indicating no discrepancy between perceived and actual numbers of 
heartbeats, and larger discrepancies indicated by larger values.  
Proprioceptive accuracy  
Proprioceptive accuracy was measured using a task inspired by well-
established contralateral concurrent matching tasks (Goble et al. 2010). 
Participants were asked to sit in front of a desk and to familiarise themselves 
with a plain sheet of A3 paper. They were then asked to close their eyes and 
keep them closed until they were explicitly required to open them. While the 
experimenter verbally explained this, an A3 sheet was placed in front of them, 
centred on the participant’s body. The experimenter took the participant’s right 
index finger and placed it on a pre-printed dot. The participant was asked to 
place their left index finger such that it was mirroring their right index finger 
across the centre of the A3 sheet. The procedure was repeated for a total of 
six dots, three for each hand (Figure 4.6). The participant was asked to open 
their eyes only at the end of the six trials. The proprioceptive accuracy measure 
was calculated as the average of the discrepancy (in cm) between each actual 
mirrored position and the one indicated by the participant (0 = no discrepancy).  
The tasks were presented in counterbalanced order.  
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Figure 4.6. Schematic representation of the proprioceptive accuracy task. The participant has their eyes 
closed. Their left index finger is placed by experimenter on one of the dots on the left half of the paper. 
The participant has to place their right index finger such that it is mirroring their left index finger across 
the centre. The procedure is repeated for all positions and for each hand. 
Results  
Non-parametric tests were used as the variables did not meet normality criteria 
(Shapiro-Wilk test, p > .05). 
Vicarious Agency illusion 
Anticipation 
The overall effect Condition (Match vs Mismatch) was examined using a 
Wilcoxon signed ranks test on the mean of Anticipation match ratings 
compared to Anticipation mismatch ratings. Participants reported significantly 
higher anticipation in the match compared to the mismatch conditions  
(z = -4.66, p < .001), (Figure 4.7). This shows that differences in attention to 
the actions or instructions, or any response bias, are unlikely to explain agency 
or ownership effects. 
Sense of Agency  
The overall effect Condition (Match vs Mismatch) was examined using a 
Wilcoxon signed ranks test on the mean of agency match ratings compared to 
agency mismatch ratings.  Participants reported significantly higher sense of 
agency in the match compared to the mismatch conditions (z = -3.42, p = .001), 
(Figure 4.7) 
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Sense of Ownership 
The overall effect Condition (Match vs Mismatch) was examined using a 
Wilcoxon signed ranks test on the mean of ownership match ratings compared 
to the ownership mismatch ratings. Participants reported significantly higher 
sense of ownership in the match compared to the mismatch conditions  
(z = -3.51, p < .001), (Figure 4.7). 
These results show the significant effects of the manipulation on agency and 
ownership.  
 
Figure 4.7. Mean ratings for Anticipation, Agency and Ownership in both Match and Mismatch conditions. 
Error bars show standard deviation across participants. 
Interoceptive and proprioceptive accuracy  
To investigate how interoception and proprioception influence the SoA and SO, 
we ran correlation analyses between individual differences in performance on 
tests of interoceptive and proprioceptive accuracy and individual differences in 
the vicarious agency illusion. These were calculated as the difference between 
match and mismatch trials for the agency question (Agency effect) and the 
difference between match and mismatch trials for the ownership question 
(Ownership effect). 
Interoceptive and proprioceptive accuracy on SoA 
We found that the strength of the agency illusion was correlated with 
interoceptive accuracy error (r = .45, p < .001) and with proprioceptive 
accuracy error (r = .53, p < .001). These results suggest that people that 
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performed worse on the interoception and proprioception tasks were more 
susceptible to the illusion of agency (Figure 4.8).  
 
 
Figure 4.8. Scatterplot depicting the relationship between Agency effect (calculated as match-mismatch) 
and interoceptive (above) and proprioceptive (below) accuracy error 
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Interoceptive and proprioceptive accuracy on SO 
We found that the strength of the ownership illusion was correlated with 
interoceptive accuracy error (r = .55, p < .001) and with proprioceptive 
accuracy error (r = .76, p < .001). These results suggest that people who 
performed worse on the interoception and proprioception tasks were more 
susceptible to the illusion of ownership (Figure 4.9).  
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Figure 4.9. Scatterplot depicting the relationship between Ownership effect (calculated as match-
mismatch) and interoceptive (above) and proprioceptive (below) accuracy error. 
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Discussion 
We explored the relationship between interoceptive and proprioceptive 
accuracy and the susceptibility to illusory experience of agency in a group of 
younger adults. The results show that interoceptive and proprioceptive 
accuracy predict the magnitude of illusion of vicarious agency and ownership, 
with lower interoception and proprioception corresponding to greater illusion.  
Previous research has shown that lower interoception is associated with 
various aspects of cognition, for example with reduced sensitivity to emotion 
of others (Terasawa, Moriguchi, Tochizawa, & Umeda, 2014), or higher levels 
of alexithymia in typical adults  (Herbert, Herbert, & Pollatos, 2011). 
Importantly, reduced interoception has been linked to increased malleability of 
body representation measured with body ownership illusion (Tajadura-jiménez 
& Tsakiris, 2014; Tsakiris et al., 2011).  Here we confirm these previous findings 
on body ownership and show that a similar link is present with regards to the 
sense of agency. Crucially, within the cue integration approach framework, our 
findings seem to suggest that a reduction in the influence of external agency 
cues is due to a relative increase in the reliability of internal signals. In light of 
this, if the age-related differences in SoA found in Experiment 1 are due to 
increased reliability on internal cues in older adults, we should expect elderly 
participants to perform better in interoceptive and proprioceptive accuracy 
tasks. This hypothesis is tested in Experiment 3. 
Experiment 3: Age-related differences in the experience of 
vicarious agency: a closer investigation into the underlying 
mechanisms. 
The aim of this experiment is to further investigate the possible mechanisms 
responsible for age-related changes in SoA and SO. The results of Experiment 
1 suggest that the influence of external cues on agency and ownership 
processing is attenuated in older adults. In experiment 2 it was found that, in 
younger adults, a stronger illusion of agency and ownership is linked with 
reduced interoceptive and proprioceptive accuracy. This strongly supports the 
hypothesis that increased susceptibility to external manipulation of external 
agency cues is related to reduced reliability of internal cues. 
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In this experiment, we examine the possibility that age-related differences in 
SoA are explained by increased reliance on internal cues in older adulthood. A 
group of older adults and a group of younger adults were tested with the 
vicarious agency paradigm and with the interoceptive and proprioceptive 
tasks. If our findings in older adults are due to increased relative reliability of 
internal cues, older adults should show improvements in interoceptive and 
proprioceptive accuracy relative to younger adults.  
Method 
Vicarious agency illusion 
The procedure was identical to that used in Experiment 1 and Experiment 2. 
Interoceptive and proprioceptive accuracy 
The procedure was identical to the one used in Experiment 2. 
Results 
The following results section is partially taken from Cioffi et al. 2017 (in 
appendix). 
Vicarious agency task 
The vicarious agency task was analysed with separate 2x2 mixed-design 
ANOVAs on the mean judgments for each question, with ‘Congruence’ the 
within-subjects factor and ‘Age’ (young/old) the between-subjects factor. 
Anticipation 
The results presented in Figure 4.10a directly replicate those from Experiment 
1. A main effect of Congruence was found (F (1, 33) = 489.96, p < .001,  
η2partial = .94), showing that participants reported a greater feeling of 
anticipation in the match conditions compared to the mismatch conditions. 
Importantly, there was no main effect of Age (F(1,33) = .15, p > .250.,  
η2partial < .01) and no interaction between Congruence and Agency  
(F1,33) = 2.00, p = .166, η2partial = .06). These results showed that the prime-
action relationship was equally well attended to by both groups. Therefore, 
differences in attention are unlikely to explain differences in agency and 
ownership on this task.  
95 
 
Sense of Agency 
The results presented in Figure 4.10b directly replicate those from Experiment 
1. A main effect of Congruence was found (F (1, 33) = 37.57, p < .001,  
η2partial = .53), showing that participants felt a stronger sense of agency over 
the experimenter’s arm in the match compared to the mismatch conditions. A 
main effect of Age was also found (F (1, 33) = 7.91, p = .008, η2partial = .19), 
showing that the overall sense of agency was lower in older adults. Crucially, 
a significant interaction between Age and Congruence was also found,  
(F (1, 33) = 7.84, p = .008, η2partial = .19). Two post-hoc t-tests were carried out 
to examine this interaction (Bonferroni correction: p < .025). Although there 
was a significant effect of congruence in both age groups, this effect was 
weaker in older adults (‘Younger Adults’, Match vs. Mismatch, match: M = 3.22, 
mismatch: M = 1.25, mean difference = 1.97, 95%, CI = [1.19, 2.75],  
t(17) = 5.34, p < .001, d = 1.43; ‘Older Adults’, Match vs. Mismatch, match:  
M = 1.76, mismatch: M = 1.03, mean difference = 0.73, 95%, CI = [0.24, 1.23], 
t(16) = 3.18, p = .006, d = 1.08). These results replicate those of Experiment 
1, showing that the experience of agency in older adults was not as strongly 
modulated by the experimental manipulation.  
Sense of Ownership 
The results directly replicate those from Experiment 1. A main effect of 
Congruence was found (F (1, 33) = 38.16, p < .001, η2partial = .54), showing that 
participants felt a stronger sense of ownership over the experimenter’s arm in 
the match compared to mismatch conditions. A main effect of Age was also 
found (F (1, 33) = 8.15, p = .007, η2partial = .20), showing that the overall sense 
of ownership was lower in older adults. Crucially, a significant interaction 
between Age and Congruence was also found, (F (1, 33) = 4.54, p = .041,  
η2partial = .121). Inspection of Figure 4.10c suggests that the effect of the 
experimental manipulation was weaker in older adults. Two post-hoc t-tests 
were carried out to examine this interaction (Bonferroni correction: p < .025). 
Although there was a significant effect of congruence in both age groups, this 
effect was weaker in older adults (‘Younger Adults’, Match vs. Mismatch, 
match: M = 3.50, mismatch: M = 2.11, mean difference = 1.39, 95%,  
CI = [0.79, 1.98], t(17) = 4.93, p < .001, d = 0.88; ‘Older Adults’, Match vs. 
Mismatch, match: M = 2, mismatch: M = 1.32, mean difference = 0.68, 95%, 
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CI = [0.31, 1.04], t(16) = 3.95, p = .001, d = 0.79). These results directly 
replicate those of Experiment 1, showing that the experience of ownership in 
older adults was not as strongly modulated by the experimental manipulation. 
 
Figure 4.10. Mean ratings for anticipation (a), agency (b) and ownership (c) for younger and older adults, 
in match and mismatch conditions. Error bars show standard deviation across participants. Older adults 
show a weaker illusion of agency and ownership, compared to younger adults. 
Interoceptive and proprioceptive accuracy 
We compared the performance of the two age groups on the proprioceptive 
and interoceptive tasks (Figure 4.11). We found that older adults performed 
significantly better than younger adults on both tasks (‘Interoceptive Error’, 
Younger Adults vs Older Adults, younger adults: M = 0.47, older adults:  
M = 0.33, mean difference = 0.14, 95%, CI = [0.02, 0.26], t(33) = 2.21,  
p = .034, d = 0.80; ‘Proprioceptive Error’, Younger Adults vs Older Adults, 
younger adults: M = 4.28, older adults: M = 3.16, mean difference = 1.12, 95%, 
CI = [0.31, 1.94], t(33) = 2.80, p = .009, d = 0.95). This result suggests that 
older adults monitor internal bodily signals more successfully than younger 
adults.  
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Figure 4.11. (a) Error rate of interoceptive accuracy, with 0 indicating no discrepancy between actual and 
estimated number of heartbeats. (b) Error rate of proprioceptive accuracy with 0 indicating no 
discrepancy between actual and estimated position. The error bars show standard deviation across 
participants. Older adults perform better in both interoceptive and proprioceptive accuracy. 
Agency, interoceptive and proprioceptive accuracy 
We wanted to investigate further the relationship between susceptibility to the 
illusion of agency, and interoceptive and proprioceptive accuracy. To do so, we 
looked at individual differences in performance on tests of interoceptive and 
proprioceptive accuracy, and the overall correlations between individual 
differences in the vicarious agency illusion. The latter of which was calculated 
as the difference for the agency question between match and mismatch trials. 
A reduction in the strength of the illusion was correlated with improved 
interoceptive and proprioceptive accuracy (interoceptive: r = .40, p = .019; 
proprioceptive: r = .38, p = .026), see Figure 4.12. These findings confirm our 
initial prediction that better performance on the interoceptive and 
proprioceptive measures would be correlated with a reduction in the strength 
of the illusion.  
We then looked at correlations for each age group separately. In younger 
adults, there was a significant correlation between interoceptive accuracy and 
the agency effect (r = .49, p = .038). Although there was no significant 
correlation with proprioception, this finding is consistent with the overall 
correlation analyses reported above. In the older adults, there were no 
significant correlations between the agency effect and proprioception or 
interoception.  
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Figure 4.12. Scatterplot depicting the distribution of interoceptive accuracy (above) and 
proprioceptive accuracy (below) error individual scores, in relation to the agency effect 
(calculated as the difference between match and mismatch).   
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Ownership, interoceptive and proprioceptive accuracy 
To further investigate the relationship between susceptibility to the illusion of 
ownership and interoceptive and proprioceptive accuracy, we looked at overall 
correlations between individual differences in the illusion of ownership and 
individual differences in performance on tests of interoceptive and 
proprioceptive accuracy. There was no significant correlation between the 
ownership effect and the interoceptive accuracy task (r = -.17, p > .250). We 
found instead that a reduction in the strength of the illusion was correlated with 
improved proprioceptive accuracy (r = .38, p = .022), (Figure 4.13). 
We then looked at correlations for each age group separately. In younger 
adults, we found that the strength of the illusion was correlated with 
proprioceptive accuracy (r = .50, p = .035) but not with interoceptive accuracy  
(r = -.35, p = .147). In the older adults, there was no significant correlation 
between the ownership effect and proprioceptive accuracy (r = -.24, p > .336) 
but there was a significant correlation between the ownership effect and 
interoceptive accuracy (r = -.51, p = .034). This suggests that a reduction in 
the strength of the ownership illusion was correlated with a worse performance 
in the interoceptive accuracy task in older adults. This is in contrast with our 
previous findings. 
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Figure 4.13. Scatterplot depicting the distribution of interoceptive accuracy (above) and 
proprioceptive accuracy (below) error individual scores, in relation to the ownership effect 
(calculated as the difference between match and mismatch).   
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Discussion 
The aim of this experiment was to explore the possibility that age-related 
differences in SoA are explained by increased reliance on internal cues in older 
adulthood. We tested a group of younger adults and a group of older adults 
with the vicarious agency paradigm as well as the interoceptive and 
proprioceptive accuracy tasks. The results from the vicarious agency task 
replicated those of Experiment 1, showing that external cues have less 
influence on agency (and ownership) in older adults. Importantly, we found that 
older adults were better on the proprioceptive and interoceptive tasks. This 
may help explain, in line with the cue integration approach to SoA, why the 
older adults are less sensitive to the illusion. 
We also found that, across both age groups, performance on interoceptive and 
proprioceptive tasks is correlated with a reduction in the vicarious agency 
illusion. This is consistent with the findings of Experiment 2, and with the cue 
integration framework: the external manipulation was less effective in those 
that were better in monitoring internal bodily signals.  
However, when looking at each age group separately, the results of our 
investigations were less clear-cut. When correlating performance on 
interoceptive and proprioceptive tasks with the illusion of agency for each age 
group, we failed to find a significant relationship in older adults. Results were 
similar with regards to the illusion of ownership. We did not find any significant 
relationship between SO and proprioceptive awareness in older adults. 
Furthermore, we found a relationship between interoceptive accuracy and SO 
which was going in the opposite direction to our predictions: i.e. older adults 
that showed better interoceptive accuracy were more susceptible to the illusion 
of ownership. These correlations might have to be interpreted carefully as the 
stability of correlations can be influenced by sample size in smaller samples. 
So, although it remains a strong possibility that differences in the weighting of 
internal cues can explain agency processing differences in older adults, our 
data are not definite on this matter and future work should address this. 
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General discussion 
The studies presented in this chapter sought primarily to investigate a) agency 
changes in older adulthood b) cue integration in agency processing. 
In Experiment 1, we investigated age-related changes in SoA by testing 
younger and older adults with a vicarious agency illusion. We found that older 
adults are less sensitive to external manipulation of agency cues compared to 
younger adults. 
In Experiment 2, we investigated the relationship between susceptibility to 
manipulation of external cues and reliability of internal bodily signals. We did 
so by testing a group of younger adults with a vicarious agency illusion and 
interoceptive and proprioceptive tasks. We found that in younger adults 
reduced sensitivity to external cues is linked with reduced reliability of internal 
sensory signals. 
In Experiment 3, we tested the hypothesis that age-related changes in SoA are 
due to increased reliability on internal cues in older adults. We tested both 
younger and older adults with the interoceptive and proprioceptive tasks, along 
with the vicarious agency illusion paradigm. We replicated the results of 
Experiment 1 and found that older adults performed better in interoceptive and 
proprioceptive tasks. While our data were not unequivocal on this, we 
suggested that age-related differences in SoA may be due to increased 
reliability of internal cues in older adults.  
These results are in line with previous work on SoA in older adults (Metcalfe et 
al., 2010; Wolpe et al., 2016) and give considerable insights into the 
mechanisms underpinning age-related changes in SoA. 
Our experiments strongly suggest that older adults rely more on internal 
agency cues and discount external ones. This enhanced weighting of internal 
cues could be the result of increased reliability of internal information  
(as shown by our results) combined with a decreased reliability of external 
information. When viewed within the context of the optimal cue integration 
framework, this pattern of agency processing may be disadvantageous. The 
fact that the experience of agency in older adults is less sensitive to compelling 
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external cues suggests that they may be discounting potentially useful sources 
of information. This sub-optimal integration might be linked to the overall 
reduction in SoA associated with older adulthood. That is, by not optimally 
integrating different sources of information, older adults may be less likely to 
recognize their own agency and feel less in control of their own life. Although 
this is entirely speculative, it could be extremely informative for future research 
aimed at furthering the understanding of successful ageing and developing 
interventions that promote older adults’ well-being. 
In the narrower context of agency research, it would be informative if future 
work extended our investigation to the implicit aspects of agency, as nothing 
is currently known about implicit SoA in older adulthood.  
In this chapter, we have uncovered agency changes in older adulthood, and 
started to understand their underlying mechanisms. In turn, this has been 
informative in the study of SoA.  
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CHAPTER FIVE  
An investigation of explicit sense of agency in 
mirror-touch synaesthesia  
Recent accounts postulate that mirror-touch synaesthesia is linked with 
atypical self-other representations. Here we examine whether or not putative 
self-other processing abnormalities in mirror-touch synaesthesia extend to 
sense of agency. 
Introduction 
For most of us, observing another person being touched activates neural 
regions in the somatosensory cortex that are also involved in experiencing 
touch (e.g., Keysers, Kaas, & Gazzola, 2010; Schaefer, Heinze, & Rotte, 
2012). However, this activation does not lead to overt sensations of the 
observed event. In other words, we typically do not feel any tactile sensation 
when observing the tactile experience of others. People with mirror-touch 
synaesthesia (MTS) do: they feel a tactile sensation on their body when simply 
seeing someone else being touched (Blakemore, Bristow, Bird, Frith, & Ward, 
2005). Mirror-touch synaesthesia occurs when there is a conscious experience 
of a tactile sensation that occurs automatically following the observation of 
touch applied to another person (Banissy, Kadosh, Maus, Walsh, & Ward, 
2009). This experience of touch can be felt exactly in the same place as the 
touch seen on the other person (anatomical correspondence) or in a mirrored 
position - hence the name - (specular correspondence) (Banissy & Ward, 
2007) (Figure 5.1).  
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Figure 5.1. Illustration of the specular and anatomical correspondences. Modified from Banissy and Ward 
(2007). 
The first case of MTS was reported in 2005 by Blakemore and colleagues 
(Blakemore et al., 2005). MTS is currently thought to affect 1.6% of the 
population (Banissy et al., 2009).  
A behavioural protocol to test the authenticity of the condition was developed 
in 2007 by Ward and Banissy. This is a Visuo-Tactile Stroop task, where 
participants are required to report the location of the actual touch applied on 
their own cheeks (left, right or both cheeks) whilst looking at a video of a face 
being touched either on the left or the right cheek (Figure 5.2). Since 
participants with MTS are confused by the synaesthetic touch (i.e. touch 
induced by vision), they make a significantly higher number of errors and their 
reaction times are significantly slower in incongruent conditions. An example 
of an incongruent trial is when a participant receives a touch on the right cheek, 
so they should answer ‘right’, while they see a touch applied on the opposite 
cheek. In such a trial, a mirror-touch error consists of reporting ‘both’. All 
participants considered as MT synaesthetes in this work, have been tested 
with the Visuo-Tactile Stroop. 
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Figure 5.2. Illustration of the Visuo-Tactile Stroop used to confirm potential cases of mirror touch 
synaesthesia. Participants are required to report the site on which they received the actual touch (that 
is, left cheek, right cheek, both cheeks or no touch) while ignoring the touch observed on the screen (and 
the synesthetic touch induced by it). From Banissy and Ward (2007). 
Accounts of MTS have pointed out how MTS is linked with empathy (Banissy 
& Ward, 2007). In particular, Banissy and Ward (2007) reported that MT 
synaesthetes score significantly higher on the emotional reactivity subscale of 
the EQ (Empathy Quotient) compared to controls. More recently, studies have 
focused on how mirror-touch synaesthetes may have atypical self-other 
representations. More specifically, MTS may be linked to an impairment in the 
ability to control self-other representations, leading to a difficulty in inhibiting 
the experiences of others (Banissy & Ward, 2013; Heyes & Catmur, 2015; 
Santiesteban, Bird, Tew, Cioffi, & Banissy, 2015; Ward & Banissy, 2015). This 
suggestion is based on neuroimaging data that shows that MT synaesthetes 
have reduced grey matter in the right temporo-parietal junction (rTPJ) 
compared to non synaesthetes (Holle, Banissy, & Ward, 2013). In fact, rTPJ 
has been shown to be involved in controlling self-other representations: 
Santiesteban and colleagues (2012) used transcranial direct current 
stimulation (tDCS) to show how modulating the cortical excitability of rTPJ has 
an impact in controlling self-other representations. Interestingly, rTPJ is 
commonly associated with the sense of agency (Decety & Lamm, 2007; Farrer, 
Franck, Paillard, & Jeannerod, 2003). In the context of SoA, it might be that 
rTPJ is executing the same ‘controller’ role, influencing self-other agency 
judgments. While this hypothesis is tested directly in the studies presented in 
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chapter 6, investigating SoA behaviourally in MTS offers an opportunity to 
explore how the control of self-other representations influences SoA. 
Behavioural studies have shown that a disturbance in the ability to inhibit 
representations of others and an augmented malleability of self-other 
boundaries are core features of MTS (Maister, Banissy, & Tsakiris, 2013; 
Santiesteban et al., 2015). In particular, Maister and colleagues (2013) ran an 
‘enfacement illusion’ study with mirror-touch synaesthetes, where the touch 
component was removed (Figure 2). In the traditional ‘enfacement illusion’, 
participants are shown images of faces that are morphed between their own 
and that of another person. They are asked to say to what extent the images 
look like themselves or the other. The participant is then touched on their face 
while watching a video of the other person being simultaneously and 
congruently touched on their face. After experiencing a synchrony between the 
observed and felt touch, the images that participants had initially perceived as 
containing equal quantities of self and other became more likely to be 
recognized as the self (Longo, Schüür, Kammers, Tsakiris, & Haggard, 2008; 
Sforza, Bufalari, Haggard, & Aglioti, 2010; Synofzik, Thier, Leube, 
Schlotterbeck, & Lindner, 2010; Tajadura-Jiménez, Grehl, & Tsakiris, 2012). In 
the adaptation of Maister et al. (2013), individuals observed a touch to other 
person, but synchronous touch was not physically applied to the face. MT 
synaesthetes experienced the same effect of ‘enfacement illusion’ in the 
absence of a touch applied to their face. Simply viewing the touch on others 
evokes changes in self-other representations in MTS.  
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Figure 5.3 A representation of the enfacement illusion paradigm used by Maister et al (2013). The ‘touch 
condition’ is presented above and the ‘no touch condition’ below. In the traditional version of the 
enfacement illusion only the ‘touch condition’ is present. During both conditions, participants are required 
to perform a self-recognition task before and after viewing a video. From Maister et al. (2007). 
This evidence that MT synaesthetes seem to have blurred boundaries 
between self and other, along with more malleable body representations 
(Banissy & Ward, 2013; Maister et al., 2013) is very relevant when talking 
about the two main components of self-awareness, the sense of ownership 
and the sense of agency.  
Aimola Davies and White (2013) looked at the sense of ownership using the 
paradigm of the rubber hand illusion (RHI) (Botvinick & Cohen, 1998). The 
results of their studies showed how mirror-touch synaesthetes experienced the 
rubber hand illusion in a ‘no-touch condition’, where participants were just 
looking at the prosthetic hand with no-touch delivered to their real hand  
(Figure 5.3). This study shows that this self-other discrimination disturbance is 
extended to the SO.  
 
Figure 5.4 Rubber hand paradigm. ‘touch condition’ (left): the experimenter (E) strokes both the rubber 
hand and the participant’s hand; ‘no-touch condition’ (right): the experimenter strokes the rubber hand 
only. Figure adapted from Aimola Davies and White (2013). 
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Although nothing is known about SoA in MTS, this disturbance in the SO is 
likely to have consequences on the SoA. Theoretical accounts of agency 
propose that the experience of agency over a movement is predicated on the 
feeling that body part that moves is one’s own (Gallagher, 2000). Changes in 
the sense of agency in MTS could be the result of a fundamental ownership 
deficit. Despite this being the most likely scenario, the opposite can also be 
true: as the sense of agency itself can play a role in structuring the sense of 
ownership (Ma & Hommel, 2015; Tsakiris, Longo, & Haggard, 2010), it could 
be that the SO disturbances that characterise MTS may be a result of SoA 
abnormalities. In the experiments presented in this chapter, we test both 
agency and ownership in MT synaesthetes, taking the opportunity to shed light 
on how these two crucial components of self-awareness interact. 
This work on MTS may be especially informative with regards to models of 
agency. In the context of the cue integration approach, where agency is 
created by optimally integrating external and internal cue, it can be 
hypothesised that a MT synaesthetes’ agency is more heavily influenced by 
external cues. In fact, external stimuli seem to dominate the creation of self-
representations in MTS, with SO being driven almost exclusively by visual 
stimuli (Aimola Davies & White, 2013; Maister et al., 2013). This is not 
surprising when taken in the context of the condition itself: MTS happens 
precisely in the presence of a visual component, by definition ‘MT 
synaesthetes feel a tactile sensation on their body when simply seeing 
someone else being touched’.  
In this chapter, I present two experiments that tested the influence of external 
agency cues on MTS’s agency processing. In the two paradigms used, a 
situation of agentic uncertainty is artificially created, and the biasing effects of 
external agency cues are then assessed.  
In Experiment 1, participants completed the so-called vicarious agency task 
(developed by Wegner et al., 2004). In this paradigm, the experimental setting 
is designed such that the participant is led to feel SO over the experimenter’s 
arm and SoA over the experimenter’s arm movements. Owing to the purported 
blurring of self-other boundaries in MTS, it is expected that these individuals 
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would be more vulnerable to this illusion, showing stronger experiences of 
vicarious agency and ownership.  
In Experiment 2, participants completed an action recognition task (based on 
the paradigm developed by Farrer et al., 2008). Here they were asked to judge 
whether a video that they are watching showed their own finger movements or 
those of the experimenter. In reality, the video always showed the participants’ 
movement with a temporal delay. Farrer et al. showed that this set up created 
a bi-stable impression of sense of agency, with agency reports flipping 
spontaneously between “self” and “other”. It can be predicted that participants 
with MTS may be prone to shift more often between self and other actions as 
a consequence of their more malleable self-other representations.  
Experiment 1: An illusion of agency and ownership in Mirror-
touch synaesthesia 
The aim of this study is to investigate SoA and SO in MTS, and how these two 
components of self-awareness interact. A group of participants with MTS and 
non-synaesthete controls were tested on a modified version of a vicarious 
agency paradigm created by Daniel Wegner and colleagues (Wegner, 
Sparrow, & Winerman, 2004). The task requires participants to look in front of 
them, towards a mirror. Gestures are performed by the experimenter hidden 
behind the participant in such a way that the gestures look like they are being 
performed by the participant’s hands. The gestures seen in the mirror can be 
either congruent with the action instructions heard over a pair of headphones 
(match condition) or incongruent (mismatch condition). Participants are asked 
to report their feeling of agency and ownership over the gestures and the hand.  
The following Method and Results sections are largely taken from Cioffi, 
Banissy, & Moore, (2016) (in appendix) 
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Method 
Participants 
A group of eight adult mirror-touch synaesthetes (age range = 19-60, average 
age = 36. 3, SD = 16.8, one male) and a group of eight non-synaesthetes 
controls (age range = 19-38, average age = 26.5, SD = 8.33, four males) were 
recruited. All participants were right-handed. All mirror-touch synaesthetes 
were confirmed as individuals with MTS using the Visuo-Tactile Stroop task, 
designed to detect the authenticity of the condition (Banissy et al., 2009; 
Banissy & Ward, 2007). All MTS participants differed significantly on a single 
subject basis (using Crawford’s modified t-test; Crawford & Howell, 1998) to 
previous published control data on this task (Banissy et al., 2009; Banissy & 
Ward, 2007). All controls were interviewed with a synaesthesia questionnaire 
(including a question on MTS; adapted from Banissy et al., 2009) and did not 
report any synaesthetic experiences. Three of the mirror-touch synaesthetes 
self-reported other types of synaesthesia. All participants gave consent to 
participate in the study and were paid £10/hour to take part in the experiment. 
The study was approved by the local ethical committee.  
Procedure 
The task required participants to look in front of them, towards a mirror. 
Gestures were performed by the experimenter hidden behind the participant 
in such a way that the gestures look like they were being performed by the 
participant’s hand (Figure 5.5). The gestures seen in the mirror were either 
congruent with the action instructions heard over a pair of headphones (match 
condition) or incongruent (mismatch condition). Participants were asked to 
report their experiences by answering three questions on a 7-point scale with 
1 being “not at all” and 7 being “very much’’. 
The questions were:  
1) Anticipation: ‘’To what degree did you feel you could anticipate the 
movements of the arm?”  
2) Agency: ‘’How much control did you feel you had over the arm’s 
movements?” 
3) Ownership: ‘’To what degree did the arm feel like it belonged to you?’’  
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As the procedure of the vicarious agency task was identical to the one 
described in chapter 2, further details can be found there. 
 
Figure 5.5 Experimental set-up. Pictured side view (left) and participant view (right). The experimenter 
sits behind the curtain hidden from the participant’s view. Here, the experimenter places his arm forward, 
where the participant’s arm would normally appear. The participant sits in front of the mirror where she 
can see the arm as her own. The participant hears instructions through the headphones and observes 
the action being performed by the arm. In the match condition instructions and actions are congruent, 
while they are incongruent in the mismatch condition. From Cioffi et al. (2016) 
Results 
A preliminary analysis on left and right hands were carried out for each 
condition using a paired sample test to see if their results could be 
distinguished. As no significant differences emerged, the mean judgements for 
left and right hands were collapsed into a single score (for example: 
(Anticipation match condition Left hand + Anticipation match condition Right 
hand)/2). These were entered into mixed design ANOVAs. Any interactions 
were explored using planned paired comparisons or where relevant post-hoc 
tests (corrected for multiple comparisons using a Bonferroni correction). In any 
cases where individual variables did not meet assumptions of normality non-
parametric paired comparisons were used.  
The mean ratings were entered into a 3 (Question) X 2 (Condition) X 2 (Group) 
mixed measure analysis of the variance with ‘Question’ (Anticipation/ Agency/ 
Ownership) and ‘Condition’ (Match/Mismatch) as within-subjects factors and 
‘Group’ (MTS/Controls) as a between-subjects factor. The ANOVA showed 
main effects of Question (F (2, 28) = 11.2, p < .001, η2partial = .445), Condition 
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(F (1, 14) = 87.3, p < .001, η2partial = .862) due to higher ratings overall in the 
match condition and Group (F (1, 14) = 41.3, p = .009, η2partial = .392), this was 
due higher ratings showed by the MTS group compared to controls (figure 5a). 
The interaction between Question and Group was significant  
(F (2, 28) = 10.32, p < .001, η2partial = .424) as well as the interaction Question 
by Condition (F (2, 28) = 24.855, p < .001, η2partial = .640). A three-way 
interaction between Question, Condition and Group was also significant  
(F (1, 14) = 4.35, p < .023, η2partial = .237). The three-way interaction was 
explored by running separate 2 (Condition) X 2 (Group) mixed measures 
analysis of the variance for each question (Anticipation/Agency/Ownership). 
Further analyses exploring this interaction can be found in the supplementary 
results. 
Anticipation 
The analysis of the mean ratings for Anticipation showed a significant main 
effect of Condition (F (1, 14) = 295.7, p < .001, η2partial = .955). Participants 
reported significantly greater anticipation in the match condition, where the 
gesture corresponded to the voiced instruction, than in the mismatch condition. 
There was no significant interaction (p > .250) and no main effect of Group  
(p > .250), (Figure 5b). This shows that both groups attended equally well to 
the prime-action relationship.  
Sense of Agency 
The analysis of the mean ratings for Agency also showed a main effect of the 
Condition (F (1, 14) = 37.03, p < .001, η2partial = .726). Participants reported 
significantly greater SA in the match condition, than in the mismatch condition. 
A significant main effect of Group (F (1, 14) = 8.09, p = .013, η2partial= .366) was 
found showing that, overall, the SA was stronger in the MTS Group. A 
significant Group by Condition interaction was also found (F (1, 14) = 4.64,  
p = .049, η2partial = .249), indicating that the effect of the manipulation was 
different for the two groups. In order to further explore this interaction, we 
performed planned comparisons on the mean ratings for each group: the 
Agency ratings were significantly different in the match condition (t (14) = 2.60, 
p = .021), (Figure 5c). 
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Sense of Ownership  
The analysis of the mean ratings for Ownership showed a main effect of 
Condition F (1, 14) = 15.37, p < .001, η2partial = .523). Participants reported 
significantly greater SO in the match condition, than in the mismatch condition. 
A significant main effect of Group (F (1, 14) = 12.008, p = .004, η2partial = .462) 
was found: as predicted people with MTS reported an overall greater SO 
during the task (Figure 2a). Interesting, there was no significant interaction 
between Condition and Group (p > .250) suggesting that the differences in the 
SO between mirror-touch synaesthetes and controls were similar across the 
match and mismatch conditions. In line with this, planned comparisons on 
ownership ratings revealed that mirror-touch synaesthetes reported a higher 
SO compared with controls in the match conditions (t (14) = 2.56, p = .046) 
and a higher SO in the mismatch condition (U = 34.00, p = .03). Overall, these 
results suggest a heightened SO on this task in the MTS group (Figure 5d). 
 
 
Figure 5.6 Overall mean ratings of match and mismatch conditions for each of the three questions (a); 
mean ratings plotted as a function of condition (‘Match’, Mismatch’) and group (‘Mirror-touch 
synaesthetes – MTS’, ‘Controls’), for Anticipation (b), Agency (c) and Ownership (d). The error bars show 
Standard Deviation across participants. * = p < .05. The results show that mirror-touch synaesthetes 
reported overall higher ratings in both match and mismatch conditions for Agency and Ownership but not 
for Anticipation (a). Mirror-touch synaesthetes (MTS) reported greater sense of agency compared to 
controls in match conditions (c) and greater sense of ownership in both match and mismatch conditions 
(d). No differences between MTS group and controls were found in the ratings of anticipation. Modified 
from Cioffi et al. (2016) 
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Discussion 
We used a modified version of a well-established paradigm developed by 
Wegner et al (2004) to investigate changes in self-awareness associated with 
mirror-touch synaesthesia. Our results showed that people with MTS 
experienced higher SoA over the movements when in the match condition. 
This shows for the first time that previously reported alterations of self-
awareness in MTS extend to the SoA.  
In the context of the cue integration approach to SoA, the exaggerated SoA 
shown by MT synaesthetes could be due to a stronger weighting placed on 
external cues than on internal signals. That is, external visual stimuli may exert 
a stronger influence on agency-processing in MT synaesthetes compared to 
non synaesthetes. The greater weight attributed to external agency cues is 
compatible with the finding that MTS is characterised by a specific difficulty in 
inhibiting ‘the other’ (Santiesteban et al. 2015). 
With respect to SO, synaesthetes showed a stronger feeling of ownership 
compared to controls, in both the match and mismatch conditions. This is in 
keeping with previous findings, which showed changes in SO in MTS (Aimola 
Davies 2013), and suggests that SO may be the primary aspect of self-
awareness altered in MTS, with changes in SoA being a consequence of this.  
As this is the first investigation of SoA in MTS, further studies looking at both 
SoA and SO are needed in order to gain a better understanding of how these 
aspects interact in MTS. The relationship between SoA and SO in MTS is 
further investigated in Experiment 2. 
Experiment 1 demonstrated that MTS is associated with changes in sense of 
agency. In Experiment 2 we looked at one of the possible consequences of 
these changes, namely whether or not they impact on the stability of sense of 
agency in MTS.  
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Experiment 2: Explicit agency in mirror touch synaesthesia: an 
action recognition task 
The aim of this study is to further investigate SoA and SO in MTS by using an 
action recognition task. This type of task requires participants to make self-
other agency judgments while the authorship of their actions is made 
ambiguous by the experimental setting. This is achieved by creating a 
mismatch between the prediction of the movement and the sensory feedback: 
participants perform a movement and a temporal or spatial distortion is 
inserted into the visual feedback of that movement. When the distortion in the 
feedback goes past a threshold, the participants do not recognise the actions 
as their own, even when they are (Daprati et al., 1997; Farrer et al., 2008). 
These tasks can be used as an indication of agency-processing changes in 
different groups. Here we compare the performance of a group of MT 
synaesthetes and a group of non-synaesthete controls in an action recognition 
task.  
Method 
Participants 
A group of six mirror-touch synaesthetes (age range = 19-48, average age = 
28.6, SD = 11.36, one male) and a group of twelve non-synaesthetes controls 
(age range = 19-43, average age = 25.17, SD = 8.86, one male) were recruited. 
All participants were right-handed. All the mirror-touch synaesthetes were 
confirmed as individuals with MTS using the Visuo-Tactile Stroop task, 
designed to detect the authenticity of the condition (Banissy et al., 2009; 
Banissy & Ward, 2007). All the MTS participants significantly differed on a 
single subject basis (using Crawford’s modified t-test; Crawford & 
Howell,1998) to previous published control data on this task (Banissy et al., 
2009; Banissy & Ward, 2007). All controls were interviewed with a 
synaesthesia questionnaire (including a question on MTS; adapted from 
Banissy et al., 2009) and did not report any synaesthetic experiences. One of 
the mirror-touch synaesthetes self-reported other types of synaesthesia. All 
participants gave consent to participate in the study. The study was approved 
by the Goldsmiths Psychology Department ethical committee.  
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Procedure  
The action recognition task consisted of a modified version of the paradigm 
developed by Farrer et al. (2008). Participants sat in front of a computer display 
(See experimental set-up in Figure 5.7). This display was covered using black 
fabric so that only a small region of the display was visible. Participants were 
told to make simple tapping movements, alternating the index and middle 
fingers. These movements could not be seen directly, as the participants’ hand 
was to be hidden behind the computer monitor. Instead, a camera attached to 
the top of the computer monitor would provide video feedback of their 
movements on the visible region of the display. Tapping speed was kept at a 
constant tempo. The participants were previously trained with a metronome to 
perform the movement at a constant speed throughout the experiment:  
60 Beats Per Minute (BPM). Participants were told that the experimenter would 
be making the same simple tapping movements, and that the video feedback 
on the computer monitor would undetectably switch from their own to the 
experimenter’s actions randomly. In fact, the experimental setting was 
arranged so that the experimenter had a display and a camera recording their 
movements exactly as the participants had. In reality, the footage was always 
of the participant, but a 800ms delay was introduced. According to Farrer et al. 
(2008) this delay produces in the participant a bi-stable impression of agency, 
with participants spontaneously switching between “self” and “other” 
judgements throughout the task.  
Both the participant and the experimenter wore a rubber glove and a black 
cloth was used to cover their arm and part of their hand, with two holes in the 
cloth where the index and middle fingers were passed through. There were no 
distinguishable features the participant could identify to judge whether it was 
the experimenter’s actions or the participant’s actions being displayed on the 
screen.  
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Figure 5.7 Action-recognition set-up. Participant and experimenter sit in front of each other. The 
participant is shown how the setting works with one camera placed such that it records the experimenter’s 
movements and one the participant’s movements (a); Both participant and experimenter put on a pair of 
gloves and a cloth covering everything except their index and middle finger (b); The participant looks at 
the screen where his finger movements are shown while his hand is hidden from view behind the screen 
(c). 
To indicate whether they were viewing their own actions or the experimenter’s 
actions, participants gave a verbal report – either “self” for their own 
movements, or “other” for the experimenter’s. The response was recorded by 
audio recording software. Each trial lasted for a period of exactly 150 seconds. 
There were three 150 seconds trials, with 30 seconds rest between the trails. 
During the rest period participants did not move and the screen did not display 
anything. 
In addition to recording the time spent in self and other judgment, we recorded 
the number of self-other switches as a measure of the stability of SoA 
throughout the experiment. 
Farrer et al. (2008) showed that under conditions of uncertainty created by the 
task, participants tended to attribute agency more to themselves compared to 
others. As uncertainty is an important factor in agency attribution (Desantis, 
Roussel, & Waszak, 2011; Farrer et al., 2008; Moore & Fletcher, 2012), we 
decided to measure the degree of certainty around the experience of agency 
reported by participants to investigate whether this changed across trials.  
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After each trial, participants were asked to rate their certainty regarding the 
agency judgements they made on a Likert scale from 1 being ‘not at all certain 
to 7 being ‘almost certain’.  
At the end of the final trial, participants were asked to give overall ratings of 
their sense of ownership and agency felt during the entire duration of the 
experiment. In particular, they were asked how much they felt that the hand 
“belonged to them” (Q1), how much they felt the hand was “part of their body” 
(Q2), and how much they experienced the hand “in their control” (Q3) or “out 
of their control” (Q4). These questions were answered using a Likert scale from 
1 to 7, with 1 being ‘not at all’ and 7 being ‘very much’. 
Results 
Three 2 x 3 mixed Analyses of Variance (ANOVA) were run with Group 
(MTS/Controls) as a between-subjects factor and Trial (Trial 1/ Trial 2/ Trial 3) 
as a within-subjects factor. The dependent variables considered were: ‘number 
of self-other switches’, ‘time spent in self-judgment’ and ‘certainty’ scores.  
Certainty scores and post session ownership and agency ratings had not been 
collected with two subjects.  
Self-other switches  
The ANOVA investigating the effect of Group (MTS/Controls) and Trial (Trial 1/ 
Trial 2/ Trial 3) on ‘number of self-other switches’ showed no main effect of 
Group (p > .250) and no main effect of Trial (p > .250), as well as no interaction 
between Group and Trial (p > .250). These results suggest that MTS and 
controls did not differ in the stability of their sense of authorship over their own 
actions in this task. This stability also remained the same over the course of 
the experiment (Figure 5.8a).  
Time spent in self-judgement 
The ANOVA investigating the effect of Group (MTS/Controls) and Trial (Trial 1/ 
Trial 2/ Trial 3) on ‘time spent in self-judgement’ showed no main effect of 
Group (p > .250) with MTS and controls showing no significant difference on 
the time spent in self. There was no main effect of Trial (p > .250) showing no 
changes across trials and no interaction between Group and Trial (p > .250). 
These results suggest that MTS and control did not show any differences in 
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the feeling of authorship over their own actions in this task and that this did not 
significantly change across trials (Figure 5.8b). 
While no differences between groups were found, we also performed a one-
sample t-test on the whole data looking at the time spent in self-judgment. 
Results showed that participants perceived the observed movements 
significantly more as their own versus those of the experimenter (t (17) = 2.835,  
p = .011). This result replicates the one reported by Farrer and colleagues 
(2008).  
 
Certainty 
The ANOVA investigating the effect of Group (MTS/Controls) and Trial (Trial 1/ 
Trial 2/ Trial 3) on ‘certainty’ showed no main effect of Group (p > .241) and no 
main effect of Trial (p > .250), as well as no interaction between Group and 
Trial (p > .250). These results suggest that both MTS and Controls felt the 
same degree of certainty over their self-other judgements and this degree did 
not change across trials.  
Post session agency and ownership judgments 
Two independent samples t-test were carried out to examine the effect of 
Group on post-session ownership (Q1+Q2) and agency (Q3+Q4) ratings. 
While no significant difference in the agency ratings between MTS and Control 
was found (MTS: av = 4.75, sd = .65; Controls: av = 3.71, sd = 1.23;  
t (14) = -1.592, p = .134), we found a significant difference in the ownership 
Figure 5.8. Average number of self-other switches in MT synaesthetes and Controls, for each Trial. No 
significant differences between groups were found (a); Average time (in seconds) spent in self-other 
judgment in MT synaesthetes and Controls, for each Trial (b). No significant differences between groups 
were found. Overall, both groups spent more time in ‘self-judgment’ than in ‘other-judgment’ 
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ratings, with MTS reporting higher feeling of ownership towards the moving 
hand compared to controls (MTS: av = 5.87, sd = 1.44; Controls: av = 4.5,  
sd = .95; t (14) = -2.21, p = .044), (Figure 5.9). 
 
Figure 5.9. Post-session average ratings for agency and ownership, for MT synaesthetes and Controls. 
MT synaesthetes reported higher sense of ownership over the hand compared to Controls. 
Discussion  
In this action recognition paradigm, the visual feedback of the participant’s 
tapping movement had been deliberately distorted, making the authorships of 
their movement ambiguous. Under these conditions, a group of mirror-touch 
synaesthetes and a group of non-synaesthetes were asked to make self-other 
agency judgments. We found that both MTS and controls did not differ in their 
stability of agency experience (i.e. number of self-other switches), nor in the 
content of their agency experience (i.e. predominance of self or other 
judgments).  
In Experiment 1 we found augmented agency in participants with MTS and we 
attributed this to an increased reliance on external cues in MTS. We might 
have expected MT synaesthetes to report a more predominant experience of 
self-judgments in this action-recognition paradigm, compared to controls. That 
is, just seeing a movement on the screen automatically triggers authorship of 
that movement in people with MTS, even when the visual feedback is distorted 
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to deliberately induce ambiguity. However, in this action recognition paradigm, 
participants are not just seeing the fingers moving but they themselves are 
performing the same finger movements. This fundamentally changes the 
strength of the internal cues: in this action-recognition paradigm the internal 
sensorimotor signals are stronger compared to the vicarious agency illusion 
paradigm. As internal and external cues interact to form SoA, it may be that 
under those conditions the weight of internal motor cues dampened the 
increased reliance on external cues in MTS, resulting in a SoA that did not 
differ from the ones of controls. This hypothesis could be addressed in the 
future by modifying this paradigm so that the weight of internal cues is reduced, 
such as by passively moving the fingers of the participants. It has been already 
shown that neurotypical individual have reduced SoA over passive movements 
compared to active movements (Engbert, Wohlschläger, & Haggard, 2008; 
Moore, Wegner, & Haggard, 2009), this may not occur in participants with 
MTS.  
Alternatively, the fact that this task did not detect changes in SoA in MTS may 
be also attributed to the task itself not being intrinsically suitable to uncover 
those changes. Perhaps to elicit these changes it is necessary to provide more 
striking external evidence about the origin of the action being in another agent, 
as for the case of the vicarious agency task in Experiment 1.  
Lastly, we also found that MTS reported a higher feeling of ownership towards 
the hand compared to non-synaesthetes. This is in line with previous findings 
on ownership in MTS and with the results of Experiment 1. It suggests that 
ownership, compared to agency, may be the principal component of self-
awareness that is affected by mirror touch synaesthesia. 
General Discussion 
The studies presented in this chapter sought to primarily investigate  
a) possible agency changes in MTS, b) cue integration in agency processing, 
and c) how SO and SoA interact. Experiment 1 investigated sense of agency 
and sense of ownership in MTS with the use of a vicarious agency illusion. It 
was found that both sense of agency and sense of ownership are augmented 
in MTS. However, these aspects of self-awareness were found to be affected 
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differently, with the sense of ownership being more profoundly altered 
compared to SoA. Experiment 2 investigated the sense of agency and 
ownership in MTS further by using an action recognition task. No difference 
was found in the type and stability of self-other agency judgments between 
controls and participants with MTS. When looking at post-session ratings of 
agency and ownership, MT synaesthetes reported a higher sense of 
ownership over the moving hand compared to controls. 
From the results of these studies, the experience of agency in MTs seems to 
be more malleable than in non synaesthetes. Experiment 1 clearly shows how 
MT synaesthetes are likely to experience a higher sense of agency over 
someone else’s movements in an ambiguous situation. It is proposed that this 
may be due to an enhanced saliency of external cues in the creation of the 
SoA, possibly the result of a general deficit in inhibiting ‘the other’ that 
characterises MTS (Santiesteban et al., 2015; Ward & Banissy, 2015).  
In addition to providing insight on self-other processes in MTS and in agency 
processing, these findings may help shed light on the relationship between SA 
and SO. Our results show that SO is more dramatically disrupted than SoA in 
MTS. In Experiment 1, the augmented SO was present not only in the match 
but also in the mismatch conditions. This suggests that for MT Synaesthetes, 
seeing a body part that looks like their own is enough to elicit a sense of 
ownership over the body part, regardless of whether SoA is felt over its 
movements (i.e. like controls, MT synaesthetes did not show high SoA in the 
mismatch conditions). This hypothesis is confirmed by the overall higher SO 
reported by MT synaesthetes in Experiment 2. Based on these findings, it is 
speculated here that SO is the primary aspect of self-awareness to be 
disturbed in MTS. This primary disturbance of SO in turn leads to the 
alterations in the SoA we have observed. This is consistent with the theoretical 
accounts of agency processing, which argue that the experience of agency is 
predicated on the feeling that the body part is one’s own (Gallagher, 2000).   
However, whilst our findings demonstrate a clear change in explicit agency and 
ownership experiences in MTS, nothing is known yet about implicit agency in 
MTS. Future research should address this, by testing whether the changes in 
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explicit agency correspond to similar changes at the implicit level. This would 
allow both the examination of whether self-other control disturbance in MTS 
extend to the implicit aspect of sense of agency and provide an opportunity to 
test the not yet fully understood relationship between explicit and implicit 
agency. 
In this chapter, we have shown how investigating MTS can be particularly 
informative in the study of SoA. Significantly, the gain is reciprocal, knowing 
how SoA works in MTS provides new directions for understanding this 
condition.  
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CHAPTER SIX  
The role of right Temporo Parietal Junction in 
agency attribution 
After testing sense of agency in different groups, we now look at the neural 
mechanisms that might be responsible for the observed SoA changes. 
Specifically, we use transcranial Direct Current Stimulation to test the 
contribution of right Temporo Parietal Junction to agency processing in 
response to the same tasks used in the previous chapters. 
Introduction 
The areas that are involved with sense of agency processing have been 
identified with the help of neuroimaging, non-invasive brain stimulation studies 
and lesion analyses (chapter 1). Consistently, these studies have pointed out 
the fundamental role of the parietal cortex and, in particular, the role of the right 
Temporo Parietal Junction (rTPJ). The rTPJ is a supramodal association area 
located between the right temporal and parietal lobes (Figure 6.1). 
 
Figure 6.1. Schematic representation of right Temporo Parietal Junction’s location. 
It is sometimes referred to as posterior inferior parietal lobule, angular gyrus 
or Brodmann area 39 (Bzdok et al., 2013; Decety & Lamm, 2007). This area 
has been linked with many heterogeneous cognitive functions. These include 
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low-level attentional processes (e.g. Corbetta, Kincade, Ollinger, McAvoy, & 
Shulman, 2000; Downar, Crawley, Mikulis, & Davis, 2000), various aspects of 
social cognition (e.g. Santiesteban, Banissy, Catmur, & Bird, 2012; Uddin, 
Molnar-Szakacs, Zaidel, & Iacoboni, 2006), as well as the integration of 
sensory (bottom up) stimuli and contextual (top down) information in 
sensorimotor control (Bzdok et al., 2013), (Figure 6.2). 
 
Figure 6.2. A seed region combining rTPJ’s functional diversity. Modified from Bzdok et al. (2013) 
As mentioned in chapter 1, a great wealth of work has looked specifically at 
the role that rTPJ plays in sense of agency processing. Early neuroimaging 
studies identified strong activation of the rTPJ in situations in which 
participants were required to distinguish between self-produced actions and 
those generated by others (Farrer and Frith 2002; Ruby and Decety 2001). 
Interestingly, it was then found that this activation increased in proportion to 
the difficulty in distinguishing between self or other’s actions (Farrer, Franck, 
Paillard, & Jeannerod, 2003). In this study, Farrer and her colleagues used a 
device that allowed them to change the degree of control participants had over 
the movements of a virtual hand presented on a screen. They found that the 
activity of the rTPJ was modulated by the degree of discrepancy between the 
movement executed and the movement seen on the screen. That is, the 
mismatch between normally congruent sets of action related cues  
(e.g. external visual cues and internal motor commands) is likely to result in an 
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increased activation of this area. This suggests that rTPJ plays a crucial role 
in integrating different agency cues.  
Studies investigating the role of the rTPJ on susceptibility to body illusions 
have shown that this is the case with the sense of ownership. Pepeo and 
colleagues (Papeo, Longo, Feurra and Haggard, 2010) found that disrupting 
rTPJ with single-pulse Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation (TMS) impaired the 
ability to detect conflict between different cues in the mirror-illusion paradigm 
devised by Ramachandran et al. (1995). In this paradigm, participants place 
their hands on either side of a mirror in such a way as to hide their left hand 
and reflect their right hand, thereby creating the illusion that they are looking 
directly at their left hand. The experimenter simultaneously strokes either the 
same fingers in both hands (congruent condition) or different fingers for each 
hand (incongruent condition). Papeo et al. found that following TMS stimulation 
of rTPJ, participants were less accurate at localising the touch delivered on the 
hidden hand, particularly in the incongruent condition. This suggests that rTPJ 
is responsible for the ability to identify mismatches between external visual 
information and internal proprioceptive feedback. In light of findings like this, it 
might be that the rTPJ plays a fundamental role in maintaining a coherent and 
stable sense of ownership over one’s own body and sense of agency over 
one’s own actions (Farrer et al., 2008; Tsakiris, Costantini, & Haggard, 2008). 
Studies have shown how disruption of the neural processing in rTPJ can lead 
to dramatic disruptions of SO and SoA. Daprati et al. (2000) described the case 
of a patient (PA) with somatoparaphrenia who had right TPJ lesions. 
Somatoparaphrenia is a neuropsychological condition characterised by 
unawareness of ownership of one’s limb associated with delusional 
misidentification and confabulation (Feinberg et al., 2010). Patient PA was 
tested with an action-recognition task where he was required to identify his 
own actions, the same actions produced by the experimenter or different 
actions produced by the experimenter. In all three conditions patient PA denied 
that the actions were his own. Similarly, Bundick and Spinella (2000), reported 
the case of patient with infarct of the rTPJ and low density in part of the right 
frontal white and grey matter. This patient showed involuntary movements and 
would express ‘perplexity and estrangement’ from those movements, clearly 
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manifesting symptoms of alien hand syndrome (Della Sala, Marchetti, & 
Spinnler, 1991). 
Additionally, the rTPJ has also been shown to be involved in non-clinical 
conditions, such as Mirror-Touch Synaesthesia (discussed in chapter 5) 
(Blakemore, Bristow, Bird, Frith, & Ward, 2005; Holle, Banissy, & Ward, 2013). 
Neuroimaging data showed that MT synaesthetes have reduced grey matter 
in the right temporo-parietal junction (rTPJ) compared to non synaesthetes 
(Holle et al., 2013). Recent accounts of MTS propose that rTPJ may be 
responsible of a specific impairment in the ability to control self-other 
representation in MTS (Banissy & Ward, 2013; Ward & Banissy, 2015). In 
support of this hypothesis, Santiesteban and colleagues (2012) used 
transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS) to show that an increase in the 
cortical excitability of rTPJ leads to improved self-other distinction. In the 
context of SoA, these results strongly support the hypothesis that rTPJ may be 
executing the same ‘controller’ role, regulating self-other agency judgments. 
In the studies presented in this chapter we test this hypothesis and investigate 
the causal role of the rTPJ in agency attribution in healthy adults. Specifically, 
while previous research has shown the crucial role played by rTPJ in 
integrating different ownership cues (e.g. Papeo et al., 2010), less in known 
about the role of the rTPJ in integrating different agency cues. Here we use 
anodal tDCS to enhance the activity of the rTPJ and test participants in two 
tasks where external agency cues are deliberately manipulated in order to 
create a situation of agentic uncertainty.  
Transcranial Direct Current Stimulation is a non-invasive brain stimulation 
method that delivers low intensity current (between 1 and 2 mA) over a cortical 
area through the use of electrodes placed on the scalp. By doing so, it 
modulates the excitability of the cortex within its physiologic range (Nitsche et 
al., 2008). The current runs from the anode to the cathode electrode: the anode 
electrode induces facilitation of the neural firing and cathode induces inhibition. 
The tDCS has been used extensively as a safe method to investigate brain – 
behaviour relationship in clinical and healthy populations (Costa, Lapenta, 
Boggio, & Ventura, 2015). 
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In Experiment 1, participants received anodal tDCS on rTPJ (experimental 
condition) or anodal tDCS on the occipital cortex (V1) (control condition) before 
completing the so-called vicarious agency paradigm developed by Wegner et 
al. 2004 and used in previous chapters. The task is designed to blur self-other 
boundaries as the participant is led to feel SO over the experimenter’s arm and 
SoA over the experimenter’s arm movements. In light of the evidence that rTPJ 
plays a role in resolving discrepancies in a situation of agentic ambiguity 
(Farrer, Franck, Georgieff, et al., 2003), and that hyperactivation of rTPJ led to 
enhanced control of self-other representations (Santiesteban et al., 2012), we 
expect that hyperactivation of rTPJ would lead to a reduced susceptibility to 
the illusion of agency. 
Similarly, as rTPJ has been shown to play a role in maintaining a coherent SO 
(e.g. Tsakiris et al., 2008), it is expected that participants who received 
excitatory anodal stimulation on rTPJ would present a reduced illusion of SO 
compared to the control group  
In Experiment 2, participants received anodal tDCS stimulation on rTPJ or 
sham stimulation before completing an action recognition task (based on the 
paradigm developed by Farrer et al., 2008 and used in chapter 5). Here 
participants were asked to judge whether a video that they were watching 
showed their finger movements or those of the experimenter. In reality, the 
video always showed the participants’ movements with a temporal delay. 
Farrer et al., showed that this set up created a bi-stable impression of sense 
of agency, with agency reports flipping spontaneously between “self” and 
“other”. Using this task, Farrer and colleagues found that participants were 
more likely to perceive observed movement as their own rather than those of 
another. Moreover, they found that activation of rTPJ was greater when 
subjects experienced a perturbed SoA. The authors suggested that the rTPJ 
activation may have reflected the process of integration of conflicting signals. 
Here we investigated whether inducing hyperactivation of rTPJ influences 
agency attribution. Crucially, this task not only allows us to test whether 
hyperactivation of rTPJ affects participants’ SoA but whether it has an impact 
on the stability of their agency experience.  
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It is predicted that participants who received anodal stimulation rTPJ would 
show increased tendency to attribute authorship of the movements to 
themselves, as well as a generally more stable experience of agency  
(i.e. fewer alterations between self and other during the task). 
Experiment 1: The role of the right Temporo Parietal Junction 
in the vicarious experience of agency 
The aim of this experiment is to investigate the role of right Temporo Parietal 
Junction in the susceptibility to a vicarious agency illusion. A group of 
participants received anodal transcranial current stimulation on rTPJ, and a 
control group received anodal rTPJ on the primary visual cortex (V1). 
Participants were then tested on a modified version of a vicarious agency 
paradigm (Wegner et al., 2004). In this paradigm, gestures are performed by 
the experimenter hidden behind the participant in such a way that the gestures 
look like they are being performed by the participant’s hands. The gestures 
seen in the mirror can be either congruent with the action instructions heard 
over a pair of headphones (match condition), or incongruent (mismatch 
condition). Participants are asked to report their feeling of agency and 
ownership over the gestures and the hand.  
Method 
Participants 
A group of 30 adults took part in the study (age range 20-49, average  
age = 26.6, SD = 6.9; 12 females). They were randomly assigned to two 
groups: the anodal stimulation on rTPJ (n = 15) or the anodal stimulation on 
the occipital cortex (V1), (n = 15). Two participants were left handed. All 
participants met criteria for participation and read an information sheet 
containing description of non-invasive brain stimulation. The study was 
approved by Goldsmiths Ethical Committee. 
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Procedure 
tDCS Protocol 
Transcranial direct current stimulation was administered through a battery-
driven current stimulator (NeuroConn GmbH, Germany). The stimulation was 
delivered through a two 5x7cm sponge electrodes, that had been previously 
soaked in a saline solution.  
In the experimental condition (rTPJ stimulation), the anodal electrode was 
placed on CP6 according to the international 10-20 EEG system (Herwig, 
Satrapi, & Schönfeldt-Lecuona, 2003). This location has been used in previous 
studies investigating rTPJ (e.g. Hogeveen et al., 2015; Santiesteban et al., 
2012). The reference electrode was placed on the vertex (CZ) (Figure 6.3). 
In the control condition (V1 stimulation), the anodal electrode was placed on 
the primary visual cortex, OZ according to the international 10-20 EEG system. 
This brain region was chosen as control site because it has never been 
identified for its involvement in agency processing. In both groups, the 
stimulation (1mA) was delivered for 20 minutes. The fade in and fade out time 
were both set at 15s each. The stimulation was delivered offline (i.e. before 
performing the task).  
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Vicarious agency task 
The task required participants to look in front of them, towards a mirror. 
Gestures were performed by the experimenter hidden behind the participant 
in such a way that the gestures look like they were being performed by the 
participant’s hand ( 
Figure 6.4). The gestures seen in the mirror were either congruent with the 
action instructions heard over a pair of headphones (match condition) or 
incongruent (mismatch condition). Participants were asked to report their 
experiences by answering three questions on a 7-point scale with 1 being “not 
at all” and 7 being “very much’’. 
Reference elect rode
Anodal st im ulat ion
Reference elect rode
Anodal st imulat ion
Figure 6.3. Depiction of the electrodes set-up. In the experimental condition (above) anodal stimulation 
was placed on rTPJ (CP6) and the reference electrode on the vertex (CZ). In the control condition 
(below) anodal stimulation was placed on the occipital cortex (OZ) and the reference electrode on the 
vertex (CZ). 
 
 
141 
 
The questions were:  
1) Anticipation: ‘’To what degree did you feel you could anticipate the 
movements of the arm?”  
2) Agency: ‘’How much control did you feel you had over the arm’s 
movements?” 
3) Ownership: ‘’To what degree did the arm feel like it belonged to you?’’  
As the procedure of the vicarious agency task was identical to the one 
described in chapter 2, further details can be found there. 
 
 
Figure 6.4 Experimental set-up (based on Wegner et al., 2004). The left picture shows what the 
participant sees in the mirror placed in front of her. The right picture shows the set up from the side, with 
the experimenter sitting behind the participant and putting her hand forward so that it appears where the 
participant’s hand would normally be. 
Results 
Preliminary analyses on left and right hands were carried out for each condition 
using a paired sample test to see if their results could be distinguished. As no 
significant differences emerged, the mean judgements for left and right hands 
were collapsed into a single score (for example: (Anticipation match condition 
Left hand + Anticipation match condition Right hand) / 2). These were entered 
into 2 X 2 mixed design ANOVAs for each Question 
(Anticipation/Agency/Ownership), with ‘Condition’ (Match/Mismatch) as within-
subjects factors and ‘Condition’ (rTPJ stimulation/Control stimulation) as a 
between-subjects factor. 
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Anticipation 
The analysis of the mean ratings for Anticipation showed a significant main 
effect of Condition (F (1, 28) = 232.7, p < .001, η2partial = .892). Participants 
reported significantly greater anticipation in the match condition, where the 
gesture corresponded to the voiced instruction, than in the mismatch condition. 
There was no significant interaction (p > .250) and no main effect of Group  
(p > .250), (Figure 6.5a). This shows that both groups attended equally well to 
the prime-action relationship.  
Sense of Agency 
The analysis of the mean ratings for Agency also showed a main effect of the 
Condition (F (1, 28) = 57.79, p < .001, η2partial = .674). Participants reported 
significantly greater SoA in the match condition, than in the mismatch 
condition. There was no significant interaction (p > .250) and no main effect of 
Group (p > .250), (Figure 6.5b). 
Sense of Ownership  
The analysis of the mean ratings for Ownership showed a main effect of 
Condition (F (1, 28) = 44.35, p < .001, η2partial = .613). Participants reported 
significantly greater SO in the match condition, than in the mismatch condition. 
There was no significant interaction (p = .136) and no main effect of Group  
(p > .250), (Figure 6.5c). 
Figure 6.5. Mean ratings for anticipation (a), agency (b) and ownership (c) in match and mismatch 
conditions. The error bars show standard deviation across participants. No differences between the rTPJ 
stimulation group and the control (occipital stimulation) group were found. 
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Discussion 
We investigated the causal role of the rTPJ in the susceptibility to a vicarious 
agency illusion. Participants received either anodal stimulation on rTPJ or on 
the occipital cortex prior to taking part in the so-called vicarious agency 
paradigm. The results show that participants who received anodal stimulation 
on rTPJ and participants who received anodal stimulation on V1 did not show 
any difference in the illusion of vicarious agency and ownership. Previous 
studies showed the importance of the rTPJ in integrating different bodily cues 
(Leube et al., 2003; Papeo, Longo, Feurra and Haggard, 2010),  and 
maintaining a coherent sense of self (Tsakiris et al., 2008). Furthermore, 
hyperactivation of rTPJ was shown to boost self-other control (Santiesteban et 
al., 2012). In light of this, we would have expected that anodal stimulation of 
the rTPJ reduced the susceptibility to vicarious sense of agency and ownership 
elicited by this paradigm. The reasons why we found that hyperactivation of 
rTPJ did not influence the susceptibility to the vicarious agency illusion may 
reside in the characteristics of the task. 
This task is characterised by strong agency visual cues and very weak 
sensorimotor cues. If rTPJ plays a role in integrating conflicting agency cues 
(Farrer & Frith, 2002; Farrer et al., 2008), it is possible that stimulation of the 
rTPJ was not sufficient to elicit agency changes because the relative strength 
of internal and external cues was polarised. That is, the combination of weak 
sensorimotor cues and strong external visual cues might not have been the 
ideal scenario for testing the role that rTPJ plays in resolving cue discrepancy.  
It is also possible that hyperactivating rTPJ may not directly affect agency 
attribution per se, but may affect the stability of agency experience over time. 
Experiment 2 addresses these points. We combine anodal rTPJ stimulation 
with a task that captures the stability of self/other agency experiences over 
time.  
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Experiment 2: The role of the right Temporo Parietal Junction 
in self-other agency attribution. 
The aim of this experiment is to investigate the causal role of the rTPJ in self-
other agency attribution, as well as in its stability over time. Participants 
received either anodal stimulation on rTPJ or sham stimulation before 
completing an action recognition task. This type of task requires participants 
to make self-other agency judgments while the authorship of their actions is 
made ambiguous by the experimental setting. This is achieved by creating a 
mismatch between the prediction of the movement and the sensory feedback: 
participants perform a movement and a temporal distortion is inserted into the 
visual feedback of that movement. When the distortion in the feedback goes 
past a threshold, the participants do not recognise the actions as their own, 
even when they are (Daprati et al., 1997; Farrer et al., 2008).  
Here we predict that participants who received anodal stimulation on rTPJ 
would show increased tendency to attribute authorship of the movements to 
themselves, as well as a generally more stable experience of agency. 
Method 
Participants 
Twenty-six participants took part in this experiment (age range 19-27, average 
age 21.5, SD = 1.61, 14 females). All participants were right-handed. They 
were randomly assigned to two groups: anodal stimulation of the rTPJ (n = 13) 
or sham stimulation (n = 13). All participants met the criteria for participation 
and read an information sheet containing a description of non-invasive brain 
stimulation. The study was approved by Goldsmiths Ethical Committee.  
tDCS protocol 
Transcranial direct current stimulation was administered through a battery-
driven current stimulator (NeuroConn GmbH, Germany). The stimulation was 
delivered through a two 5x7cm sponge electrodes, that had previously been 
soaked in a saline solution.  
In the experimental condition (rTPJ stimulation), the anodal electrode was 
placed on CP6 according to the international 10-20 EEG system (Herwig et al., 
2003). This location has been used in previous studies investigating rTPJ 
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(Hogeveen et al., 2015; Santiesteban et al., 2012). The reference electrode 
was placed on the vertex (CZ) (Figure 6.6). The stimulation (1mA) was 
delivered for 20 minutes. The fade in and fade out time were both set at 15s 
each.  
In the control condition (sham stimulation), the set up was identical to the 
experimental condition, with participants being led to believe that they were 
receiving stimulation for 20 minutes while it only lasted 15 seconds. In both 
conditions the stimulation was delivered offline (i.e. before performing the 
task). 
 
 
Figure 6.6. Depiction of the electrodes set-up. In the experimental condition anodal stimulation was 
placed on rTPJ (CP6) and the reference electrode on the vertex (CZ). In the control condition, anodal 
stimulation was substituted with sham stimulation.  
Action recognition task 
The action recognition task consisted of a modified version of the paradigm 
developed by Farrer and colleagues in 2008 (Farrer et al., 2008).  
Participants sat in front of a computer display (See experimental set-up in 
Figure 6.7). This display was covered using black fabric so that only a small 
region of the display was visible. Participants were told to make simple tapping 
movements, alternating the index and middle fingers. These movements could 
not be seen directly, as the participants’ hand was hidden behind the computer 
monitor. A camera attached to the top of the computer monitor provided video 
feedback of their movements on the visible region of the display. The 
experimental setting was arranged so that the experimenter had a display and 
Reference elect rode
Anodal st imulat ion 
or sham st imulat ion
(cont rol condit ion)
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a camera recording their movements in exactly the same way. Tapping speed 
was kept at a constant tempo. The participants were previously trained with a 
metronome to perform the movement at a constant speed throughout the 
experiment (60 Beats Per Minute, BPM). Participants were told that the 
experimenter would be making the same simple tapping movements, and that 
the video feedback on the computer monitor would undetectably switch from 
their own to the experimenter’s actions randomly. In reality, the footage was 
always of the participant, but a 800ms delay was introduced. According to 
Farrer et al. (2008) this delay produces in the participant a bi-stable impression 
of agency, with the participant spontaneously switching between “self” and 
“other” judgements throughout the task.  
Both the participant and the experimenter wore a rubber glove and a black 
cloth was used to cover their arm and part of their hand, with two holes in the 
cloth where the index and middle fingers were passed through. There were no 
distinguishable features the participant could identify to judge whether it was 
the experimenter’s actions or the participant’s actions being displayed on the 
screen.  
 
Figure 6.7 Action-recognition set-up. (a) Participant and experimenter sit in front of each other. The 
participant is shown how the setting works with one camera placed such that it records the experimenter’s 
movements and one the participant’s movements; (b) Both the participant and experimenter put on a 
pair of gloves and a cloth covering everything except their index and middle finger; (c) The participant 
looks at the screen where his finger movements are shown while his hand is hidden from view behind 
the screen. 
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To indicate whether they were viewing their own actions or the experimenter’s 
actions, participants gave a verbal report – either “self” for their own 
movements, or “other” for the experimenter’s. The response was recorded by 
audio recording software. Each trial lasted for a period of exactly 150 seconds. 
There were three 150 second long trials, with 30 seconds rest between the 
trials. During the rest period participants did not move and the screen did not 
display anything. 
In addition to recording the time spent in self and other judgment, we recorded 
the number of self-other switches as a measure of the stability of SoA 
throughout the experiment. Farrer et al. (2008) showed that under conditions 
of uncertainty created by the task, participants tended to attribute agency more 
to themselves compared to others. As uncertainty is an important factor in 
agency attribution (Desantis, Roussel, & Waszak, 2011; Farrer et al., 2008; 
Moore & Fletcher, 2012), we decided to measure the degree of certainty 
around the experience of agency reported by participants to investigate 
whether this changed with rTPJ stimulation or across trials. After each trial, 
participants were asked to rate their certainty regarding the agency 
judgements they made on a Likert scale, with 1 being ‘not at all certain to 7 
being ‘almost certain’. At the end of the final trial, participants were asked to 
give overall ratings of their feelings of sense of ownership and agency during 
the entire duration of the experiment.  
In particular, they were asked how much they felt that the hand “belonged to 
them” (Q1), how much they felt the hand was “part of their body” (Q2), and 
how much they experienced the hand “in their control” (Q3) or “out of their 
control” (Q4). These questions were answered using a Likert scale from 1 to 
7, with 1 being ‘not at all’ and 7 being ‘very much’.  
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Results 
Three 2 x 3 mixed Analyses of Variance (ANOVA) were run with Condition 
(rTPJ/sham) as a between-subjects factor and Trial (Trial 1/Trial 2/Trial 3) as a 
within-subjects factor. The dependent variables considered were: ‘number of 
self-other switches’, ‘time spent in self-judgment’ and ‘certainty’ scores.  
Self-other switches  
The ANOVA investigating the effect of Condition (rTPJ/Sham) and Trial  
(Trial 1/ Trial 2/ Trial 3) on ‘number of self-other switches’ showed no main 
effect of Condition (p = .091) and no main effect of Trial (p = .053), as well as 
no interaction between Condition and Trial (p > .250). These results suggest 
that the stimulation did not have an effect on the stability of their sense of 
authorship over their own actions in this task. This stability also remained the 
same over the course of the experiment (Figure 6.8a).  
Time spent in self-judgement 
The ANOVA investigating the effect of Condition (rTPJ /Sham) and Trial  
(Trial 1/ Trial 2/ Trial 3) on ‘time spent in self-judgement’ showed no main effect 
of Condition (p > .250) nor interaction between Condition and Trial (p = .206). 
There was a main effect of Trial (F 1 (24) = 6.982, p = .014, η2partial = .225). 
Pairwise comparisons revealed that Time of Self-judgment in Trial 3 was 
significantly greater (av = 80.24, sd = 41.33) than in Trial 1 (av = 63.33,  
sd = 33.26), (t (25) = -1.649, p = .015), (Figure 6.8b). While no differences in 
Condition (rTPJ vs sham) were found, we performed a one-sample t-test on 
the whole data looking at the time spent in self-judgment. Results showed that 
participants perceived the observed movements significantly more as their 
own versus those of the experimenter (t(25) = 11.62, p = < .001 (Time of Self 
Judgement for one trial: av = 71.95, sd = 31.51; Time of Other judgment:  
av = 63.96, sd = 31.22). This result replicates that reported by Farrer and 
colleagues (2008).  
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Figure 6.8. (a) Average number of self-other switches in the anodal rTPJ stimulation and sham 
stimulation conditions, for each Trial. No significant differences between conditions were found. (b) 
Average time (in seconds) spent in self-other judgment in the anodal rTPJ stimulation and sham 
stimulation conditions, for each Trial. No significant differences between conditions were found. Overall, 
both groups spent more time in ‘self-judgment’ than in ‘other-judgment’ 
Certainty 
Data on certainty ratings was missing for one participant. The ANOVA 
investigating the effect of Condition (rTPJ /Sham) and Trial (Trial 1/ Trial 2/  
Trial 3) on ‘certainty’ showed no main effect of Condition (p = .248) and no 
main effect of Trial (p = .175). There was also no significant interaction between 
Condition and Trial (F (2, 22) = 3.238, p = .059). These results suggest that 
the stimulation did not influence the degree of certainty over participants’ self-
other judgements and this did not change across trials. 
Post session agency and ownership judgments 
Questionnaire data was missing for one participant. Four independent samples 
t-test were carried out to examine the effect of Condition on post-session 
ownership (Q1 and Q2) and agency (Q3 and Q4) ratings. No differences were 
found between conditions in Question 1 (p > .250), Question 3 nor Question 4 
(p > .250). However, there was a significant effect of Condition on Question 2 
(i.e. how much did you feel your hand as part of your body?’). Greater sense 
of ownership towards the hand was shown by participants that received rTPJ 
stimulation (av = 4.24, sd = 1.48) compared to participants in the Sham 
condition (av = 2.92, sd = 1.25), t (23) = 2.41, p = .024), (Figure 6.9). 
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Figure 6.9. Post-session average ratings for agency and ownership, for the rTPJ stimulation and the 
sham stimulation groups. Participants who received anodal rTPJ stimulation showed greater sense of 
ownership towards the hand (Q2: How much did the hand feel like it was part of your body?). 
Discussion 
Participants received anodal rTPJ stimulation or sham stimulation before 
completing an action recognition task. In this action recognition paradigm, the 
visual feedback of the participant’s tapping movement had been deliberately 
distorted, making the authorship of their movement ambiguous. Under these 
conditions, participants were asked to make self-other agency judgments. We 
found that the two groups of participants did not differ in their stability of agency 
experience (i.e. number of self-other switches), nor in the content of their 
agency experience (i.e. predominance of self or other judgments). Results also 
showed that participants spent significantly more time in self-judgment 
compared to other judgment. This result is a replication of the effect found by 
Farrer and colleagues (2008). Interestingly, the time spent in self-judgment 
increased across trials suggesting that the experience of self-agency was 
enhanced as trials went on.  
rTPJ stimulation did not have a significant effect on time spent in self-judgment 
nor in the stability of the agency experience. However, a trend in the number 
of self-other switches suggests that increasing the statistical power of the study 
may unveil an effect of rTPJ on the stability of the agency experience. That is, 
hyperactivation of rTPJ would lead to a more stable experience of agency. 
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While the stimulation did not seem to influence the sense of agency, 
participants who received anodal stimulation on rTPJ, reported an overall 
higher sense of ownership over the hand compared to participants who 
received sham stimulation. This finding is in line with previous work showing 
the crucial role of the rTPJ in embodiment (e.g. Arzy, Thut, Mohr, Michel, & 
Blanke, 2006; Blanke, 2005). In light of findings showing that hyperactivating 
rTPJ leads to improved self-other distinction (Santiesteban et al., 2012), this 
result may be the effect of an enhanced self-representation. That is, 
hyperactivating rTPJ reduced the malleability of the boundaries between self 
and other, leading participants to feel greater SO towards their own hand. 
The fact that rTPJ stimulation did not elicit changes in the SoA could be 
attributed to the nature of the task. Humans show an automatic tendency to 
imitate movements of others (Heyes, 2011), in particular when they are similar 
to those they are executing (Heyes, Bird, Johnson, & Haggard, 2005). It could 
be hypothesised that, under the conditions created by the present task, 
participants were led to synchronise with the movements seen on the video 
and therefore not have kept the rhythm constant as instructed. This could have 
affected the validity of the study and may have covered putative changes in 
the SoA. Future studies may address this aspect by recording participants’ 
finger movements in order to check whether there is a tendency to synchronise 
with the visual feedback. 
General discussion 
The studies presented in this chapter sought to investigate the role of the rTPJ 
in the rise of one’s own SoA under conditions of agentic uncertainty. In 
particular, we used tDCS to look at the effects of anodal rTPJ stimulation on a) 
vicarious experience of agency and b) self-other agency attribution.  
Our results showed that enhancing the activity of the rTPJ did not have any 
effects on the experience of SoA reported by the participants. The absence of 
significant results could be due to the complex nature of SoA. The SoA is a 
multifactorial, multi-layered and dynamic phenomenon (David, 2012; 
Gallagher, 2013; Synofzik, Vosgerau, & Newen, 2008). Consequently, while 
rTPJ has been consistently shown to be involved in the sense of agency, other 
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brain areas have also been shown to be play a role in its creation  
(e.g. Khalighinejad, Di Costa, & Haggard, 2015; Moore, Ruge, Wenke, 
Rothwell, & Haggard, 2010).  
Similarly, we hypothesised that rTPJ could be the area where different cues 
integrate to give rise to the SoA. By enhancing its activity during tasks where 
external cues were manipulated, we sought to uncover its role. One possible 
explanation for our lack of significant effects may be that integrating different 
cues does not resides in a single brain structure, but in the connectivity 
between the various areas that contribute to SoA (Haggard, 2017).  
Alternatively, the absence of changes in SoA following stimulation may be 
attributed the inefficacy of tDCS stimulation. A recent quantitative review on 
cognitive effects of single session tDCS have shown that one tDCS session 
does not have a reliable effect on cognition in healthy adults (Horvath, Forte, 
& Carter, 2015). Future studies could address this point by enhancing the 
activity of the rTPJ with a different type of brain stimulation, for example the 
relatively novel transcranial Alternating Current Stimulation (tACS) (Antal & 
Paulus, 2013). 
In this chapter, we have tested the contribution of the rTPJ to agency 
attribution. We did so by enhancing its activity through anodal transcranial 
Direct Current Stimulation. Although our results failed to find significant effects 
of rTPJ stimulation on sense of agency we do feel that this approach is worth 
persevering with. However, such research should perhaps consider alternative 
stimulation modes and agency paradigms, and be mindful of power issues 
associated with this approach.  
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CHAPTER SEVEN  
Agency and Ownership: Rubber Hand and Vicarious 
Agency illusions combined. 
Throughout the studies presented there has been an underlying discussion 
about the relationship between SoA and SO. Here we aim to test this directly, 
by combining the rubber hand illusion with the vicarious agency task. 
Introduction 
As discussed in chapter 1, the relationship between the sense of agency (SoA) 
and the sense of ownership (SO) has long been investigated. However, it still 
remains unclear (Ma & Hommel, 2015; Tsakiris, Longo, & Haggard, 2010; 
Tsakiris, Prabhu, & Haggard, 2006).  
Some studies have argued that SoA and SO are two separate components of 
self-awareness (e.g. Tsakiris, Schütz-Bosbach, & Gallagher, 2007), while 
others have shown that these two components interact (e.g. Caspar, 
Cleeremans, & Haggard, 2015; Dummer, Picot-Annand, Neal, & Moore, 2009). 
This interplay between SoA and SO has often been investigated using 
ownership illusions and, in particular, with paradigms inspired by the traditional 
Rubber Hand Illusion (Botvinick & Cohen, 1998) with the addition of a 
movement component. In the traditional RHI illusion, an artificial hand is placed 
in a body congruent position in front of the participant whose hand is hidden 
from view. By synchronously stroking the artificial and the real hand, visual and 
tactile information are combined and the perceived location of the real hand is 
shifted towards the artificial hand. This is known as proprioceptive drift. Explicit 
measures (i.e. questionnaires) also reveal that participants report experiencing 
sense of ownership towards the artificial hand.  
With the aim of investigating the interplay between SoA and SO, recent studies 
have created paradigms that would allow the implementation of voluntary or 
involuntary motor control over the artificial hand. This has been achieved with 
different technologies, such as with the use of robotic hands or Virtual Reality 
(VR) (e.g. Caspar et al., 2015; Kokkinara & Slater, 2014; Ma & Hommel, 2015).  
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Findings from these studies are not consistent. For exemple, Caspar et al. 
(2015) investigated both SoA and SO with the use of a robotic hand  
(Figure 7.1). They reported a significant positive correlation between SoA and 
SO ratings, that is, an increase in illusionary SO would correspond to an 
increase in illusionary SoA ( 
Figure 7.2). Along these lines, a VR study by Kokkinara et al.  (2014) (Figure 
7.3), showed that SO towards a virtual leg would increase with active 
movement compared to visuotactile stimulation only. On the other hand, 
Dummer et al. (2009) found the opposite pattern: the SO illusion towards a 
prosthetic rubber hand was stronger in the visuotactile condition, compared 
to conditions where SoA was induced with active or passive movements.  
 
Figure 7.1.Pictures of the robotic hand and experimental set-up used by Caspar et al. (2015). Participants 
put their hand under the table while the robotic hand was placed above the table. The robotic hand was 
programmed to execute exactly the same movements performed by the participant. From Caspar et al. 
(2015). 
 
Figure 7.2. Correlation between agency and ownership scores reported by Caspar et al. 
(2015). From Caspar et al. (2015) 
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Figure 7.3. Virtual reality set up used by Kokkinara et al. (2014). Real movement made by the participant 
(left) and virtual movement (right). From Kokkinara et al. (2014) 
Ma and Hommel (2015) suggest that one reason behind these contradictory 
findings may be the confusion between objective and subjective sense of 
agency, where ‘objective’ refers to the question of whether the subject was 
actually performing a movement and ‘subjective’ refers to whether this subject 
was perceiving to have control over the movement. While the two aspects are 
undoubtedly linked, the authors suggest it is crucial to distinguish them, as 
they rely on different sources of information.   
The majority of the studies that looked at the interplay between SO and SoA, 
have used objective agency (i.e. the participants actually moving the artificial 
limb) to investigate the nature of the relationship between subjective ownership 
(i.e. feeling of belonging towards the limb) and subjective agency (i.e. feeling 
of control towards the limb). The conflicting findings may be an effect of this 
confusion, which is exacerbated by the types of methods used to investigate 
both SoA and SO. For example, in studies with virtual reality, the induction of 
objective agency (i.e. actually moving the hand) can be much stronger than 
when the hand is completely static (such as in the traditional rubber hand) or 
when its movements are very limited (e.g. Dummer et al. 2009). The different 
degree of sensorimotor cues available may have a different impact on the 
subjective agency and ownership experienced by the participant.  
In the work presented in this chapter, we try to overcome this confusion by 
testing participants with a standard RHI (Botvinick & Cohen, 1998), followed 
by the vicarious agency task (originally developed by Wegner, Sparrow, & 
Winerman, 2004). In this task, participants are not actually moving but they are 
induced to feel agency towards the moving hand. Therefore, we will induce 
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subjective agency to investigate the relationship between subjective sense of 
ownership and subjective sense of agency. Sensorimotor signals are kept 
constant throughout the experiment allowing us to test the influence of 
subjective ownership on subjective agency, while keeping at the minimum the 
influence of objective agency. 
Participants were tested on two separate occasions with the RHI paradigm, 
followed by the vicarious agency illusion. In one testing session, they received 
synchronous RH stimulation followed by the vicarious agency task and, in 
another testing session, they received asynchronous RH stimulation followed 
by the same vicarious agency task. Importantly, the experimental setting was 
designed to establish a connection between the hands used in the RHI and 
the moving hands in the vicarious agency task. If the SO exerts an influence 
over the SoA, we would expect participants to experience higher vicarious 
agency after the synchronous RH stimulation, compared to asynchronous 
stimulation.  
Method 
Participants 
Thirty participants (18 males) took part in the study. Their average age was 
22.1 years (age range = 19-26). All participants signed a consent form prior 
taking part to the experiment. The study was approved by Goldsmiths Ethical 
Committee. 
Procedure 
All participants took part in two testing sessions which were scheduled a week 
apart from each other. One testing session consisted of the rubber hand 
illusion synchronous condition, followed by the vicarious agency illusion. The 
other testing session consisted of the rubber hand illusion asynchronous 
condition, followed by the vicarious agency illusion. The order of 
synchronous\asynchronous conditions was counterbalanced across 
participants.  
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Rubber Hand Illusion 
Participants were seated at a table facing the experimenter. A box with open 
sides was placed on the table. Participants were asked to place their hand 
inside the box, where it was hidden from view. The participant’s hand was 
placed 40 cm away from their midline and the rubber hand, located inside the 
box, was half way between the participant’s hand and their midline. This spatial 
arrangement is known to elicit a reliable illusion (Holle, Mclatchie, Maurer, & 
Ward, 2011). The participant could see the rubber hand from a hole the top of 
the box, while their real hand was always kept hidden from view. Before each 
trial began, the hole was covered in order to keep the rubber hand concealed 
and a tape measure was placed on top of the box.  
At the start of each trial the participant was asked to indicate where they 
thought their index finger was located, by reporting a number on the tape 
measure. For each judgement, the tape measure was placed with a different 
offset in order to prevent memory effects. The tape measure was then removed 
along with the covering cloth to make the rubber hand visible. The 
experimenter stroked both the real and the rubber hand with identical 
paintbrushes. Each stroke went from the major knuckle to the fingertip and 
lasted between half a second and one second. In the synchronous condition, 
both real and rubber hands were stroked simultaneously. In the asynchronous 
condition, the rubber hand was stroked before the real hand with the 
asynchrony randomly varied between half a second and one second. 
Participants were asked to look at the rubber hand throughout the stimulation 
period, which lasted 120 seconds. After the stimulation had finished, the 
covering cloth and the ruler were placed back on top of the box. The participant 
was once again asked to indicate the position of their index finger. The 
proprioceptive drift elicited by the stimulation was calculated by subtracting the 
pre-stimulation position from the post-stimulation position. 
The same procedure was repeated for both the right and the left hand. The 
order of the stimulation of the hand was counterbalanced across participants. 
After both hands had been stimulated, participants were asked to verbally 
answer a questionnaire. Eight questions from the short rubber hand 
questionnaire from Longo et al (2008) were used. Four items investigated the 
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SO felt by the participant and four items acted as check questions to control 
for task compliance or any response bias. 
In order to create a stronger association between the participant’s hands, the 
rubber hands and the experimenter’s hands used in the vicarious agency task 
(see below), both the participant and the experimenter wore a pair of red 
gloves. The rubber hand was also covered with red gloves.  
Vicarious agency task 
The task required participants to look in front of them, towards a mirror. 
Gestures were performed by the experimenter hidden behind the participant 
in such a way that the gestures look like they were being performed by the 
participant’s hand. The gestures seen in the mirror were either congruent with 
the action instructions heard over a pair of headphones (match condition) or 
incongruent (mismatch condition). Participants were asked to report their 
experiences by answering three questions on a 7-point scale with 1 being “not 
at all” and 7 being “very much’’. 
The questions were:  
1) Anticipation: ‘’To what degree did you feel you could anticipate the 
movements of the arms?”  
2) Agency: ‘’How much control did you feel you had over the arms’ 
movements?” 
3) Ownership: ‘’To what degree did the arms feel like they belonged to 
you?’’  
The procedure of the vicarious agency task was identical to the one described 
in chapter 2, except for the two arms being tested simultaneously instead of 
separately. 
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Results 
Non-parametric tests were used as variables did not meet normality criteria 
(Shapiro-Wilk test, p > .05). 
We first analysed the RHI and the vicarious agency task separately, to 
establish whether they elicited the classical illusory effects. We then 
investigated the effects that the RHI had on the vicarious agency illusion.  
Rubber hand illusion 
The effect of Stimulation (Synchronous vs Asynchronous) on Ownership 
questionnaire ratings was examined by conducting Wilcoxon signed ranks 
tests on the mean ratings for ownership in synchronous compared to 
asynchronous trials. Participants reported significantly higher ownership  
(z = -4.79, p < .001) in the synchronous condition (av = 4.95 sd = .79) 
compared to the asynchronous condition (av = 1.29, sd = .29) (Figure 7.4).  
A Wilcoxon signed rank test on the mean proprioceptive drift revealed that 
participants showed significantly greater proprioceptive drift after the 
synchronous (av = 2, sd = 1.07) compared to the asynchronous condition  
(av = .62, sd = .79), (z = -4.16, p < .001), (Figure 7.5). These results show that 
participants displayed the classical RHI effects for both ownership 
questionnaire and proprioceptive drift. 
We used a Wilcoxon signed rank test to compare the Ownership ratings to the 
Check question ratings. As expected, participants reported higher ratings in 
the Ownership questions compared to the Check questions in both the 
Synchronous (z = -4.79, p < .001) and in the Asynchronous condition  
(z = -2.06, p = .039). 
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Figure 7.4. Mean Ownership ratings reported by the participants following synchronous and 
asynchronous stimulations. Participants reported significantly higher ownership after synchronous 
stimulation. Error bars represent standard deviation. 
 
Figure 7.5. Mean proprioceptive drift shown by participants following synchronous and asynchronous 
stimulations. Participants showed significantly greater drift towards the artificial hand after synchronous 
stimulation. Error bars represent standard deviation. 
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Vicarious agency task 
The effect of Condition (Match vs Mismatch) on ‘Anticipation’ ratings was 
examined using a Wilcoxon signed ranks test. Participants reported 
significantly higher anticipation in the match conditions compared to the 
mismatch conditions in both the vicarious agency task following synchronous 
RH stimulation (z = -4.73, p < .001) and asynchronous RH stimulation  
(z = -4.84, p < .001) (Figure 4.7a). This shows that differences in attention to 
the actions or instructions, or any response bias, are unlikely to explain agency 
or ownership effects.  
The effect Condition (Match vs Mismatch) on ‘Agency’ ratings was examined 
using a Wilcoxon signed ranks test. Participants reported significantly higher 
sense of agency in the match compared to the mismatch conditions in the 
vicarious agency task following synchronous RH stimulation (z = -4.78,  
p < .001) and asynchronous RH stimulation (z = -4.76, p < .001) (Figure 7.6b).  
The overall effect Condition (Match vs Mismatch) on ‘Ownership’ ratings was 
examined using a Wilcoxon signed ranks. Participants reported significantly 
higher sense of ownership in the match compared to the mismatch conditions 
in both the vicarious agency task following synchronous RH stimulation  
(z = -4.63, p < .001) and asynchronous RH stimulation (z = -4.46, p < .001) 
(Figure 7.6c). These results show the established effects induced by the 
vicarious agency task. 
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Rubber Hand Illusion + Vicarious Agency Task 
To examine the effect of the RHI stimulation (Synchronous vs Asynchronous) 
on the magnitude of vicarious agency illusion, we calculated the difference 
between match and mismatch trials for the agency question (Agency effect) 
and the difference between match and mismatch trials for the ownership 
question (Ownership effect). The difference between match and mismatch 
trials for the anticipation question (Anticipation effect) was also calculated. The 
Agency, Ownership and Anticipation effects were calculated separately for 
ratings that followed the synchronous and the asynchronous conditions. 
These were entered into a Friedman’s ANOVA, which revealed that the 
magnitude of the Agency and Ownership effects in the synchronous and 
asynchronous conditions was significantly different (2 (5) = 59.76, p < .001). 
Subsequent pairwise comparisons (using Wilcoxon signed rank tests) showed 
that synchronous stimulation induced a significantly greater illusion of 
ownership compared to asynchronous stimulation (z = -2.71, p = .007)  
(SO Synch: av = 2.23, sd = 1.22; SO Asynch: av = 1.43, sd = 1.04). Although 
a trend can be observed, there was no significantly greater illusion of agency 
following the synchronous stimulation compared to the asynchronous 
stimulation (z = -1.66, p = .089) (SoA Synch: av = 2.63, sd = 1.01; SoA Asynch: 
av = 2.4, sd = 1.2), (Figure 7.7). This suggests that the rubber hand 
Figure 7.6. Mean ratings for Anticipation (a), Agency (b) and Ownership (c) at the vicarious agency task, 
following both synchronous and asynchronous stimulations. Error bars represent standard deviation. 
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manipulation selectively modulated the sense of ownership on vicarious 
agency task.  
As predicted, the type of stimulation did not influence the ratings for the check 
question (i.e. Anticipation), as shown by a Wilcoxon signed rank test between 
anticipation effect in synchronous vs asynchronous stimulation (z = -1.07,  
p > .250) (Anticipation Synch: av = 3.53, sd = 1.57; Anticipation Asynch:  
av = 3.77, sd = 1.19), (Figure 7.7). 
To further investigate whether SO influenced SoA, we ran separate linear 
regressions between the SO mean ratings obtained immediately following the 
RHI and differences in the Agency effect shown during the vicarious agency 
illusion, after both synchronous and asynchronous stimulations. The results 
showed that SO ratings did not predict the Agency effect in neither the 
synchronous nor the asynchronous conditions (p > .250). Similarly, mean 
proprioceptive drift measures did not predict the Agency effect in neither the 
synchronous nor the asynchronous conditions (p > .250) 
 
Figure 7.7. Mean difference ratings (match-mismatch) reported in the vicarious agency task for 
Anticipation, Agency and Ownership following RHI synchronous and RHI asynchronous stimulation. 
Participants reported greater SO over the hands in the vicarious agency task following synchronous 
compared to asynchronous stimulations. No difference was found in Anticipation and Agency ratings. 
Error bars represent standard deviation. 
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Discussion 
This work sought to shed light on the relationship between sense of ownership 
and sense of agency. While this relationship has been extensively 
investigated, it remains unclear (Ma & Hommel, 2015; Tsakiris et al., 2010, 
2006). 
Here we investigated whether the subjective experience of ownership towards 
a hand can influence the subsequent illusory experience of agency towards 
the ‘same’ hand on a separate task. We did so by combining two well-
established paradigms: the Rubber Hand Illusion (Botvinick & Cohen, 1998) 
and the Vicarious Agency illusion (Wegner, Sparrow, & Winerman, 2004). 
Participants were tested on two occasions: they underwent the RHI 
synchronous condition followed by the vicarious agency task in one occasion 
and, on a separate occasion, they underwent the RHI asynchronous condition 
followed by the same vicarious agency task.  
Our study was able to replicate the well-established effects of both paradigms. 
Participants felt higher SO towards the rubber hand after synchronous, 
compared to asynchronous stimulations. Equally, the proprioceptive drift 
towards the rubber hand was greater following synchronous compared to 
asynchronous stimulations. With regards to the vicarious agency task, 
participants reported higher Anticipation (check question), Sense of Agency 
and Sense of Ownership in the match conditions, compared to the mismatch 
conditions. These effects were shown in the vicarious agency task sessions 
following both the RHI synchronous and asynchronous stimulation sessions. 
By looking at the differences in the vicarious agency experience following 
synchronous or asynchronous stimulation, we found that illusory SO elicited 
by the RHI did not influence the illusory experience of control in the vicarious 
agency task. Interestingly, the illusory SO elicited by the RHI did influence SO 
towards the moving hands of the vicarious agency task. That is, participants 
felt greater SO in the vicarious agency task after synchronous RHI stimulation, 
compared to asynchronous RHI stimulation.  
At first glance, our results seem to support idea the ‘independent model’ of SoA 
and SO, which suggests that SoA and SO are two separate experiences. This 
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model is supported by behavioural studies showing modulating SoA does not 
affect the SO (e.g. Dummer et al., 2009; Sato & Yasuda, 2005) and that SoA 
and SO play different roles in structuring body awareness (Tsakiris et al., 
2006). Neuroimaging evidence also shows different neural activation for the 
SoA compared to SO (Tsakiris et al., 2010). In line with this view, our results 
seem to suggest that SO and SoA are, at least partially, independent 
experiences. Were SO to exert an influence on the SoA, we would expect that 
synchronous stimulation in the RHI would influence the vicarious SoA. Instead, 
we did not find such modulation.  
However, there are a few aspects that should be considered. Firstly, our 
investigation was limited to explicit judgments of agency: in the RHI we 
collected a measure of implicit SO (i.e. proprioceptive drift), but we did not 
collect a measure of implicit SO and SoA in the vicarious agency task. In light 
of previous results showing a dissociation between implicit and explicit agency 
(e.g. Dewey & Knoblich, 2014), it is possible that illusory SO would exert a 
different influence on explicit compared to implicit agency. However, recent 
findings suggest that dissociation between SoA and SO is also valid at an 
implicit level (Braun, Thorne, Hildebrandt, & Debener, 2014; Kalckert & 
Ehrsson, 2014). For example, Braun and colleagues (2014) incorporated the 
intentional binding paradigm into the traditional RHI in order to measure the 
interplay between SO and SoA also at an implicit level. Their results showed 
that an absence of SO towards the hand did not lead to an absence of SoA 
towards its movements, and vice versa, supporting the idea of a dissociation 
between SoA and SO also at an implicit level.  
Secondly, our aim was to investigate whether illusory SO would influence 
illusory SoA. It is possible that the relationship between SoA and SO goes in 
the opposite direction, with illusory SoA having an influence on SO. While we 
hypothesised that SO would be a cue for SoA it might be the case that SoA is 
a cue for the SO, reflecting the role that agency plays in the construction of SO 
(Ma & Hommel, 2015; Tsakiris et al., 2006) or in the self-recognition of one 
own’s body (e.g. Van Den Bos & Jeannerod, 2002). Future studies should 
investigate this, perhaps by swapping the order of the tasks: vicarious agency 
task followed by the RHI. 
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In conclusion, our results show that subjective ownership does not seem to 
have an influence on subjective agency. However, further behavioural and 
anatomo-physiological evidence is needed in order to understand this complex 
relationship.  
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CHAPTER EIGHT  
General discussion 
In this thesis, I have presented a set of novel findings on explicit sense of 
agency (SoA) in different groups. This work was conducted with two principal 
aims. Firstly, to gain a better understanding of SoA and how it is created in light 
of the cue integration approach to SoA. Secondly, to improve our 
understanding of agency changes in groups where there has been little, or no, 
agency research. 
These two objectives bring mutual gains to each other: by investigating agency 
in groups that deviate from those normally studied (i.e. young neurotypical 
adults) we gain unique insight into the mechanisms of agency processing. At 
the same time, improving our understanding of the basic mechanisms involved 
in sense of agency will help us better understand, and remedy, agency 
processing problems.  
In chapter 2, we built on the extensive literature of agency in schizophrenia to 
look at the relationship between the schizotypy personality trait and 
susceptibility to the vicarious experience of agency. We found that a greater 
susceptibility to external agency cues predicted higher schizotypy scores.  
In chapter 3, we showed that SoA in patients with anosognosia for hemiplegia 
(AHP) is largely dominated by their intention to move, while external agency 
cues are discounted. Importantly, we showed that this disturbance of SoA 
extends to the healthy limb. 
In chapter 4, we focused on healthy older adults. Our results suggested that 
older adults tend to rely more on internal agency cues and discount external 
cues. Moreover, we showed that older adults may discount external cues 
because of increased reliance on internal agency cues. 
In chapter 5, for the first time, we investigated changes in SoA in people with 
Mirror-touch synaesthesia (MTS). Our results showed that the experience of 
agency in MT synaesthetes is more malleable than in non synaesthetes and 
that this may be due to an enhanced saliency of external cues in the creation 
of the SoA. 
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Chapter 6 sought to investigate the role of the right temporo-parietal junction 
(rTPJ) in agency attribution in healthy adults; specifically looking at its 
contribution in integrating different agency cues. Our results failed to speak 
more on this but are useful in directing future research on this topic. 
Lastly, chapter 7 investigated the relationship between sense of agency and 
sense of ownership (SO), which was indirectly explored throughout the 
experiments presented in the other chapters. Our results showed that illusory 
SO did not have an influence on the illusory SoA, suggesting that SO and SoA 
are, at least partially, independent. 
Here I will discuss what are the implications of these findings, when taken 
together, as well as future directions.  
Cue integration approach as a common basis to understand 
the sense of agency 
The cue integration approach to SoA proposes that SoA is created by optimally 
integrating a large variety of internal and external cues. Importantly, these cues 
are interactive and their relative influence depends on their reliability (Moore & 
Obhi, 2012; Synofzik, Vosgerau, & Lindner, 2009). This approach has a strong 
explanatory power and sets itself as a conceptual basis for understanding SoA 
in healthy subjects, as demonstrated by Moore et al. (2009), and in groups 
where the experience of agency may be disrupted, as suggested by Moore & 
Fletcher (2012). Throughout this work we have tested specific predictions 
developed on the basis of this approach and demonstrated its validity across 
a variety of cases.  
We showed that, according to our predictions, patients with anosognosia over-
rely on cues associated with their intention to move and under-rely on visual 
feedback (chapter 3). These results are significant in that they provide the first 
evidence that certain neuropsychological disorders can be characterised by 
changes in the way the various agency cues are integrated. We have shown 
that SoA can be a key factor in neuropsychological syndromes and that taking 
this approach can advance our understanding of these conditions. Future 
studies can build on our work using this approach to investigate other 
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neuropsychological conditions, such as alien hand or anarchic hand 
syndromes (Bundick & Spinella, 2000; Della Sala, Marchetti, & Spinnler, 1991). 
While this work on AHP has shown the validity of this approach with a clinical 
group that presented a well-demarcated disruption of SoA, we have also 
shown that the approach can predict and explain changes in SoA that are much 
subtler (chapters 2, 4 and 5).  
We demonstrated that the weighting given to external visual cues predicted 
schizotypy scores (chapter 2). This offers a new research direction: it shows 
not only that SoA changes can relate to individual differences, but also that this 
framework is a useful tool to detect them and understand them. For example, 
studies have shown that disruptions of SoA play an important role for patients 
with obsessive compulsive disorder (Gentsch, Schtz-Bosbach, Endrass, & 
Kathmann, 2012) as well as agoraphobia (Gallagher & Trigg, 2016). Here I 
suggest that future research should work towards identifying links between 
SoA changes and individual differences that predispose to the development of 
those pathologies (Mrazek & Haggerty, 1994).  
We have shown that changes in the weighting of different agency cues occur 
with older adulthood. This raises new questions about the changes in SoA 
during the lifespan. Our findings in older adulthood have demonstrated that 
experimentally manipulating different agency cues is a viable route to detect 
age-related changes in the SoA. To date, only two studies have looked at SoA 
in childhood (Cavazzana, Begliomini, & Bisiacchi, 2014; Metcalfe, Eich, & 
Castel, 2010) and very little is known about agency processing in children and 
adolescents. Examining cue integration in children and adolescents is likely to 
provide us with insights into their agency processing and, in turn, inform us on 
the development of this fundamental aspect of cognition. 
In chapter 5, we have found that mirror-touch synaesthetes (MTS) present 
exaggerated SoA. Based on the evidence that MTS is characterised by a 
difficulty in inhibiting the others (Santiesteban, Bird, Tew, Cioffi, & Banissy, 
2015), we suggested this could be linked to stronger weighting placed on 
external cues than on internal signals. Our work on MTS helps narrow the gap 
between social and individual aspects of cognition. Previous studies 
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investigating SoA using social scenarios suggest that not only do we have SoA 
for our own actions but our SoA may extend to other agents’ actions in social 
contexts (e.g. Obhi & Hall, 2011; Pfister, Obhi, Rieger, & Wenke, 2014). 
Although speculative, this ‘extended agency’ may be the result of the 
integration of various cues. Recent research on SoA and autism seems to 
support this suggestion. Lafleur and colleagues (2016) suggested that a lack 
of reliability in sensorimotor agency cues may explain alternations in SoA 
found in people with autism. They also went on to suggest that part of the 
changes in social and interpersonal abilities that characterise autism may 
ensue from altered SoA. Future work should consider using the cue integration 
approach as a framework to understand agency also in social contexts. 
The cue integration theory was initially supported by results obtained by 
manipulating the implicit experience of agency in healthy adults (Moore et al., 
2009). Very few studies have looked at the role of external and internal agency 
cues on explicit SoA (e.g. Sato, 2009; Synofzik, Thier, Leube, Schlotterbeck, 
& Lindner, 2010; Wegner, Sparrow, & Winerman, 2004). Crucially, our set of 
findings speaks about the explicit SoA. We have expanded previous work and 
shown that the cue integration approach is a valid framework to explain not 
only implicit but also explicit aspects of SoA (chapters 2-5). This has significant 
conceptual implications. While implicit and explicit aspects of agency are 
dissociable (e.g. Dewey & Knoblich, 2014), it was also proposed that they are 
not fully independent (Moore, Middleton, Haggard, & Fletcher, 2012; Synofzik, 
Vosgerau, & Newen, 2008). Although speculative, the findings presented in 
this thesis support this view and, moreover, suggest that implicit and explicit 
aspects of agency may be the result of a similar process, namely the 
integration of different agency cues. Importantly, future work should look at 
whether our findings on explicit SoA in the populations examined are confirmed 
with regards to the implicit SoA. 
Taken together, these findings prove that the cue integration approach to SoA 
is a valid and testable approach to understand SoA in many contexts. This 
work lays the groundwork for detailing studies aimed at systematically 
investigating SoA within a unifying framework. In particular, the mechanisms 
that are responsible for differences in cue weighting discussed in this work 
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(chapters 2-5) should be more closely examined. That is, future work should 
test whether these changes in agency cue weighting are a direct consequence 
of differences in their reliability. We have partially addressed this in chapter 4, 
where we investigated the relationship between the susceptibility to the 
manipulation of external cues in older adults and the ability to interpret internal 
cues (i.e. interoception and proprioception) in both younger and older adults. 
Our findings suggested that the decreased reliance on external cues shown 
by older adults is linked to an increased reliability on internal agency cues. 
Future work should build on this and continue exploring the mechanisms 
behind the difference in agency cues weighting. This will allow us to achieve a 
deeper understanding of SoA processing.  
Self-agency and self-other distinction 
A difficulty within SoA research consists of defining what it is meant by SoA, 
and what the measures used are actually measuring. As proposed in the 
introductory chapter, explicit and implicit measures of agency are likely to be 
both valid but measuring different aspects of sense of agency. How much the 
explicit SoA is representative of the overall SoA is an unanswered question, 
and it is likely to depend on the nature of the action being performed (Synofzik 
et al., 2008). Even within the categories of implicit and explicit measures of 
agency, what aspects of SoA are actually measured can be different. 
In this thesis, I have investigated the explicit aspects of SoA. The tasks that 
have been used created ambiguous situations in which participants had to 
report the amount of vicarious control exerted over movements (vicarious 
agency task) or identify whether movements belonged to them or someone 
else (action recognition). Crucially, both tasks are characterised by the 
presence of another agent. These paradigms differ from those where an 
agency judgment is asked but there is no alternative agent involved in the 
action (e.g. Sato & Yasuda, 2005). The presence of another agent adds an 
important component to the agentic situation. That is, judging agency in these 
contexts involves to some extent recognising oneself (Haggard & Tsakiris, 
2009). The paradigms used in this work have emphasized the fundamental 
role that agency plays in distinguishing oneself from another. Differentiating 
actions that are self-generated from those that are performed by others gives 
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rise to a self-other distinction in the domain of action and contribute to the 
experience of a distinct self (David, Newen, & Vogeley, 2008; Georgieff & 
Jeannerod, 1998). 
Strikingly, we have shown the tight relationship between self-other distinction 
and SoA in chapter 5. We found that the blurring in self-other distinction 
processes that characterises mirror touch synaesthetes (Banissy & Ward, 
2013; Ward & Banissy, 2015) is significant for their SoA. While we have not 
focused on the role that agency plays in self-other distinction, our studies have 
measured the SoA in contexts where the agents were required to make self-
other distinctions. Future work could directly investigate the role that SoA plays 
in the construction self-awareness. 
Sense of agency and Sense of ownership 
As discussed in the introductory chapter and in chapter 7, the relationship 
between SO and SoA has been extensively investigated but still remains 
unclear (Ma & Hommel, 2015; Tsakiris, Prabhu, & Haggard, 2006). Throughout 
this thesis, the relationship between SoA and SO has been an underlying 
theme (chapter 2-6). This was then explored directly in the experiment 
presented in chapter 7. Here I summarise what our data tell us about the 
interplay between SoA and SO and discuss future directions for research on 
this topic. 
In chapter 2, we found that changes in the vicarious experience of agency, and 
not of ownership, were uniquely predictive of schizotypy scores. In chapter 3, 
patients with anosognosia for hemiplegia showed an altered SoA, while their 
SO did not differ from those of controls. These results suggest that SoA and 
SO are, at least partially, independent. In particular, they show that alterations 
of SoA are not necessarily linked with a significant disturbance of SO. In 
chapter 6, we found that hyperactivating the right temporo parietal junction did 
not have any effect on self-other agency attribution, but seemed to have led to 
a more robust sense of ownership (experiment 2). Although this result should 
be further investigated, it suggests that SoA and SO are underpinned by 
different neural mechanisms. Lastly, we have investigated whether illusory SO 
induced by the synchronous stimulation, in the RHI paradigm, influenced 
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illusory SoA over the same hand in the vicarious agency task. We found that 
SO did not influence SoA in the vicarious agency task, but boosted the illusory 
SO towards the hand in the same task. This finding supports the view that SO 
and SoA are independent. 
All the findings mentioned so far are compatible with each other, in that they 
support the view that SoA and SO are two separate aspects of self-awareness 
and may even stem from different processes (Sato & Yasuda, 2005; Tsakiris, 
Longo, & Haggard, 2010; Tsakiris et al., 2006). However, some of our other 
findings point towards a much closer relationship between SO and SoA. For 
example, when we looked at changes in SoA in older adults (chapter 4), we 
found that older adults were less susceptible to vicarious experience of control 
compared to younger adults. Their SO was also reduced. We then found that 
a greater susceptibility to vicarious experience of both agency and ownership 
was correlated with reduced interoceptive and proprioceptive awareness. 
These results suggest that SoA and SO may be somewhat related. In Chapter 
4 we also suggested SO seems to be the primary aspect of self-awareness to 
be disturbed in MTS but that this primary disturbance of SO may lead to the 
alterations of SoA that we observed. These results support the accounts of 
agency processing that argue that the experience of agency is predicated on 
the sense of ownership (Gallagher, 2000). 
To summarise, our results on the one hand (chapters 2-3-6 and 7) seem to 
support the independence model, but on the other hand (chapter 4) seem to 
be in line with an additive view of SO and SoA, for which SO and SoA are more 
closely linked. While these results add to the understanding of SoA and SO, 
especially within the single populations studied, the relationship between these 
two components of self-awareness remains elusive. There may be a few 
reasons behind the contradictory results presented in the literature and in this 
thesis. 
Firstly, different studies may define SoA and SO in different ways. For example, 
often studies investigating SO do not distinguish between the feeling of 
recognising the body as one’s own, and the feeling that the body is one’s own. 
While these two aspects are undoubtedly linked, they may rely on different 
181 
 
processes. A second source of confusion may lie in the distinction between 
explicit and implicit aspects of both SoA and SO. Many studies have 
investigated implicit and explicit aspects of SO and only explicit aspect of SoA 
(e.g. Kalckert & Ehrsson, 2012, 2014) and only a few studies have looked at 
both implicit and explicit aspects of SoA and SO (e.g. Braun, Thorne, 
Hildebrandt, & Debener, 2014; Burin, Pyasik, Salatino, & Pia, 2017). As a 
consequence of these issues, the measures used to capture SO and SoA may 
also be responsible for the heterogenous results. Equally, the equipment used 
to induce SO or SoA varies incredibly, going from traditional rubber hands  
(e.g. Dummer, Picot-Annand, Neal, & Moore, 2009), to robotic hands  
(e.g. Caspar et al., 2015), to Virtual Reality (e.g. (Kokkinara & Slater, 2014; Ma 
& Hommel, 2015). It is plausible that all these methods give rise to very 
different experiences. 
Lastly, the conflicting findings of the literature may reflect the complexity of the 
interplay between SO and SoA. So far, there has been a generalised effort to 
categorise these two aspects of awareness as independent or entirely linked 
(Tsakiris et al., 2010). However, it is possible that this relationship is much more 
nuanced. While SO and SoA could be completely independent or completely 
related, these are just the two extremes of a continuum. Where on the 
continuum and how the SO-SoA interplay develops may depend on different 
factors such as the context of the investigations or the populations 
investigated, as we have seen throughout this thesis. 
To conclude, future work is needed to disentangle the relationship between 
SoA and SO and taking into account these points may provide fruitful 
directions. 
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Concluding remarks 
In every chapter of this thesis, I have listed and discussed the different 
implications that our studies have for each of the groups investigated. Here, I 
aim to reflect on the overall impact of this work.  
As highlighted by Moore (2016), the majority of the applied work around SoA 
is still in its infancy and it is at times difficult to articulate the relevance of SoA 
research. This thesis provides examples of the potential applications for 
agency research. 
In this work, I have presented studies that range from clinical, to atypical and 
typical populations. Our findings have shown how SoA research can have a 
substantial impact on the health and well-being of the groups investigated. As 
SoA is such a fundamental feature of our daily lives, research aimed at 
understanding it and uncovering its changes across different groups or 
contexts, has the potential to bring great benefits, not only to those groups but 
to all of us. 
In this thesis, I have investigated sense of agency in clinical, atypical and 
typical populations. Our results have brought a new understanding of sense of 
agency processing and of each of the groups investigated. While we have 
answered many questions, many others have arisen. This work represents one 
more piece of the puzzle.  
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